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Abstract 
This thesis explores how everyday makers construct creative identities. The literature 
review charts creativity research from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. 
Transdisciplinary theories of creativity and identity are discussed, and the emerging 
theory of circuits of creative affordance is found to be a useful means for considering 
creative identities. Three research questions are developed: How do the internal and 
external affordances to creativity influence an individual maker’s evolution toward 
seeing him or herself as a creative actor? How do people identify and perceive these 
affordances? How does assuming a creative identity change a person’s life? 
Participants in the purposive sample (n = 42) were recruited from adult everyday 
makers in the UK and US who answered yes when asked if they felt creative working 
in their media. The quantitative segment of the parallel sequential mixed-methods 
research design consisted of an online creative identity questionnaire. The qualitative 
segment was comprised of one-on-one ethnographic interviews. The project also 
introduced craft elicitation, a method in which participants prepare for interviews by 
making something in the medium that they felt creative in, and thinking about when 
they first felt that way. Study findings indicate that participants are creative people 
who recognize affordances in their everyday making. A new Affordances-in-Action 
model proposes they burnish their identities in psychological, social, and cultural 
contexts by confronting affordances when they make things, which affects their sense 
of creative identity and produces the agency that drives further experiences in action. It 
is concluded that, when considered alongside agency and action, creative affordance 
theory offers a way to understand how everyday makers create identities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE FACETS OF CREATIVE IDENTITY 
 
 The man scooped the sweet raised dough from its warm glass bowl and coaxed 
it onto a sheet of baking parchment spread along his kitchen counter. After cutting the 
dough in half with a bench knife, he sprinkled a portion with flour and began to pass 
over it with an old wooden rolling pin. Yes, he said, he did feel creative whenever he 
made these cinnamon rolls. “But it didn’t happen overnight.”  
His first attempts at replicating his mother’s recipe “looked pretty, but you’d 
break a tooth in a heartbeat,” he remembered. But he was undeterred. Subsequent 
experiments with every variable—ingredients, pans, ovens, times—were painstakingly 
recorded, along with tasting notes from his family and friends. After weeks of trips to 
the grocery store to buy supplies and 28 separate revisions, he had what he was after: 
the most delectable rolls anyone, including his mother, had ever tasted. He became the 
acknowledged master baker among his circle. Along the way, he said, “it just became a 
part of who I am.” 
 
Context: An Expansive View of Creating and Identity 
This man’s account of everyday creativity illustrates how the sense that one is 
creative is built. That construction—indeed, the construction of individual identity 
itself—is understood as a continual, reflexive process (Giddens, 1991). Yet, what is 
the foundation of the building? Is it, as in the baker’s case, an ambition that merges 
with a facet of identity? Or is it an internal conviction that one’s actions are novel and 
meaningful, as befits someone who is, by extension, novel and meaningful? More to 
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the point, how do people come to think of themselves as creative, and how do they 
keep thinking that?  
 This thesis, which incorporates four dozen interviews with amateur makers in 
the UK and US, attempts to resolve these seemingly simple questions. Yet, as the 
following chapters illustrate, arriving at answers was hardly a straightforward effort.  
Historically, most of the research into creativity has been aimed at 
demystifying individual processes and qualities. Consequently, the preponderance of 
the existing research into creativity—and creative identity—is rooted in psychology. 
Moreover, much of it has examined the work of eminent creators in the hopes of 
arriving at a grand theory of creativity, still an elusive destination. After the 
introduction by social psychologists in the 1980s of the first systems theories of 
creativity, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, the field had generally 
acknowledged that research should have psychological, sociological, and 
anthropological bases. After all, people like the baker make the things they do in 
specific personal, social, and cultural contexts.  
Yet, while the interim has seen significant works focused on creativity in 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology, they frequently used language specific to 
their fields and were published in journals and books aimed at those who already 
understood what they might be saying. The silos of these fields in effect reinforced 
their differences and sustained their divisions, setting a challenge to those who would 
seek a broader vista. It follows that, as Glăveanu (2017) and Hennessey and Amabile 
(2010) continue to demand, concerted research efforts into creativity should 
interrogate them all.   
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A Case for the Quotidian  
Moreover, those efforts could focus on everyday creators. As Amibile (2017) 
explains, little is known about how ordinary people go about their creative pursuits. 
The predilection in the field for studying well-known creators to illustrate by extension 
how all people could create has resulted in a shortfall in the field, she argues. 
Researching the way amateurs make things offers a complete picture of creativity, one 
that is central to the present research.  
While the everyday makers who took part in this project think of themselves as 
creative knitters, painters, musicians, woodworkers, among other things, they are often 
creative in more than one medium. One of the participants described it this way: “It’s 
not that I’m creative in a thing. I’m creative, and it comes out in all sorts of different 
ways.”  
Therein lies a significant reason why this work, and, indeed this field, matters. 
People like that participant are, Amabile (2017) proposes, the same ones whose 
creative identity and habits of thinking could power incremental positive change:  
Evidence is mounting that such individuals can be responsible for important 
instances of creativity and innovation in the world: Open innovation, user 
innovation, and citizen innovation. Research into this phenomenon could do 
much to advance the study and practice of creativity (p. 1).  
Indeed, as Gauntlett (2011) explains, ordinary people who make things not 
only hold the potential for innovation but also perform as change agents in their 
contexts. By transforming their materials, their identities, and their social worlds, 
everyday makers can accumulate the capabilities to solve problems both big and small. 
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Theoretical Framework 
To that end, this thesis surveys the personal, social, and cultural literature on 
creativity for ways to understand the stories of everyday makers who feel creative 
making things they love. Doing so allows for a full range of theories that reveal 
transdisciplinary insights about how these makers developed their creative identities.  
For example, the aforementioned social psychology-based systems theories of 
creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmilhalyi, 1988; Glăveanu, 2017; Glăveanu & 
Tangaard, 2014; Hennessey, 2015) provide models of the interrelationships between 
people and their environments required for creativity to flourish. Likewise, 
sociological theories (e.g., Bourdieu, 1969, 1984; Dalton, 2004; Joas, 1996) attempt to 
clarify how creative practice interacts with society’s rules and resources. Further, the 
anthropological aspects of phenomenology (e.g., Csordas, 1990; Douny, 2014; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Warnier, 2001) clarify why material culture—the actual making 
of things—can help explain the epiphanies that occur to everyday creators.  
Similarly, this project relies on theories of identity that are also cross-
disciplinary. Social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997) was initially developed as 
a social-psychological means to explain how people learn. It has since been adopted to 
explain identity, including creative identity (e.g., Jaussi, Randel, & Dionne, 2007; 
Karwowski, Lebuda, & Wiśniewska, 2012, in press; Tierney & Farmer, 2012). 
Sociological theories of identity construction (Giddens, 1984, 1991) describe identity 
as an ongoing project within a sociocultural milieu that requires people to build their 
creative identities reflexively. Furthermore, the narratives that people construct about 
themselves (e.g., Gauntlett, 2007; Pachuki, Lena, & Tepper, 2010) necessarily mix 
personal, social, and cultural perspectives. 
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The Significance of Affordances 
Importantly, affordance theory (Gibson, 1977, 1979), an evolving construct 
whose genesis lies in ecological psychology, provides a crucial plank in the theoretical 
platform of the current research. At its essence, affordance theory is concerned with 
aspects of the environment that exist in potentiality until they are encountered by an 
organism. Then they function as a support or barrier to that organism. Almost anything 
can be considered as an affordance, which may account for the theory’s use in such 
diffuse disciplines as artificial intelligence and economics. Its recent recruitment as a 
means of visualizing the supports and barriers people face in pursuing creative 
identities (Glăveanu, 2013; Moeran, 2014) offers a fresh and relevant way to consider 
the negotiations with tools, materials, and other affordances all makers encounter.  
Moeran’s (2014) circuit of creative affordances—which incorporates 
economic, representational, spatial, temporal, techno-material, and social aspects 
sparking off each other in much the same way neural networks fire—is particularly 
useful for looking at how everyday creators fuel their identities. Like the other theories 
that the present research draws upon, its transdisciplinarity can be seen as an 
advantage in examining how creativity’s cultural, social, and personal permutations 
play out in the lives of people who make things. 
 
An Opening in the Knowledge 
 Obviously, effort is required to stitch together the patchwork of disciplines and 
theories this project uses. Yet, as noted earlier, the time seems right for work that 
explores how regular people craft creative identities, perhaps in part because 
concerted, multi-disciplinary forays in research have been thin on the ground. 
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 Those who advocate for the more expansive approach have just begun to 
scratch the surface. Consider Glăveanu’s research into Romanian Easter egg 
decorators (2012). He used a variety of innovative methods, including narrative 
analysis, sketching, and videography, to capture their thoughts and actions. While 
operating in varied locales, the rural and urban egg decorators he surveyed were all 
working in the same medium and the same country.   
Moeran’s (2014) account tells how affordances showed themselves in the 
output and operations of Japanese magazine editors, photographers, curators, and 
ceramists—professionals involved in cultural production. Moeran, an amateur potter, 
participated in his qualitative research by staging a curated show of his work and 
including a chapter about the episode in his book based on the project. Much Western 
research frames creativity as an individual endeavor, while more collaborative Eastern 
approaches are less well studied, particularly by Western scholars (Radclyffe-Thomas, 
2014; Sawyer, 2006). Therefore, Moeran’s work is instrumental because he shares 
insights about the affordances faced by the Japanese professionals in his study. 
These two projects are unquestionably revealing about affordance theory and 
creativity. Moreover, any project, including the present research, cannot investigate 
every aspect of creativity. Therefore, the opening exists for a study that looks at how 
everyday makers who work in a variety of media approach the affordances they 
encounter on the way to honing their creative identities.  
 
Method and Inquiry 
The present research aims to address how people move through the affordances 
they encounter in making and how they, in turn, effect creative identity. Its purposive 
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sample of six adult men and women in the UK and US in a pilot project, along with 42 
in the main research project, included participants from a range of backgrounds and 
ages who pursued a variety of media. They each answered yes to the qualifying 
question, which asked if prospective participants felt creative when they worked in 
their medium of choice. Instead of using an arbitrary definition of creativity and seeing 
if participants aligned with it, the present research allowed them to define creativity for 
themselves. That self-definition was necessary for this project because of the vast 
number of personal, social, and cultural definitions people assign to creativity. 
Consequently, it was deemed more important for individuals to feel creative on their 
own terms than to fall into a too-narrowly conscripted line.   
To get the fullest picture of the creative identities of these people, I selected a 
convergent parallel mixed-methods strategy (Creswell, 2014). This research plan calls 
for both quantitative and qualitative data to be collected simultaneously, with data 
related and interpreted during analysis.  
The quantitative segment featured an optional online self-report scale that 
measures creative personal identity; it was adapted for the present research from 
Karwowski et al. (2012; in press). Use of this adaptation, the Creative Identity 
Questionnaire, was deemed a guard against the possibility of confirmation bias, the 
tendency to construe information in a way that confirms one’s beliefs.  
The qualitative segment featured craft elicitation, my term for a method that 
asks participants to make something in their chosen media and think about when they 
first felt creative doing so. Craft elicitation builds on the construct of making as a form 
of identity construction (Holroyd, 2017) as well as on previous research (Gauntlett, 
2007; Schön, 1992) that proposes makers reflexively think while they create. This 
direction is also favored by Amabile (2017) in her call for a more thorough inquiry 
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into everyday creators. “[W]e must undertake studies of creative behavior—and the 
accompanying psychological states and environmental contexts—in situ” (p. 5). By 
asking participants to make things, and then interviewing them if possible in the space 
where they create, this research hews closely to that directive. 
Interviews with participants took place as often as possible in the studios, 
garages, spare rooms, and kitchens where they worked. The resulting transcripts were 
systematically reviewed using the precepts of thematic qualitative text analysis 
(Kuckartz, 2014) in which successive waves of dissection build on each other, always 
relating back to the research questions. 
 
Questions and Foundations 
The key to selecting and implementing the elements of any research design is 
arriving at methodological fit (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Accordingly, this 
project sought congruence between the research question, constructs and methods, the 
type of data collected, and the methods used to collect and analyze them.  
Looking at interdisciplinary constructs such as creativity, identity, and 
affordances dictated the use of a mixed-methods research design. It also followed that 
an online quantitative assessment to measure creative identity, as well as craft 
elicitation and in-depth interviews, would yield layers of data that could be analyzed 
both statistically and qualitatively.   
Ultimately, though, the success of methodological fit depends on the research 
questions. They emerged from the review of the literature:  
• How do the internal and external affordances to creativity influence an individual 
maker’s evolution toward seeing him or herself as a creative actor?  
• How do people identify and perceive these affordances?  
18 
 
• How does assuming a creative identity change a person’s life?  
To address the questions, the present research expands upon two empirical 
foundations. First, it is an independent examination of Morean’s (2014) theory of 
creative affordances. Second, it aspires to deepen work on creative personal identity by 
Karwowski et al. (2012; in press) by combining its quantitative thrust with qualitative 
evidence. It also seeks to gauge the appropriateness of craft elicitation as a research 
method. 
 
Clarifying Aims and Intent 
 Such a broad research agenda necessarily calls for a delineation of the scope of 
this thesis, a declaration of its scale and intent. By elucidating what this project 
covers—as well as what is beyond its scope—I present its intentions and goals as a 
way of situating its position in the field of creativity research.   
One choice made in the process of conducting research influences those that 
follow. Of all the parameters of this project, perhaps the most important is the decision 
to focus on everyday creators. The field of creativity research calls these people little-c 
creators (Richards, 2007), as opposed to world-class, or Big-C, creators 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). While these distinctions are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2, it is crucial here to understand the implications of this choice. The most 
significant of these is that the participants in the present research are amateurs.  
While they may—like the baker at the beginning of this chapter—be 
recognized in their social networks for what they do, they clearly are not eminent 
creators. This differentiation matters because some researchers maintain that only 
those Big-C creators who solve long-elusive problems or produce acclaimed works can 
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be recognized as creative (Sawyer, 2006). Studying Big-C creators undoubtedly can 
bring insight into how the rest of us create. Studying these amateurs who follow the 
creative pursuits they do simply because they want to seems more likely to lead to 
findings that are directly relevant to a larger number of people, particularly in how 
they might cultivate creative identity. 
 Focusing on everyday makers has a related consequence: The field often 
measures eminence based on product. I reasoned that because the present research 
focuses on a range of everyday makers, it should be more concerned with creative 
process than creative product. My focus is on the path to creative identity, not the 
objects produced along that journey. So the decision to valorize the process over the 
product was not simply a matter of expediency borne of the difficulty in finding expert 
reviewers for activities such as creating spreadsheets or putting together outfits. 
Rather, the processes of everyday makers could reasonably be considered more 
relevant to the development of creative identity. This point of view also surfaces in the 
work of Glăveanu (2017), Gauntlett (2011), and Moeran (2014), which figures 
prominently in this thesis. 
 That the current research follows the lead of those scholars—whose 
backgrounds are, respectively, in psychology, sociology, and anthropology—signals 
another feature of this project. It canvasses research from each of those fields to arrive 
at a more global perspective into how creative identity is maintained and developed.  
 As noted earlier, the preponderance of research in the field of creativity is 
based on psychology. The literature review for this project, therefore, begins there to 
examine the inner states of creators. While there is currently no firm sociology of 
creativity, sociological theory focusing on how institutions and networks affect the 
processes of making does provide a useful background for understanding their effects 
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on a person’s creative identity. Similarly, as material culture is a primary concern of 
anthropology, that field’s theoretical foundations afford a basis for appreciating the 
motivations people have for making things.  
 The discipline of social psychology subsumes a variety of precepts from 
anthropology and sociology in the many configurations of systems theory, whose 
intricacies are well suited to a subject as complex as creativity. Social psychology, too, 
forms the core of much theory about creative identity, along with social and cultural 
aspects that also lend depth to consideration of the topic.  
 From those antecedents, the present research incorporates affordance theory 
(Gibson, 1977, 1979). While the theory arose from the field of ecological psychology, 
it has become appropriated by a host of other disciplines, including, fairly recently, 
creativity. Some of the most intriguing research in the field (Glăveanu, 2012; Moeran, 
2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Withagen, de Poel, Araújo, & Pepping, 2012) 
relies mainly on the sociocultural turn in psychology yet is also undeniably 
transdisciplinary.  
This thesis situates itself in that niche. By doing so, it contributes to the field 
by exploring the relationship between affordances, individual agency, and creative 
identity in the lives of everyday makers.  Indeed, it finds that creative identity is 
shaped by the interaction of affordances, agency, and action as these everyday creators 
engage in their chosen activities. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
Accordingly, this thesis first sets out the background necessary to understand 
the questions. Chapter 2 reviews relevant psychological, sociological, and 
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anthropological theories that could explain the birth of the creative actor. It also 
discusses germane systems theories of creativity that attempt to synthesize relevant 
principles from these disciplines.    
With that grounding in place, Chapter 3 considers multidisciplinary approaches 
to creative identity, looking to social psychology as well as sociology to ascertain the 
importance of self-narrative. Chapter 4 assesses approaches to affordance theory and 
makes a case for Moeran’s circuit-based schema (2014) as a fitting theoretical linchpin 
for this project. An overview of the convergent parallel mixed-methods strategy 
(Creswell, 2014) used in this project as well as the sampling and data collection 
procedures are highlighted in Chapter 5. Conveying the presentation and analysis of 
quantitative data, Chapter 6 details the questionnaire results and summarizes the 
comparative interlude. With the presentation and analysis of the qualitative data, 
Chapter 7 describes how craft elicitation and interviews together helped uncover more 
about the participants’ creative identities. The chapter also spotlights themes that 
emerged from the repeated analyses of qualitative interviews. I discuss and interpret 
the results in Chapter 8, revealing a new theoretical model of creative identity that 
situates affordances in the action of making within cultural, psychological, and social 
spheres. In that chapter, I also identify the implications of the research and future 
directions additional research could take.  
After sharing my reflections on the project, I offer a conclusion to the work. I 
argue that knowledge of how affordances temper action—and how agency and action, 
in turn, imbue creative identity—could point the way for people who say they cannot 
make anything to begin thinking of themselves as creative actors. This would allow 
them to not only experience the joy inherent in making but position them as people 
whose shifted worldview imbues them with creative identity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE, PART 1: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL  
PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY 
 
 Creativity is sometimes described as one of the qualities that makes us human 
(Puccio, 2013; Sawyer, 2008), and as a critical factor in moving society forward 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Gauntlett, 2011). Yet for a trait so important, widely 
distributed, and valued, creativity only became a subject of sustained academic 
research after Guilford’s (1950) presidential address to the American Psychological 
Association galvanized study in the field (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). 
Subsequently, creativity has grown into an abiding interest for psychologists as well as 
anthropologists and sociologists—and their counterparts in subfields from innovation 
management to cognitive neuroscience. 
In the ensuing decades, creativity research has endeavored to answer many of 
the big questions in the field. It is now widely acknowledged, for example, that 
creativity involves ordinary cognitive processes (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992); is 
developed cumulatively, rather than in a single inspired moment (Tardif & Sternberg, 
1988); and is the province of groups as well as individuals (Amabile, 1996; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Sawyer, 2006). Yet the matter at the center of this 
investigation—how someone starts thinking of him or herself as creative—has yet to 
be directly addressed. 
This chapter endeavors to bring context to that question by surveying and 
analyzing the pertinent literature surrounding creativity. It aims to underscore why the 
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present research constitutes a new and original contribution to the field by critically 
appraising what is known about how everyday creators build a creative identity.   
 While multiple perspectives from psychology, anthropology, and sociology 
provide necessary depth to the present discussion, these disciplines paradoxically point 
to one of the shortcomings in creativity study: While these fields share many of the 
same concerns and constraints, investigators in one arena may often appear oblivious 
to developments in another (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Montouori & Purser, 1995). 
The resulting fragmentation has meant that research occasionally duplicates or 
occludes, rather than illuminates, the existing body of knowledge.  
Due in part to the momentum afforded by Guilford’s (1950) exhortation, 
psychologists have considered creativity as a subject worthy of study in its own right 
for more than 60 years, and the majority of empirical research on the matter comes 
from that field. Social psychology now frames much discussion of creativity theory, 
while relevant sociological and anthropological theories often approach the subject 
obliquely through art practice or other sorts of cultural production (Burns, 2012).  
Yet Sawyer (2006) describes creativity as necessarily requiring an 
interdisciplinary approach: “For a complex phenomenon like creativity, a complete 
understanding requires us to develop explanations at individual, social and cultural 
levels” (p. 316). His position is amplified by the abstract analysis performed by Kahl, 
da Fonseca, and Witte (2009) who found few published studies in any discipline which 
examined creativity from individual, group, organizational, and cultural spectrums. For 
the required panoramic consideration, then, this review will describe, analyze, and 
perhaps most importantly, synthesize significant psychological, anthropological, and 
sociological currents in creativity research.  
 
24 
 
The ‘Who’ of Interest 
Before any in-depth theoretical analysis can take place, the nomenclature of the 
term “creativity” must be understood. Over time, it has been characterized as 
belonging to select groups, such as artists or intellectuals (Sternberg & Lubart, 1999), 
and these people were the first to be empirically studied as creators. It is widely agreed 
now, though, that creativity—be it world-changing or workaday—is an essential 
human trait (Petrie, 1991; Weisberg, 1993), an understanding that has given rise to the 
study of everyday creativity (Richards, 2007). In the investigation of the genesis of 
creative identity, everyday creativity is of primary interest.  
Further, creativity requires some evidence of both novelty and appropriateness 
(Amabile 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 2006; Kaufman, 2009; Sawyer, 2006). It is also 
construed as being relevant to degrees of significance (Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 
2010). Torrance (1988) relates theories about levels that progress from expressive to 
productive, inventive, innovative, and ultimately emergent and generative. In a simpler 
delineation, Boden (1994) suggests a typology with H-creativity—that which is 
historically significant—and P-creativity, which is the creativity most people engage in 
daily.  
Today, social psychologists most commonly classify creativity theories as 
applying to three levels of significance: Big-C creators (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) are 
eminent; pro-c creators (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) evince professional-level 
creativity that stops short of eminence; and little-c creators (Richards, 2007) exhibit 
the kind of creativity that most people express every day—drawing a sketch, for 
example, or making a video holiday greeting. In a proposed fourth level, mini-c 
creativity (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007), people construct knowledge, a necessary step 
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in developing any sort of sustained pursuit and integral to building the frames of 
reference necessary for all the other levels within a domain.  
Indeed, Beghetto and Kaufman (2007) contend that the four levels are 
interrelated; big-C creators are likely to have been considered professionals before 
their rise to eminence, and everyday creativity can sometimes kindle a career. The 
permeability of the line between little- and mini-c creativity is relevant to the present 
research as both permit the consideration of real-life endeavor and learning.   
In addition, creativity theories also are understood to apply to people, 
processes, products, and environments (Rhodes, 1962). Glăveanu (2013) suggests a 
similar framework drawn from social and ecological psychology: actors, action, 
artifacts, and—splitting Rhodes’ environments into two segments—audiences and 
affordances. These transdisciplinary delineations are appropriate to the scope of the 
present research and will reappear later in this thesis. Regardless of the language used 
to address them, creativity theories consider the construct from a variety of vantage 
points. 
 
Arriving at a Definition 
In order to investigate what happens when someone begins viewing him or 
herself as creative, alighting on a definition that considers mini- and little-c creativity 
is essential. A selection of definitions over time and from a variety of vantage points 
illustrates how the concept of everyday creativity has evolved from an individualist 
point of view to a wider societal one. It also highlights the necessity of reading 
theorists in anthropology and sociology, as well as psychology. 
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Runco and Jaeger (2012) relate that the mid-1950s versions of what they call 
the “standard definitions of creativity” (p. 92) maintain a product or idea that is novel 
and unusual, a construct still standard in creativity research. Stein (1953) was among 
the first to explicitly describe creativity in this way:   
The creative work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or 
satisfying by a group at some point in time . . . By “novel” I mean that the 
creative product did not exist previously in precisely the same form . . . In 
speaking of creativity, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between internal 
and external frames of reference (pp. 311-312).  
Stein’s (1953) characterization addresses the social implications of creativity, 
and also refers to the maker’s existing knowledge as a starting point for novelty. Yet 
while its simplicity may be the reason for its longevity as a working definition, Stein’s 
version does not go far enough in the direction of mapping everyday creativity. 
Other mid-20th-century theorists constructed more complex definitions. 
Reviewing his life as a psychologist, Torrance (2001) recalled online his 1958 
observation of creative thinking: 
[It] . . .  is the process of sensing difficulties, problems, gaps in information, 
missing elements, something askew; making guesses and hypotheses about the 
solution of these deficiencies; evaluating and testing these hypotheses; possibly 
revising and restating them; and finally communicating the result (para. 4).  
This became his working definition throughout his long career as a creativity 
researcher. While Torrance’s (2001) description illuminates process and could apply to 
mini- and little-c creativity, it neglects to directly address the person doing the work of 
sensing, making, testing, and communicating.  
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One of the first specific mentions of everyday creativity in the academic 
literature comes from Richards, Kinney, Benet, and Merzel (1988). Explaining their 
Lifetime Creativity Scales, the authors identify everyday creativity by a pair of 
markers: “(a) originality—new or unusual elements must be involved and (b) 
adaptation to reality—outcomes must be meaningful to others rather than random or 
idiosyncratic” (p. 476). Interestingly, their definition was among the first to explicitly 
allow that a wide range of activities, recognized by a wide range of audiences, could 
be considered creative. Even as these researchers were attempting to measure the 
extent of everyday creativity among their study participants, though, they omitted the 
person in their definition of creativity. 
An actor-centric direction emerged a few years later in anthropology. Taylor 
(1991) claims that “. . . creation becomes the paradigm mode in which people can 
come to self-definition” (p. 62). Pickering and Negus (2004) pick up on this 
characterization, considering creativity “a form of imaginative engagement” that 
matters to people because “it answers a need that is not otherwise satisfied” (p. viii). 
They also contend that creativity communicates the creator’s experience via the 
product to others. Their interpretation clearly could apply to mini- and little-c 
creativity—and it addresses the person at the core of creativity—but it privileges the 
product above the process.  
Glăveanu (2017) takes a longer, transdisciplinary view:  
Creativity is fundamentally considered a sociocultural-psychological 
phenomenon embedded with (material and symbolic) action that, exploiting 
existing affordances, engages the relation between actors and audiences and 
leads to the generation of artifacts with properties evaluated as creative by the 
creator and/or other people (pp. 276-277; emphasis in original). 
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Inclusive as it is, this definition does not consider the feeling of being creative. As 
such, it comes within striking distance of defining creativity for this project but stops 
short on this point, which is essential for querying creative identity.   
Fortunately, a definition by Gauntlett (2011) strikes a balance between all 
concerns:  
Everyday creativity refers to a process which brings together at least one active 
human mind, and the material or digital world, in the activity of making 
something which is novel in that context, and is a process which evokes a 
feeling of joy (p. 76).  
Centrally, in Gauntlett’s point of view, evidence of one’s own everyday 
creativity appears not only as the something that is made but also as “a process and a 
feeling” (p. 17). His mention of joy speaks of the transcendence resulting from the 
process and the product. It recalls Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) connection between 
enjoyment and creative flow, as well as May’s (1994) contention that joy in making is 
an outcome of an enhanced consciousness and offers a personal glimpse into collective 
human potential. Joy might well also be an outcome of sharing one’s work, Gauntlett 
says, and his referral to material or digital venues defines an array of networks where 
people show and talk about what they have made. 
Because Gauntlett’s (2011) definition of creativity accounts for novelty, 
creation, connection, process, and emotion, it allows the necessary latitude to consider 
both mini- and little-c creativity from a wide range of people, activities, and outcomes. 
Accordingly, it will be used in the present research. 
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Relevant Psychological Approaches 
As noted in the previous section, the present research is concerned with 
theories that relate to processes and people generally, and specifically those of little- 
and mini-c adult creators engaged in everyday pursuits. Broadly considered, theories 
of creativity concerned with the specific thought processes of creative people involve 
the initial two elements of Rhodes’s (1962) person-process-product-press construct. In 
other words, the psychological research reviewed here is devoted to discovering not 
just which everyday creators think creatively, but how they think in the first place.   
 
Tracking the Creative Process  
Plsek (1996) holds most psychological theories of the creative process are 
predicated on two principles. The first is that the creative process involves both 
conscious and subconscious processes to generate and evaluate ideas. The second is 
that a creative idea is not complete until it is implemented.  
One of the first cognitive constructs of the creative process (Wallas, 1926) held 
to that standard by advancing a four-stage model that moves from preparation to 
incubation, illumination, and at the end, verification. Wallas asserted that these steps 
could be simultaneously used on varied problems, sometimes quickly, sometimes 
slowly. He proved to be far-sighted about the cognitive roots of creativity by stating 
that preparation and verification are both conscious processes, while incubation and 
illumination tread between the conscious and subconscious.  
 Following Wallas (1926), a number of stage-based theoretical models 
describing the creative process were developed throughout the 20th-century (Lubart, 
2001). In his bisociation of ideas theory, Koestler (1964) elaborated on the concept 
that creativity requires the combining of ideas. Von Oech (1983) developed a two-
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stage model that featured the development of an idea and its implementation. Barron 
(1988) detailed a four-step Psychic Creation model that proceeded from conception, 
gestation, parturition, and development. Amabile (1996) introduced a version of the 
basic stage model that features problem identification, preparation, response 
generation, and response validation, claiming the steps do not necessarily take place in 
that particular sequence. Mumford, Mobley, Reiter-Palmon, Uhlman, and Doares 
(1991) outlined sub-steps in their eight-step model of problem definition, information 
gathering, organization, conceptual combination, idea generation, evaluation, 
implementation planning, and solution monitoring. This model, too, allows for 
skipping or recombining steps. 
 Regardless of the number of steps in the model, these stage-based theories 
either implicitly or explicitly draw on the tension between divergent and convergent 
thinking. To that point, the multi-step thinking skills model (Puccio, Mance, & 
Murdock, 2009) moves from clarification to transformation and implementation and 
specifically calls for deliberate divergent and convergent thinking at each step. This 
model also accounts for recursion, an action critical to refining an individual’s creative 
process (Lubart, 2001).  
 
From Stages to Cognition 
Stage models of the creative process raise an important question: Do the stages 
they describe pertain to creativity or do they illuminate all thinking? Enter creative 
cognition (Finke et al., 1992). It holds that creative thought draws on characteristic 
cognitive processes—indeed, the same ones used in everyday, noncreative thinking. It 
appropriates concepts from cognitive psychology—notably, conceptual combination 
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and expansion, creative imagery, analogy, and metaphor—to explain how people 
develop and rationalize ideas.  
The theory is rooted in research that explored how participants discovered 
emergent patterns in images (Finke, 1996) and based on experiments in which subjects 
were asked to combine three visual forms (i.e., a cone, cube, parallelogram) mentally 
into structures that were put in categories that inspired possible creative uses. The 
resulting model describes both generative and exploratory processes (Finke et al., 
1992). Generative processes spark ideas and can involve a range of cognitive actions—
including memory retrieval, idea synthesis, and categorical recombination—sometimes 
all at once (Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995). Exploratory processes take those sparks and 
with processes such as evaluation weigh the likelihood that they might result in a 
creative fire or a failure to ignite.   
Much empirical work assessing creative cognition (e.g., Beaty, Silvia, 
Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Kunios & Beekman, 2014) draws on cognitive 
neuroscience and is supplemented by the widespread use of imaging tools such 
electroencephalography, positron emission tomography, and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging. Such studies typically have participants perform creative tasks 
while hooked up to one or more of the brain imaging machines. By analyzing what 
parts of the brain are activated when people solve problems, these studies have often 
validated conventional cognitive research (Sawyer, 2011), including the model by 
Finke et al. (1992). 
Nonetheless, not all neuroscientific research on creativity is transferrable. 
Sawyer’s (2011) critical review of the literature claims that such studies do not operate 
from a single definition of creativity, and further do not measure the same thing, as 
they employ a variety of exercises, from working puzzles (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004) 
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to listening to music (Silvia, 2011). For the purpose of the present research, that 
inconstancy might be a bonus. While it is true that all of these experiments do not 
necessarily adhere to the same definition and therefore do not compare like to like, 
they do indicate that creativity generates from multiple parts of the brain (Runco & 
Jaeger, 2012).  
That, in turn, suggests that actions which reflect little- and mini-c creativity 
employ numerous neural networks, and offers grounds for believing that everyone is 
capable of creating. As Sawyer (2011) asserts: “. . . these studies suggest that what 
people think of as creativity involves a wide variety of cognitive processes, each of 
which results in distinct patterns of brain activation” (p. 151; emphasis in original).  
Meanwhile, conventional creative cognition research continues. Miller and 
Dumford (2016) and Marin, Reimann, and Castaño (2014) have produced studies that 
found that people use a combination of deliberate and intuitive cognitive processes, 
including analogy and metaphor, in the service of everyday creativity.   
In contrast to creative cognition, metacognition—literally thinking about one’s 
thinking—accounts for an adjacent theoretical direction. It stems from mid- to late-
20th-century examinations of childhood learning (Piaget, 1962; Vygotsky, in Zaretskii, 
2009). Metacognition is also known in various branches of psychology as self-
regulation or executive function (Livingston, 1997), and is considered a component of 
intelligence (Sternberg, Kaufman, & Grigorenko, 2008).   
According to Flavell (1979), the difference between cognition and 
metacognition depends on how information is deployed. While cognitive strategies 
enable a person to achieve a goal (e.g., devise a new recipe for chocolate cake), 
metacognitive strategies will help him or her assess how effectively the goal has been 
reached (e.g., questioning whether the result tastes good and can be made again). The 
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link to creativity is implicit: Metacognitive experiences may come before or after 
cognitive ones—often when cognitions fail—to salvage a perceived shortcoming. 
Given the role of reflection, metacognition incorporates the cognitive skills of memory 
processing and knowledge of problem-solving techniques within the wide variety of 
domains that creative people pursue.  
Hargrove (2013) explored how metacognition progresses in a study that 
tracked undergraduate college design students over the course of four years. A control 
group was given no metacognitive training, while two other groups were given 
instructions in metacognitive skills. Participants in one of those groups were also 
required to record their reflections in a shared online blog, which in itself can be 
construed as a metacognitive device. All the students were tested for creativity using 
the Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1968) for convergent thinking, and the 
Similarities Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) for divergent thinking. Initially, students 
who were taught specific metacognitive techniques tested higher—that is, as being 
more creative—than the control group. Further testing throughout the study indicated 
that students who learned the skills continued to be more creative.  
Interestingly, Hargrove (2013) credits the teaching of metacognitive skills and 
reflection on and sharing of learning as critical for fostering creative thinking. He 
speculates that over time those skills become ingrained. At that point then the line 
becomes blurred, and the metacognitive model of the creative process could be 
interpreted as a model of the creative person. As it happens, that blurring is a property 
of a number of creativity theories. That is perhaps inevitable with as complex a 
construct as creativity. 
These models of the creative process are for the most part predicated on the 
understanding that the process begins with a creator’s existing knowledge. That 
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knowledge is then variously put together and recombined into some new idea. Then, 
along the way to implementation, a creative idea must be judged worthy of pursuit (or 
not) by its creator. The tension between divergent and convergent thinking required in 
these models is not only key to their conception of the creative process; it is key to the 
way creative people think. 
 
Theories of the Creative Person 
Multiple theories of the creative process clearly exist, but there are fewer 
explicit theories of the creative person. The difficulty is in identifying exactly what the 
theories purport to explain—is it intellect, personality, or some other quality? The 
answer depends on the theorist. Runco, Namiro, and Walberg (1998) surveyed 143 
creativity researchers for their implicit convictions of the creative person. The range of 
opinions led them to note that most creativity researchers agree the construct is 
complex and incorporates various psychological, social, and physical traits. Yet the 
degree and importance of individual traits was not so widely agreed to. Perhaps the 
challenge of formulating a trait-based theory that could be widely applicable has been 
a deterrent. Then again, perhaps creativity has less to do with traits and more to do 
with a turn of mind—an idea that will be explored shortly. 
As it stands, many theories simply attempt to identify the factors that influence 
creativity, while others incorporate the factors outright. That is why the four-C model 
of creativity (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2007) identified in the introduction to this review 
is helpful: Its levels simply describe an individual’s magnitude of creativity. From 
eminent Big-C creators (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996); to workaday pro-c creators 
(Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009); to everyday little-c creators (Richards, 2007); to 
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knowledge-making mini-c creators (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007), each level clearly 
describes a person relative to her or his creations. 
Since everyday creators are the main interests of the present research, theories 
that specifically illuminate them are relevant. Mednick (1962, 1968) was among the 
first with such a theory; he described creative people as those who employ remote 
associates—that is, they instinctively fit together ideas without strong overt bonds. His 
own insight came from his experience as a professor being correctly contradicted by a 
freshman student about the theretofore accepted interpretation of a psychology 
experiment. Mednick reasoned that the student’s unfamiliarity with psychological 
theory allowed him to approach it openly and creatively.   
Mednick’s (1962) theory of creative persons is embodied by the 
aforementioned Remote Associates Test, an instrument which presents examples of 
three seemingly unrelated words. The test-taker adds a fourth to complete the series, 
and the assessment is scored for creativity by an independent rater. An example would 
be the words “moon,” “cheese,” and “bell”; the fourth word that connects them is 
“blue.” Although the test arguably concerns itself with convergent thinking rather than 
fluency, flexibility, and novelty (Mendelsohn, 1976), and is obviously weighted in 
favor of people with strong verbal abilities, it is still in wide use.   
In introducing the instrument, Mednick over-optimistically described its 
potential to revolutionize the field. Later studies (e.g., Andrews, 1975, Mendelsohn, 
1976) reported that the assessment failed to show a pervasive relationship between 
scores and creativity. However, given Hargrove’s (2013) example, it is still used to 
assess convergent thinking in creativity research. Both the Remote Associates Test and 
Mednick’s theory (1962) are valuable in this discussion because their development 
reiterates the cognitive processes inherent in a creative person’s associative thinking.  
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Some theoreticians argue that the acuity required to produce creative remote 
associates is implicitly linked to intelligence (Simonton, 2000; Sternberg & O’Hara, 
1999), and some of these theories are likewise relevant to everyday creativity. One 
significant example comes from Guilford, the same psychologist who called for 
increased psychological study in creativity in 1950. He determined that problem 
solving—which he equated to creativity—requires four distinct qualities: fluency, 
flexibility, originality, and elaboration. Guilford’s structure of intellect model (1967) 
also examined the ideas of a creative person in the context of both convergent and 
divergent thinking. His model is appreciably more complex than Mednick’s, with 
either 120 blocks of subcategories or 180 of them in a later version (1988).  
Guilford asserted that intellect manifests itself in three dimensions—content, 
products, and operations—and illustrated those dimensions with a cube. In the cube 
were five operations: cognition, memory, divergent production, convergent 
production, and evaluation. The cube also housed six types of product—units, classes, 
relations, systems, transformations, and implications—and four varieties of content: 
figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral.   
 
Intelligence Models 
Sternberg’s triarchic model of intelligence (1985) offers a simpler construct 
and plainly enlists creativity in its structure. It contends that people have varying 
degrees of three competencies that can help them choose, adapt to, and change their 
circumstances: analytical/componential, practical/contextual, and creative/experiential. 
Problem solving is a key characteristic of the analytical set, while adaptation is central 
to the practical set, and discovery to the creative set. Sternberg (1996) later called this 
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the successful intelligence theory, with the understanding that people who successfully 
build on their strengths and minimize their weaknesses also successfully negotiate life.  
A related intelligence model—Gardner’s multiple intelligence theory (1985, 
1999)—does not address creativity per se, though Simonton (2000) points out that its 
list of competencies relates to various aspects of creativity. Multiple intelligence 
theory maintains that people do not possess a single type of intelligence. Instead, 
everyone has eight of them, at least to a certain extent: verbal-linguistic, logical-
mathematical, spatial-visual, bodily-kinesthetic, musical, interpersonal, intrapersonal, 
and naturalist. The theory supports the idea that individuals may have a set of preferred 
intelligences they use in learning and understanding, and that heightened proficiency 
in other intelligences can be cultivated. Gardner (1993) elaborated his theory with 
examples from the lives of eminent creators, including Martha Graham, Igor 
Stravinsky, and T. S. Eliot. 
Critics of intelligence-based theories contend that the models have an array of 
shortcomings. For example, overall statistical support for the structure of intellect 
model (Guilford, 1967, 1988) has proved somewhat untenable (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2001). Criticisms of both the triarchic and multiple intelligence theories 
(Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1985) assert that their distinctions between intelligences 
are unfocused and overlap with existing psychometric assessments.  
Indeed, some critics question whether creativity and intelligence are related in 
the first place. In her meta-analysis of 21 creativity and IQ studies, Kim (2006) found a 
negligible correlation between the two constructs. Meanwhile, research that examined 
sociocultural aspects of Guildford’s (1967, 1988) structure of intellect model  
(Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Kaufman & Baer, 2004, 2005) has 
accentuated the importance of creativity to affect, motivation, and domain specificity 
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in addition to intellect. That research will be more thoroughly discussed further in this 
review.  
 
Economic and Investment Theories 
Kaufman (2009) suggests that creativity theories referencing economics are 
also suited to a discussion of everyday creativity. Such theories generally consider 
creative output a form of capital, and a few of them refer to the creative person. 
Walberg and Stariha (1992) hypothesized that economic models of capital, with their 
emphasis on resource allocation, offered the means to enhance elementary school 
students’ creativity.  
Arguably the most important economics-based model of creativity, Sternberg 
and Lubart’s (1995) investment theory proposes the creative person buys ideas low 
and sells them high. While nominally applicable to Big-C creators, the theory has 
particular resonance for little-c creators:  
Buying low means pursuing ideas that are unknown or out of favor but that 
have growth potential. Often, when these ideas are first presented, they 
encounter resistance. The creative individual persists in the face of this 
resistance and eventually sells high, moving on to the next new or unpopular 
idea (pp. 87-88).  
Like other models, the investment theory attempts to explain the creative 
process, though it also warrants that intelligence, knowledge, environment, motivation, 
cognitive style, and personality are essential qualities of the creative person. In 
Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) view, six factors figure into a creative person’s 
investment portfolio. Intellectual proficiency allows people to judge their own ideas 
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and convince other people to accept them. Stores of knowledge are required to predict 
the direction of a field, though too much of it can inhibit new ideas. An environment 
that supports creativity is necessary, as is sufficient motivation to work toward a goal. 
As cognitive style is an individual’s preferred way of thinking, it is incumbent upon a 
creative person to cultivate openness and habitually put new ideas together. Finally, 
personality traits that promote creativity include a tolerance for ambiguity, risk-taking, 
and nonconformity.  
Yet even if a person invests in all six factors, Sternberg and Lubart (1995) 
contend, the individual must choose to do something creative, regardless of the 
consequences:  
 [C]reativity is in large part a decision that anyone can make but that few 
people actually do make because they find the costs to be too high. Society can 
play a role in the development of creativity by increasing the rewards and 
decreasing the costs (p. 97).  
Sternberg (2012), alone and with others (e.g., Chart, Grigorenko & Sternberg, 
2008; Zhang & Sternberg, 2011), has supported the investment theory with multiple 
studies of elementary through college students. Using devices such as short stories, 
drawings, advertising, and scientific problems as springboards to creative thinking, the 
studies indicate that creativity is domain specific, and can be predicted by the traits in 
the theory (Baer, 2010; Sternberg, 2009, 2012). Moreover, the theory continues to spur 
inquiry in topics as diverse as adolescent social creativity (Gu, Hu, Ngwira, Jing, & 
Zhou, 2016); unifying aesthetics with creativity (Vartanian, 2014); and teaching and 
learning mathematics (Shen, 2014).  
Sternberg (2012) sums up the psychological position regarding the creative 
person in a way that crystallizes the abstraction of everyday creativity: “. . . creative 
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people are creative largely not as a result of any particular inborn trait, but, rather, 
through an attitude toward life . . .” (p. 3). With their openness to experience and 
tolerance of ambiguity, they are compelled to solve problems in new and unusual 
ways. To paraphrase the 20th-century American politician Robert F. Kennedy (1988), 
the creative person dreams of things that never were and asks why not. 
 
Summarizing Psychological Theories  
 It should be noted that this section does not attempt to explain every theory 
regarding creative people and processes. Instead, it focuses on those that could be most 
helpful in clarifying what happens for people to consider themselves creative. For 
instance, it does not discuss evolutionary theories of creativity (e.g., Eysenck, 1996; 
Simonton, 1999) or historiographic ones (Simonton, 2010) since they emphasize big-C 
rather than little- and mini-c everyday creativity.  
Until the unlikely development of a grand theory of creativity, the evolving and 
sometimes contradictory nature of theories of the creative process and the creative 
person, therefore, calls for a certain amount of perspective. Mumford and Antes (2007) 
discouraged relying on a single model to analyze creative achievement. The same 
could be said about models of the creative person and process.  
To that end, this section reviewed several psychological approaches applicable 
to little- and mini-c creators. Theories of the creative process, including various stage-
based models, were discussed. Models relating to cognition were also explored, as was 
the construct of metacognition. Then theories of the creative person were reviewed, 
and their connections to constructs other than creativity—such as intelligence—were 
investigated. Models of the creative person that borrow from economic theory were 
considered, and their current influence noted. 
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As noted earlier, psychological theories only tell part of the story of the birth of 
the creative actor. The next section of this review proceeds to explore the social forces 
that influence what happens when someone decides they are creative.  
 
Relevant Sociological Approaches 
 Because creativity is a universal human characteristic, it follows that it is more 
than the province of individuals. Indeed, creativity often emerges through the 
interaction of individuals in groups (Sawyer, 2006). Moreover, the interplay between 
the individual and the group is why creativity can be considered the nucleus of social 
change, enabling people to solve problems, innovate, and alter institutions and 
societies (Pachuki et al., 2010; Sales & Fournier, 2007).  
Creativity in some fashion enters into the work of the 19th- and 20th-century 
founding figures of sociology. Analyzing creativity and trends in social theory, 
Domingues (2000) considered four pioneers of the field and their contributions:  
Weber’s (1980) far-reaching transformation via charisma and piecemeal 
changes under rational domination; Durkheim’s (1912) ‘collective 
effervescence’ as the source of new “collective representations”; Marx’s (1958) 
dialectics between (an active and creative) subject and object; and Simmel’s 
(1989) appeal to the philosophy of life to explain the emergence of values (p. 
468).  
Domingues (2000) admits these early social theorists did not sufficiently 
expand their ideas to consider creativity per se. Instead, the subject has often surfaced 
obliquely, as a thread in sociological examinations of production—art-making, 
economies, influence, and leadership (e.g., Becker, 1982; Chan, 2011; McIntyre, 2012; 
Menger, 2014; White, 1993).  
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That is perhaps why Domingues contends that the sociological view of 
creativity “. . . has been unfolding as a highly decentered theoretical movement, 
without common project or identity among its promoters” (2002, p. 468). As 
examples, he mentions Giddens’s (1979, 1984) theories of reflexivity and the potential 
for social change (which will be discussed later in this thesis); Habermas’s (1981) 
theory of communicative rationality, which can be described as a product of successful 
communication; and Alexander’s (1986) theories of cultural sociology, in which ideas 
and processes can hold sway over institutions.  Domingues aside, however, other 
theorists are equally enlightening on the matter of society and creativity.  
 
Williams and the Communication of Creativity 
One of the most cogent discussions of creativity within a sociological context 
occurred in the 1960s when Williams wrote about the creative mind in The Long 
Revolution (2011). Though primarily focused on the relationship between creativity, 
art, aesthetics, and culture, Williams uses the book’s first essay to pursue a spirited and 
still-relevant discourse on the past, present, and future meanings of creativity. 
Importantly, he identifies several themes in his essay that are central to later attempts 
to develop a sociology of creativity. 
The first of these is that communication is central to making, a notion also 
reflected in Arnheim’s aesthetic theory of gestalt (1974). Regardless of the medium—
be it words, wool, or wood—Williams (2011) contends that communication can be 
taken to be one of making’s most important purposes, and eliciting reaction and 
response its most important products.  
Williams (2011) also suggested that it was important to think of making as a 
way to order both individual and group experience, particularly the experience of 
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sharing work with an audience. In the complex, often messy processes of living 
together, people create organizations that eventually become institutions, such as art. 
The meanings of these organizations influence making, and vice versa. Furthermore, 
Williams maintained that communication unveils meanings that the maker and the 
audience have in common; societies recreate these meanings constantly: 
Even the skills themselves are not commodities to be passively inherited, but 
processes that have to be learned, as part of any individual artist’s growth: the 
means and the meaning, in a whole process, have to find this personal 
verification. Yet the common experience which the meanings interpret will 
itself be changing, either slowly and hardly noticeably or at a variety of rates to 
one so rapid that the fact of change is a matter of general consciousness (pp. 
50-51). 
As a social theorist with a background in literature and criticism, Williams 
further illuminates his conception of the social dynamism of creativity in Marxism and 
Literature (1972). The heart of creativity, he asserts, is the making and remaking of 
consciousness and creative practice sits at its core. In turn, Williams’s sense of creative 
practice entails a constant exchange between the self and one’s relations with others, 
what Pope (2005) terms “. . . an attempt to wrest from the complexities and 
contradictions we have internalised . . . something that helps us live to better purpose” 
(p. 11). This internalization of external forces is a key concept that surfaces in the 
sociological descriptions of creativity discussed in detail later in this section. 
Given the vagaries of time and resources, creative practice proves to be a 
moving target, which is why Williams (1972) calls for a unified effort to identify its 
parameters: 
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It is the special function of theory, in exploring and defining the nature and 
variation of practice, to develop a general consciousness within what is 
repeatedly experienced as a special and often relatively isolated consciousness. 
For creativity and social self-creation are both known and unknown events, and 
it is still from grasping the known that the unknown—the next step, the next 
work—is conceived (p. 212). 
 
Joas, Creativity, and Action 
The Creativity of Action (Joas, 1996) can be considered the beginning of a 
response to Williams’s call for a sociological theory of creativity. Starting from a point 
of view informed by the pragmatism of James (1890), Mead (1934), and Dewey 
(1934), and reacting to the many of the same “theoretical fragments” described by 
Domingues (2000, p.145), Joas claims that sociology itself is predicated on action and 
that all human action is creative.  
Examining five sociological metaphors—expression, production, life, 
intelligence and reconstruction, and revolution—he highlights the shortcomings of 
theretofore existing action theories. He expresses dissatisfaction with the ends-and-
means exercise of simply sorting human action into poles of rational and normative 
extremes. In response, Joas introduces an encompassing third model of action—
creative—that he said could better explain human agency: “It may still be the case that 
creativity contains a potential for understanding all human action that none of the 
alternative models of action can replace” (1996, p. 73). 
 In establishing this theory, Joas (1996) maintains that action is not singular, 
and not necessarily rational; instead, each act is a part of an unending fabric felted of 
inseparable thought and action. He also holds that the will and the body constantly 
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negotiate a relationship. He further posits that individual actors and their actions are 
embedded in social groups, which establishes the foundation for an individual-centered 
theory of creative action.   
He outlines his theory with four tenets: situation, corporeality, sociality, and 
creativity. Because people are able to act on purpose, control (and be controlled by) 
their bodies, and act independently of others as well as their surroundings, Joas (1996) 
proposes that the creativity inherent in devising new modes of acting or thinking 
enables them to disconnect from habit and structure to build context anew.   
Joas (1996) described their unfolding in terms of a creative practice:  
At the beginning of an action process goals are frequently unspecific and only 
vaguely understood. They become clearer once the actor has a better 
understanding of the possible means to achieve the ends; even new goals will 
arise on the basis of newly available means (p. 273)  
In his point of view, creativity occurs when an individual actor breaks from habit to 
forge a new way of contextualizing the world. 
 Joas’s theory (1996) is particularly relevant to thinking about the birth of the 
creative actor. Unlike rational and normative theories, it considers action as a response 
to a panoply of changing circumstances and structures. Yet and still, Joas offers his 
theory not as an alternative to those, but as an overarching complement. “These 
creative actors whom Joas describes are purposive in a more diffuse sense, and they 
are responsive to norms in action,” writes Little (2011) in a review. “The chief tension 
Joas offers is between stylized, mono-stranded models of action, and thick theories 
that incorporate the plain fact of intelligent adaptation and shaping of behavior that 
occurs in virtually all human activities” (para. 14). 
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 The Creativity of Action (Joas, 1996) informs the subsequent work of most of 
the sociological theorizing about creativity. Some of that work is benevolently critical 
(Del Mar, 2010), while other work, as discussed below, uses it as a springboard for an 
attempt at a more complex sociology of creativity. 
 
Building on Joas with Bourdieu 
Dalton (2004) claims that the chief flaw in Joas’s (1996) theory is that it casts 
creativity as distinct from habitual action, and it thereby “neglects the possibility that 
some action may contain creative and habitual elements simultaneously” (p. 611). For 
an explanation of everyday creativity, this might be an important distinction. If a 
particular creative pursuit is part of a person’s habitual routine—say, the knitter who 
always has a project going, or the poet who writes daily—then that quotidian output 
could be considered a part (if not outright proof of) her or his creativity.  
 To better bridge what he perceives as the gap between habit and creativity, 
Dalton (2004) incorporates ideas from Bourdieu (1969, 1984) about habitus, field, and 
practice into a proposed sociology of creativity. While Bourdieu does not mention 
creativity explicitly, Dalton argues that his theories about social capital and agency 
complement Joas’s point about creativity arising from the interruption of habit.  
 For Bourdieu (1984), habitus involves an individual actor’s largely 
unconscious predisposition toward rational, strategic action; it is a physical and 
psychic embodiment of the objective and subjective world. He further considers 
habitus a self-organizing disposition that lasts over time, “lasting but not immutable” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 108), and one that is transposable to the gamut of 
arenas of social action. Those arenas, in turn, constitute the field—i.e., “the 
inescapable boundaries in which we live” (Gauntlett, 2007, p. 64). In Bourdieu’s view, 
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the social space encompassed by the field is the scene of conflict and competition as 
individual actors struggle to control its power and seize its authority. In so doing, 
sometimes they reshape the field itself. However, they cannot succeed without 
sufficient capital—social, economic, cultural, and symbolic resources that aid mobility 
on the field. Bourdieu considered habitus, field, and capital as “thinking tools” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1989, p. 50). Indeed, Bourdieu (1986, p. 101) expressed these 
tools as integers of a seemingly straightforward equation: 
[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice 
That is, an individual actor’s predispositions and positions on the field result in 
practice, which can be understood as the exchange between her or his actions and 
circumstances. “Put another way,” states Maton (2014), “we cannot understand the 
practices of actors in terms of their habituses alone—habitus represents but one part of 
the equation; the nature of the fields they are active within is equally crucial” (p. 51).  
 Considering Bourdieu’s equation in terms of creativity, Chan (2011) frames it 
within creative practice, including art, literature, science, and technology. “Within 
each field, there is a configuration of capital, such as prestige, status, wealth, power or 
knowledge, that provides a structural dimension that recognizes the resources as well 
as constraints of practicing in that field” (p. 147).  
 In Bourdieu’s (1993) view, the field is the scene of multiple struggles in 
practice. Positions are taken with respect to what are considered legitimate products, 
players, standards, methods, and outcomes. Capital is deployed to achieve advantage. 
As it contains a schema of predispositions, habitus enables individual actors to 
navigate their fields by informing their strategies for innumerable plays in practice that 
can subvert or succeed. It is, as Dalton (2004) notes, “. . . flexible and open-ended but 
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continues to place significant bounds on the ‘horizon of possibilities’ that Joas 
describes” (p. 613). 
 
 Implications for the Everyday Creator 
Drawing out the concepts of habitus, capital, field, and practice, Dalton (2004) 
makes two observations that illustrate how these elements might support everyday 
creativity. In the first, he says that because habitus offers an “inevitably imprecise fit 
between general dispositions and concrete situations” (p. 613), it affords the sliver of 
an opening for creative action in practice. In the second, Dalton asserts that people 
operating within a field may take strategic action with their stores of capital that can 
increase their status and recognition—qualities which in turn are shaped by the field. 
Nonetheless, Dalton says the constraints of habitus and field do not suggest a robust 
environment for creativity: “This unidirectional model of agency ultimately cannot 
account for any but the most limited types of creative acts” (p. 613).  
 Dalton (2004) aims to reconcile Joas’s (1996) action theory, with its implicit 
dependence on the individual and emphasis on the interruption of habit, with the 
group- and routine-dependent characteristics of Bourdieu’s (1986) constructions of 
habitus and field. Dalton acknowledges the concurrent presence of both habit and 
creativity:  
Creativity emerges from the nature of routine activity itself (whether 
individually habitual or prescribed in roles or schemas), which can never be 
specified with absolute precision and demands “interpretation” or 
“performance” in the concrete realization of action. Recognizing further that 
action takes place in a social and physical environment in which creativity is 
both judged and has consequences for other actors establishes the potential for 
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bringing the concept of creative action, so carefully and insightfully explored 
by Joas, into broader theorizing about the relationship between agents and the 
social structures in which they are embedded (p. 620).  
 As Chan (2011) sees it, Dalton’s (2004) hybrid suggests that creative actors—
irrespective of field—share the urge to create due to overarching habitus. Creative 
actors also share a choice when they come to a creative crossroads. Chan states:  
When faced with obstacles and difficulties, people may follow the habituated 
way of dealing with problems allowed in their field or they may question or 
challenge these accepted ways and act in a creative way that transcends or 
transforms their field (p. 149).  
 Chan (2011) suggests this framework succeeds on several levels. If creative 
fields exist, so do creative subfields, each with distinct habitus of standards, 
practitioners, experts, and dispositions. She claims the construct of capital helps 
account for the uneven distribution in a field (or subfield) to access of knowledge, 
support, resources, and communities. Harkening back to Bourdieu’s (1986) equation, 
she adds that creative practice is the product of the interaction between the subfield 
and the habitus.  
Additionally, she maintains Dalton’s (2004) grafting of ideas “. . . allows for 
creative breakthroughs when practitioners overcome difficulties resulting from a 
change of environment or domain, working in a multidisciplinary team, or occupying a 
position of marginality” (2011, p. 150). Because habitus is self-mending, she says, it 
can cumulatively adapt to changes in field, which can afford creative action. Even 
creative teams with varied habituses can find space for creativity when members work 
together. 
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As for individuals, habitus might well explain the transition essential to 
developing a creative identity. Habitus is not just how an individual perceives the 
world, but how she or he experiences a place in it. If a person’s habitus shifts, and if 
that shift is sufficiently reinforced, that person experiences him or herself differently in 
the world. Because habitus is a bodily expression, an individual in the first flushes of 
feeling creative is literally experiencing something different—that is, she or he could 
be said to be newly embodying creativity. 
 
Summarizing Sociological Theories 
That the psychological study of creativity seldom regards the interplay of habit 
and creativity has a champion in Glăveanu (2012). More understanding is needed 
about the ways in which everyday creativity is simultaneously manifested in the mind 
as well as individual action, he asserts. The model Dalton (2004) proposes is a start 
toward mending how psychology and sociology consider the act of creating.  
Indeed, as a means of regarding the birth of the creative actor, Dalton’s (2004) 
scaffolding holds together a range of psychological theories of creativity. The 
geneplore model by Finke et al. (1992), with its interplay of generation and exploration 
against a background of constraints, makes sense when imagined in terms of habitus, 
capital, practice, and field. It also accommodates the varied competencies called for in 
Sternberg’s triarchic theory (1985) as well as the domain specificity required of 
Sternberg and Lubart’s investment theory of creativity (1995).  
Moreover, Dalton’s (2006) construct offers a way of thinking about the themes 
Williams (1972, 2011) identified in his earlier discourses about the nature of creativity: 
communication, audience, practice, and the embodiment of creativity. Beyond talking 
about genres of creating, making itself is a means of communication, as Joas (1996) 
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holds. Audiences who bear witness to that making comprise the field, not only creating 
in collaboration and reaction but also collectively metamorphosing into societal 
structures that share and recreate meaning.  
The internalization of creativity that Williams describes in The Long 
Revolution (2011) parallels the embodiment Bourdieu (1984, 1996) sees in habitus. 
Taken altogether, these aspects constitute a socially constructed practice that mirrors 
Williams’s (1972) sense of “grasping from the known to the unknown” (p. 212), a 
situation Bourdieu also described, and which Dalton (2004) sees as the manifestation 
of creativity.  
 In the sociological gaze, the choices that a creative actor makes among a host 
of possibilities could be viewed as the locus of structure and agency. Yet 
anthropologists would posit that the role of culture is also influential. In a very real 
way, making something is in effect making culture. The next section, then, examines 
the role culture plays in the inception of a person’s creative identity.   
 
Relevant Anthropological Approaches 
Anthropology offers a picture of everyday creativity that adds needed detail to 
the renderings drawn by psychology and sociology. The culture they interrogate is the 
milieu through which societies operate and perpetuate themselves and as such is 
clearly an aid to understanding the circumstances of how everyday makers come to 
think of themselves as creative. Indeed, the cultural sociologist Alexander (1988) 
noted the need for such added context that was lacking at the time in his field: “It is 
from anthropology, not sociology, that historians increasingly draw” (p. 91). Closely 
related to sociology, anthropology commands both ethnographic research and distinct 
theories to describe and analyze culture. Alexander’s sense of the growing importance 
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of anthropology research reflects its current relevance not just in understanding 
history, but the study of creativity as well. 
In the US and UK, cultural and social anthropology are both concerned with 
creativity. Broadly stated, cultural anthropologists view creativity in terms of how 
culture serves the needs of society while social anthropologists examine how it serves 
the needs of the individual (Monaghan & Just, 2000). The middle ground is that they 
both investigate the social dimensions of creativity and its ethnographic contexts; it is 
that space this review examines. 
This section, therefore, details an array of anthropological theories useful in 
identifying the role that culture plays in helping an individual reach the moment where 
she or he first feels creative. It begins by considering the field’s position on everyday 
creativity and proceeds to explore the anthropological constructs of agency and 
improvisation. The section concludes by examining how anthropologists view the 
creative process and creative artifacts.  
 
Definitions and Distinctions   
As in psychological theories of creativity, a principal concern in 
anthropological theories is the distinction between eminent and everyday creators. 
Turner (1967) summons the romantic ideology of the lone genius working toward an 
epiphany in his consideration of creativity. For Turner, creativity occurs when a 
maker, working in a particular sphere and somehow set apart from the commonplace, 
devises a product that transforms and adds value to the lives of others—a description 
that calls to mind the work of shamans or artists as popularly understood in the mid-
20th-century.  
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The transformations wrought by these makers yields communitas, Turner’s 
(1967) term for the gamut of human experiences in and beyond social groups that 
produce thoughts that forge feelings that in turn reciprocally fashion thought. In his 
view, communitas is a social by-product of creating though it is paradoxically brought 
about in social segregation. 
Writing later, Lavie, Narayan, and Rosaldo (1993) largely agree with Turner’s 
characterization. They add that creators can also be among the groups in which they 
live, “integrated into the mundane arenas of everyday life” (p. 5). Bruner (1993) 
contends in the same volume that as everyday creators mingle with others, that their 
creative products are not just tangible objects; rather, through what they make they 
“construct their lives as they live their lives” (p. 324).  
These differences between the solitary and the social form a contradistinction 
in how people in Western cultures view creativity, according to Wilf (2014). He terms 
many popular Western depictions of creativity “the neoliberal philosopher’s stone” (p. 
398), detailing the stories of gifted individual creators as they attempt daringly 
transcendent feats of agency. Instead, Wilf says, creativity is ubiquitous, and 
anthropology provides the means in “clarifying the social dimensions of the 
ethnographic context of ‘creativity’” (p. 407).  
 
Habitus and Bricolage 
Since the 1980s, creativity has been recast as “the recombination and 
transformation of existing cultural practices and forms” (Liep, 2001, p. 2), something 
that creators do routinely. Wilf (2014) contends that the actions of recasting and 
changing echo Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) descriptions of 
habitus as well as Lévi-Strauss’s (1966) semantics-informed description of bricolage. 
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Fittingly, perhaps, the term itself describes a mode of making that applies to the work 
of many everyday creators: “The etymological foundation of bricolage comes from a 
traditional French expression that denotes craftspeople who creatively use materials 
left over from other projects to construct new artifacts” (Rogers, 2012, p. 1). In Lévi-
Strauss’s use of the word, bricolage is considered the opposite of engineering in that 
the latter relies on specific tools and materials, while the former relies on any tools or 
materials that might be on hand.  
Habitus and bricolage have a particular relationship when viewed through an 
anthropological lens (Wilf, 2014). In both, creators both encounter and engage with 
existing structures.   
However, the extremes are not as stark as the bricoleur/engineer comparison 
might suggest. Context shades the action that differentiates the two. The bricoleur is 
constrained by the rules and structures of what exists and recombines extant elements 
to make something new. For example, a bricoleur could make a backyard swing from a 
rope and a tire, and still be bound by the nature of the materials and the purposes to 
which the creation will be put to use. This creator might wonder: Would the rope be 
suitable for holding both tire and people, would the swing withstand the elements, 
would the combination be mounted on a tree in the yard?  
When complete, the bricoleur’s swing will look as if it originated from a rope 
and a tire, and the creator’s internal dialog would have been about the nature of the 
materials. For the person in a headlong encounter with habitus, the constraint is not so 
much the experience of rules as it is the creator’s ingrained tastes, preferences, and 
perceptions shaped by her or his environment. Such a creator might wonder: Would 
the tire-and-rope swing be refined, would it be comfortable, would it—in the spirit of 
Morris (1884)—be both beautiful and useful? When complete, that swing might still 
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look as if it originated from a rope and a tire, but the creator’s internal dialog will have 
been about taste, preference, and perception.  
In the anthropological regard to action, bricolage and habitus obviously share 
common ground. For people who make things, material realities as well as one’s 
tastes, preferences, and perceptions hold sway in the things they make. Yet Wilf 
(2014) notes that the extension of the two constructs—“the one operating within an 
already-given set of constraints, and the other by changing the set of those constraints” 
(p. 399)—set the stage for a ongoing debate between anthropologists about the role of 
novelty and tradition, and how creative actors proceed in each direction. 
 
Innovation and Improvisation 
An important distinction lies between those anthropologists who focus on 
creativity as innovation and those who consider it improvisation. For instance, Liep 
(2001) contends that creativity “involves a major restructuring of the rules and a 
reorganization of experience. This is not ubiquitous but concentrated at a particular 
time and place” (p. 12). By valuing novelty over convention, his position appears to 
point to eminent creators.  
Hallam and Ingold (2007) contradict Liep by introducing the construct of 
cultural improvisation. They define it as a generative, relational, and temporal way of 
working in and considering the world. They assert that creators are impelled to 
improvise:  
. . . because no system of codes, rules and norms can anticipate every possible 
circumstance. At best it can provide general guidelines or rules of thumb whose 
very power lies in their vagueness or non-specificity. The gap between these 
non-specific guidelines and the specific conditions of a world that is never the 
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same from one moment to the next not only opens up space for improvisation, 
but also demands it, if people are to respond to these conditions with judgment 
and precision. (p. 2)  
Consequently, their position appears to point to everyday creators.   
Ultimately, it is not wholly clear that these two forms of agency are polar. 
Sawyer (2006) maintains that they are points on a continuum of creative culture. Wilf 
(2014) concurs, holding that any study of creativity must take into account its 
universality as well as ongoing and concentrated efforts that aim to alter the constraints 
on a field. As Negus and Pickering (2012) noted, “the exceptional and the ordinary 
feed off each other” (p. 1). In other words, both the field-changing, paradigm-shifting 
innovation as well as the bricological, incremental improvisation can and should be 
viewed by anthropologists as creative acts.  
 
The Constraints of Tradition 
Negus and Pickering (2012) claim that pitting innovation and improvisation as 
opposites begs the relationship of creativity to tradition. The two, they say, are 
inextricable. “Creativity involves learning from what has been done in the past and 
learning how to take from it what can be used in the present, which thereby changes it” 
(p. 112).  
To paraphrase Valéry (1962), the future is never what it used to be. Tradition is 
reacted to, reinterpreted, and reconfigured by each new generation, say Negus and 
Pickering (2012), which may alter that what might have been considered sacrosanct 
(e.g., reconstructing an “authentic” rendition of a folk song into a rap-laced version, 
perhaps, or sampling of Irish dancing in new balletic choreography). Interpretations 
and reactions may be based on the political and philosophical sensibilities of the 
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beholder. Even these are subject to the changes of time and cultural tide. In short, 
today’s tradition is tomorrow’s cultural substratum. There can be neither innovation 
nor improvisation without the context that traditional forms provide.  
While the judgments of what is or is not what Liep (2001) calls “true 
creativity” (p. 12) might vary from group to group, anthropologists generally maintain 
that the pull with and against tradition is how culture is transmitted, both in fits and 
starts as well as in leaps and bounds. That is to say, neither world-changing cultural 
progression—nor the nuances of everyday creativity—could exist without the context 
of the things that have come before. 
 
Culture and the Creative Experience  
In the realm of making music, this principle is illustrated with what Small 
(1998) calls musicking—any activity related to a performance, whether playing, selling 
tickets, writing scores, or setting up a stage. In his estimation, musicking is an 
inclusive process that invokes the past as well as the present, even as it hints at the 
future: 
The act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of 
relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies. 
They are to be found not only between those organized sounds which are 
conventionally thought of as being the stuff of musical meaning but also 
between the people who are taking part, in whatever capacity, in the 
performance; and they model, or stand as metaphor for, ideal relationships as 
the participants in the performance imagine them to be: relationships between 
person and person, between individual and society, between humanity and the 
natural world and even perhaps the supernatural world (p. 13). 
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Musicking—and, by extension, all making—is therefore highly dependent on 
the circumstance of all who partake in it. When creativity becomes a construct of 
collaborative action, collaborative context matters.  
Because of its contextuality, Negus and Pickering (2012) argue that creativity 
is more than the sum of its parts: “Creativity is not simply the functional correlation of 
competence and social class” (p. 18). As does Csikszentmihalyi with his construct of 
flow (1996), they maintain that an individual actor’s creative experience compounds 
skill with ability and ongoing practice.  
Indeed, the gulf between everyday and eminent creativity is filtered by an 
individual’s ever-altering reserves of logic and instinct, as well as his or her 
confrontations with social structures. The boundaries between Big-C and little-c 
creators can shift, and that fault line traces the way society changes. “There is in this 
movement an implicit rejection of the false divide between rationality and intuition for 
they have come to act in concert with each other, in a mutually enhancing absorption 
and understanding” (Negus & Pickering, 2012, p. 19). With this comment, they make 
the case that the process is as central to creativity as the person. In other words, 
creativity is a state of experience.  
 
Making and Artifacts  
The creative product is the tangible evidence of that state of experience. Each 
product brings together myriad facets of knowledge, perception, imagination, and 
anticipation in what Moeran (2014) terms “product-as-process” (p. 23).  
Each product, in turn, is the result of a long line of selections by its maker (or 
makers). For instance, in fabricating a simple counterpane, a crocheter chooses a color 
palette, fiber, hooks, stitches, methods of joining, and edgings or trims. Bereft of these 
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selections and the effort of making, would this counterpane exist? Another 
counterpane might well materialize, perhaps, but not this very one. The choices it 
represents—beginning with the medium, on down to the last slip stitch—are informed 
by the crocheter’s inventiveness and experience, as well as the culture and society she 
or he inhabits. Whether made explicitly or implicitly, each choice affects the others 
and renders the piece an avatar of sorts marking its and its creator’s culture, society, 
time, and place.  
In scrutinizing what is made and situating an artifact in context, anthropologists 
analyze material culture (Henare, Holbraad, & Wastell, 2007). Because the products of 
everyday creativity come into being only through human action, the act of making—
designated by anthropologists as practice or performance—is considered as important 
a subject of study as the artifact itself (Naji & Douny, 2009). Indeed, the dynamic 
between the medium or domain and the creator, mirrored countless times by countless 
makers in any given society, provides the means by which culture thrives (Bruner, 
1993).   
 
The Experience of Textility 
Seeking a framework for examining the constant exchange between maker and 
object, Ingold (2000) highlights the maker’s skills, intelligence, and process. These 
elements amalgamate with the maker’s cognition and the action of creating to form a 
materiality that arises through the process of creation. As a form of situated cognition, 
the interchange Ingold describes emerges from an ongoing adjustment of a creator’s 
perceptions and movements to the context of making.  
Ingold (2010) finds the interchange distinct from the Aristotelian construct of 
hylomorphism, which considers being an alloy of matter and form. The hylomorphic 
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creative actor imposes her or his will on the medium. The hylomorphic model has long 
been the anthropological concept that guided Western analysis of creative products 
(Murphy & Polombe, 2012).  
Because he considers that model to be a backward-facing and ultimately 
unsatisfactory way to describe the creative process and product, Ingold (2010) 
proposes textility, which highlights the interaction between creator and created. 
Drawing from the philosophical stance of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Ingold 
describes an interaction that is flexible, unpredictable, and, he avers, forward-looking. 
In making, outcome is never quite certain.  
With textilty, Ingold (2010) also introduces the distinction between iteration—
what might be considered production—and the necessary tinkering of itineration, 
comparing makers to walkers “bringing forth their work as they press on with their 
own lives” (p. 97). Itineration even applies to everyday creators who follow preset 
instructions, such as a blueprint, recipe, or pattern, Ingold says, because of the human 
agency involved in following (or not following) directions. The contact with the paint, 
food, fabric, or any other medium has bearing on the creative actor: “This field is 
neither internal to the material nor internal to the practitioner (hence external to the 
material); rather, it cuts across the emergent interface between them” (Ingold, 2000, p. 
342). 
Ingold’s (2010) construct of textility informs a variety of subsequent analyses. 
Roberts (2012) applies the concept to ready-to-assemble IKEA furniture in the UK, 
while Paton (2013) employs it to recount his experience as a sculptor shaping stone 
from Cornish quarries. While the latter author acknowledges the primacy of materials, 
his reflexive account also considers time and familiarity essential aspects of the 
interchange between maker and medium. These aspects could well be part of the 
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affordances that the creative actor must accommodate, a construct that will be explored 
later in this chapter. 
The sense that makers deploy such embodied cognition is a perspective that 
Malfouris (2013) builds on. Describing how prehistoric toolmakers work—and 
connecting it to the process of modern Greek potters—Malafouris traces the abiding 
relationship people have with the things they make: “The tool guides the grip, the grip 
shapes the hand, the hand makes the tool, and engaging the tool shapes the mind” (p. 
174). In other words, a working creator thinks through, with, and about tools and 
materials in a continuous stream of metacognition. Things shape our minds, he says, 
and the agency that allows for that comes from the creative actor’s relationships with 
both tools and materials. By studying makers and their tools, one might see the 
shaping taking place.  
 
Phenomenology and Subjectivity 
With its emphasis on embodiment, generativity, and action, the implications of 
Ingold’s (2000, 2010) and Malafouris’s (2013) approaches recall Bourdieu’s 
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) accounts of habitus. Even taken 
all together, however, those constructs do not adequately address what Naji and Douny 
(2009) classify as an inescapable “. . . dichotomy between subject/object, mind/body, 
cognition/emotion” (p. 413) that occurs in making.  
To that end, Csordas (1990) combines habitus with the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) to explain a creator’s sense of knowing the world through 
making. In summary, the individual’s skirmishes with the structures of society—and 
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with the structures of experience—consolidate with her or his bodily perceptions in 
understanding the world.  
Warnier (2001) draws on that work, adding subjectivity to the formula with his 
praxeological approach to making. He contends that made objects embody the 
techniques and the knowledge of their creator. In turn, they imbue the creator’s senses 
and body knowledge: “We know that incorporated material culture reaches deep into 
the psyche of the subject because it reaches not through abstract knowledge but 
through the sensi-motor experience” (p. 16). The experience of making, he says, 
changes the maker’s subjectivity, just as the act of making, changes a material into an 
artifact. Each artifact alters its maker and vice versa.  
 
Social Aspects of Material Culture 
Douny (2014) incorporated these views of material culture—albeit with a 
markedly more social point of view—in her research with the Dogon people in Mali:  
From a standpoint different than Warnier’s, I think that it is social relationships 
or socially directed processes that craft the individual’s self as directed outer 
self. Following Bourdieu’s thesis (1993), I suggest that subjectivity is founded 
in everyday life practice and cultural transmission. In other words, it results 
from the socialization process I saw in the field. (p. 43)  
Douny notes the ways that Dogon material culture is shared and intentionally 
learned, and her analysis emphasizes Warnier’s (2001) praxeological orientation as 
well as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962). In Dogon communities of 
practice, she finds that agency assumes a social, rather than individual, role. 
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 Writing about communities of creativity in Japan, Moeran (2014) agrees that 
this social aspect of creativity—that is, examining things that are made and the 
circumstances that surround the actors who make them—is the most direct way to 
analyze the choices made in cultural production. “To understand the meaning of 
creativity, we need to explore what choices are made by those involved and from what 
range of possibilities they are selected” (p. 24).  
 
Summarizing Social Theories 
Where are the seeds of creative identity situated in the field of anthropology? 
This section explores anthropological approaches to creativity and reviews definitions 
that evolved from the exclusive (Liep, 2001; Turner, 1967) to the inclusive (Moeran, 
2014; Wilf, 2014), a position that is also held in contemporary theories from 
psychology and sociology. The section also examines the anthropological view of 
Bourdieu’s construct of habitus (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), 
contrasting its strictures with bricolage (Lévi-Strauss, 1996). It then considers how 
anthropologists view the tensions between innovation (Liep, 2001) and improvisation 
(Hallam & Ingold, 2007); tradition and creativity (Negus & Pickering, 2012), and 
makers, materials, and artifacts (Douny, 2014; Ingold, 2010; Malafouris, 2013; Naji & 
Douny, 2009).  
From the current anthropological point of view, creativity is a state, not a trait. 
The experience of making reflects creative actor’s interchange with materials as well 
as the society she or he works in. As Ingold (2010) postulates, a wide berth surrounds 
the creative actor when people interact with materials, instructions, and each other. 
Following Douny’s (2014) line of reasoning, all comprise the elements that fabricate 
culture. 
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Douny’s insights (2014) are especially useful in illustrating the social and 
individual complexities of making things. As an actor necessarily encounters barriers 
and encouragements on the way to considering her or himself creative, the 
anthropological means of considering artifacts and processes could yield significant 
information. Makers must contend with the constraints of their chosen media and 
abilities—the material realities of creating—as well as their socially formed tastes, 
preferences, and perceptions.  
Small’s (1998) rendering of making as occurring in a web of relationships 
drives home the point that creative products are the sites of these encounters, evidence 
of the action that manufactured them as well as the action they transfer to their makers 
and the people beyond the process who experience them. Speaking to both the 
individual and the social, such artifacts are fundamental to understanding creativity 
narratives that involve maker and context. 
In his review of the semiotic influences of creativity, Wilf (2014) contends that 
anthropology offers the means to break from stubbornly held Romantic concepts that 
bind creativity to individualized inner nature. Its sharpening focus on the ethnographic 
and social dimensions of creativity, he says, is one of the field’s great strengths.  
Even as theories from psychology, sociology, and anthropology help explain 
the birth of the creative actor, they overlap in ways that suggest more expansive 
accounts. To that end, the next section of this review examines sociocultural theories 
of creativity that aim to further clarify what happens when someone determines she or 
he is creative. 
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Sociocultural Systems Approaches 
Psychology, sociology, and anthropology each contribute a distinctive way of 
considering what happens when someone decides she or he can step into the world as a 
creative actor. As previous sections illustrate, these approaches are often disparate, even 
within a single discipline. 
Yet some approaches are connected across disciplines by time, intent, and scope. 
For example, the ends-and-means psychology of the geneplore model (Finke et al., 1992) 
recalls the immediacy of Joas’s (1996) action theory. Similarly, Dalton’s (2004) 
sociological model of creativity is helpful in explaining Sternberg and Lubart’s (1999) 
investment theory. Likewise, Ingold (2000, 2010) incorporates Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu, 
1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) concepts of habitus, capital, and field to build 
the construct of textility.  
These interdisciplinary congruencies hint at what some social scientists have been 
demanding for more than three decades: panoramic ways of explaining creativity. 
Increasingly, these researchers call for explanations that acknowledge the complexity and 
interactivity that creativity entails. “What we need now are all-encompassing systems 
theories of creativity designed to tie together and make sense of the diversity of 
perspectives found in the literature—from the innermost neurological level to the 
outermost cultural level” (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010, p. 590).  
This section begins by exploring the suitability of systems theories in the social 
sciences and the implications they extend for explaining a subject as complex as creativity. 
There are sociocultural systems theories concerned exclusively with eminent creators—
most notably, Simonton’s (2010) mathematics-based reworking of Campbell’s (1960) 
model of creativity as a matter of blind variation and selective retention. However, this 
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review considers four sociocultural systems theories pertinent to everyday creators and by 
extension applicable to disparate disciplines.  
 
Networks of Networks 
Systems theories arose in the 1930s and 1940s as attempts to explain the numerous 
classes of natural phenomena studied in life sciences. Popularized by the botanist 
Bertalanffy (1968), educator Bánáthy (1968, 1992), and sociologist Parsons (1951), 
systems theories are often collectively referred to as an ecological approach (Montouri, 
2011).  
Against the turbulent backdrop of the 20th century, systems were considered a more 
robust way to state conditions and conceive of solutions to problems than the rationalistic 
determinism of Cartesian philosophy and Newtonian science. In general systems theory, 
Bertalanffy (1968) holds, the emphasis is comprehensive, crosses disciplines, and “applies 
to any whole consisting of interacting components” (p. 109). Accordingly, systems 
approaches reflect multiple conceptualizations informed by diverse sources such as 
information theory, chaos theory, complexity theory, and cybernetics (Montouri, 2011).   
Mountouri (2011) asserts that four paradigms characterize general systems 
theories. They are all non-representational, non-Cartesian, complex, and open or closed. 
That is, systems models feature networks in which people are but part of a larger 
ecosystem. Inevitable complexities, paradoxes, and connections are captured by tracing a 
system’s context through its rhizomatic nodes and offshoots of connections (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987). These connections intimate that systems either allow interchanges 
between their constituents and the environment—in which case they are open—or they are 
isolated and closed. 
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In psychology, sociology, and anthropology, the systems approach attracted wide 
acceptance beginning in the 1980s (e.g., Barron, 1995; Bateson, 2000; Wilden, 1980). 
Accordingly, sociocultural systems theories relating to creativity came into being at about 
the same time, particularly in social psychology (McIntyre, 2013).  
Sawyer (2010) maintains that systems of creativity, like systems that examine 
matter, intelligence, societies, and other complex subjects, are “chaotic, highly nonlinear, 
and essentially impossible to explain and predict from mechanisms and laws” (p. 368). 
Systems theories share a complexity with the human mind, he maintains, which 
accommodates simultaneous and multiple layers of ideas, perceptions, reactions, and 
intentions that are framed by society and context. For this reason, Sawyer argues, any 
empirical, systemic theory of creativity must feature social and cultural as well as 
psychological networks.   
The systems approach is appropriate for examining this sociocultural 
characterization, he says, because it assimilates the phenomenon of creative emergence. 
Sawyer (2006) uses an example from biology to explain its telescoping nature:  
The design of an ant colony emerges from the tiny decisions of thousands of ants; 
the decisions made by a human brain emerge from millions of neurons firing; a 
new social phenomenon emerges from the mini-insights of hundreds of people 
working together . . . These are all examples of creative emergence, and a complete 
science of creativity should be able to explain all of them. (pp. 316-317) 
 
Csikszentmihalyi’s Domain-Field-Individual Model 
Sawyer (2010) credits his mentor, social psychologist Csikszentmihalyi, for 
formulating one of the first and most enduring of the sociocultural systems models of 
creativity. The domain-field-individual model of creativity (Csikszentmihalyi,1988) 
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represents the circular relationships between  culture, social systems, and an individual’s 
genes and experiences. Using language that recalls but does not exactly duplicate 
Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) construct of habitus, 
Csikszentmihalyi routes these three bases into domain (a system of symbols), field (the 
domain’s social structure) and individual (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The domain-field-individual model illustrates the interrelationships between 
an individual, culture, and society that must be in place for creativity to exist. Adapted 
from “Society, Culture, and Person: A Systems View of Creativity,” by M. 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, in R. J. Sternberg [Ed.], The Nature of Creativity: 
Contemporary Psychological Perspectives, p. 329. 
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Because this map plots the constantly shifting links of causality, any point in it can 
be considered the beginning of the creative process. Neither persons, nor domains, nor 
fields act unilaterally; this interconnectedness is the key to the model. In aiming a 
product—what Csikszentmihalyi (1988) calls a “selected variation” (p. 330)—at the field, 
the person is working within established parameters archived within the domain. To put it 
another way, the creative person is to some degree fluent in the lingua franca of his or her 
medium and uses that fluency to produce something that draws from ideas embedded in 
the culture. The product may attract the attention of the gatekeepers of the field, who also 
draw on those ideas implicit in the social structure. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988) points out that the concept of time is integral to his model. 
The recursion of “comparison, evaluation, and interpretation” that accompanies making 
requires it: “It is not only in the transition from the domain to the person but also in the 
move from the person to the field, and from the field back to the domain, that time is 
involved” (p. 332). To that end, the arrows that connect the person to the field and domain 
in the model are intended to be read as ascending spirals tracing the path of the sequences 
of variation, selection, and transmission common to evolution. In time, the creative 
process can change the domain, the field, and the person alike. 
In his review of Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) model, McIntyre (2013) notes that it 
allows for the possibility of shifting power from domain to person to field. These 
components of the model provide what he terms a “scalable” view of the creative process: 
“That is, it applies equally well at the individual level and also at the group, 
organizational, institutional, or sociocultural level” (p. 92).  
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Research Studies of the Domain-Field-Individual Model  
Because of their inherent complexity, systems models of creativity are challenging 
to explore with empirical research. “Each study using the systems approach demonstrates 
to varying degrees that one cannot take apart a system and hope to understand it without 
accounting for the principal synergistic qualities it exhibits” (McIntyre, 2013, p. 92).  
As an illustration, McIntyre (2013) describes four studies he conducted on various 
phases of music production, from songwriting (2006, 2008) to music sampling (McIntyre 
& Morey, 2012). Each necessitated a different research method (e.g., ethnography, 
experiment, practiced-based inquiry) because of the heterogeneous nature of participants’ 
roles. Together, the studies can be taken as a wide-angle snapshot of a particular field. As 
such, the body of work illuminates McIntyre’s contention that open systems, such as the 
one in the field of contemporary music, alone supports creativity. Further, his 
investigations suggest that the patterns of agency sustain Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) 
contention that only complex systems can explain creativity.  
A longitudinal study amplifies that view. Slater (2015) recounts the interstices of 
agency that afforded creative opportunities to Middlewood Sessions, his performance 
group. Slater’s eight years of research involved participant diaries, textual artifacts, 
interviews, and performance videos taking place against a backdrop of concerts, recording 
sessions, and production. In his analysis, Slater notes that the field of music and his band’s 
self-declared domain of jazz/hip-hop/funk/soul cultivated audiences, gigs, and 
collaborations that nurtured their collective creativity. Yet at the beginning, the field and 
domain also confirmed their amateur status. That strengthened the group’s resolve to 
polish musicianship, renew financial and emotional commitments, and bridge the “gulf 
between aspiration and achievement, between the amateur project studio, and the alluring, 
professional music industry” (p. 70). 
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In Slater’s (2015) dissection, time—that is, creative space both to improve and 
build networks—was the prime resource that Middlewood Sessions needed and eventually 
accumulated. Referencing Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) model, Slater notes the fractal nature 
of time—a reasonable point, considering the years he devoted to the group and his 
research: 
How creative work unfolds over time may equally appear stable and neat from a 
distanced perspective (e.g., listening to a track or reviewing a composer’s lifework), 
but on closer inspection a story of messiness, uncertainty and flux is revealed . . .  
[W]e might think of the fractus of creativity to describe creative processes as 
interrupted, non-linear, broken, fragmented. While the experience of listening to 
music gives an impression of chronological time passing (perhaps) smoothly, the 
process by which that music was made is unlikely to be just so. An album, for 
example, proves creative processes took place, but it also obliterates the story of its 
generative origins through the illusion of the temporality it constructs (p. 72).  
Clearly, corroborating the domain-field-individual model (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) 
requires the use of what Hennessey and Amabile (2010) call “multiple lenses 
simultaneously. . .” (p. 590). These studies go about the job in different ways. McIntyre’s 
(2012) tactic of examining various facets of a domain contrasts with Slater’s (2015) time-
intensive approach that looks at a single group’s experience with those facets. By taking a 
long view, both researchers underscore the model’s recursion.  
It is no coincidence that these studies focus on professional métiers. Perhaps 
because of the model’s (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) emphasis on domain and field, 
corresponding research on aspects of everyday creativity has yet to be published. 
Nonetheless, the model is important to consider in unraveling the circumstances of the 
birth of the creative actor because of its emphasis on the interaction of culture, making, 
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and time. Moreover, it casts a long shadow over subsequent sociocultural models, 
including the others reviewed in this section.    
 
Amabile’s Componential Model 
One of the practical applications of systems theories of creativity is how they relate 
to people working in organizations (Montouri, 2011; Sawyer, 2006). Such approaches 
matter because everyday creators are likely to spend time within organizations at work, 
and those organizations are likely to color the way people approach making away from 
work. 
Amabile’s componential model (1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile & Mueller, 2008) has 
been used to illuminate the everyday creativity of an individual’s work life as well as how 
work organizations can benefit from supporting creativity (Amabile & Kramer, 2011). 
Perhaps because it can describe individual as well as group creativity (Kaufman, 2009), 
the model has cultivated wide acceptance. Amabile (2013) claims that initial versions of 
the componential model have been cited in more than 2,000 works of published research. 
In her consideration of the model, she maintains that its four components—domain-
relevant skills, creativity-relevant processes, task motivation, and the social 
environment—coalesce to influence the creative process (see Figure 2). 
  
74 
 
Figure 2. The componential model shows the bearing of task motivation, domain 
skills, and relevant processes on the creative process. The wavy lines between steps 1-
5 of the process indicate a range of variations in the process, while the model’s dotted 
lines suggest potential influences. Adapted from T. M. Amabile, Creativity in Context, 
1996, p. 113.  
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As in other systems theories, the components of this one build on each other. A 
person’s expertise in a particular field increases the likelihood that she or he can fashion 
creative responses to a problem, and then gauge possible responses. In turn, that person’s 
characteristics—including a cognitive style that promotes risk-taking, self-discipline, and 
finding new solutions for problems—promote the tolerance for ambiguity that creativity 
requires (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001).  
From those characteristics stem the drive to do something. Amabile (2013) calls 
this agency intrinsic motivation, the inborn drive is fueled by “interest, enjoyment, 
satisfaction, and the challenge of the work itself—and not by extrinsic motivators” (p. 
136). The social environment can support or deny intrinsic motivation, influencing any 
future creativity an organization can generate.   
The componential model details the subprocesses of creativity as a problem-solving 
exercise, a position also taken by Puccio, Mance, and Murdock (2010) in the thinking 
skills model discussed earlier. The problem and the resources needed to solve it are well-
defined through clarification, idea generation, verification, and implementation. Also, as 
in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) domain-field-individual model, the time sequence of this 
model is fluid; steps can be repeated in and out of sequence until a creative solution 
emerges.  
Its 1996 permutation emphasizes that some extrinsic factors can enhance intrinsic 
motivation. For example, rewards might enhance resources for a project someone cares 
deeply about, or cause a person to feel that she or he is contributing to a creative goal that 
will benefit the greater good (Amabile & Kramer, 2011). Such an outcome, which 
influences individual positive affect, influences the environment as well as creativity-
relevant processes.   
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Despite its widespread use, the componential theory is not comprehensive. Amabile 
(2013) acknowledges that it is not equipped to explain social forces outside of an 
organization that influence creativity. She also grants that it neglects to consider the role 
of the physical environment on creativity though further research could clarify that 
relationship.  
 
Research Studies of the Componential Model 
Much empirical evidence gathered on the componential model affirms its utility at 
work. Kaufman (2009) notes that Amabile and her colleagues have conducted several of 
these studies (e.g., Amabile, 1985; Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994; Amabile & 
Kramer, 2011), though most have been independently performed. 
One qualitative study that does not explicitly involve everyday creativity—but 
which yields some conclusions that could be helpful in considering the birth of the 
creative actor—concentrates on the balance between group and individual creativity in 
modern dance troupes (Harrison & Rouse, 2014). Using grounded theory, the authors 
observed, interviewed, and video recorded four dance groups whose domain expertise was 
vetted in competition. Each group had at least four members, including at least one 
choreographer. The interaction between the choreographers and the individual dancers 
revealed repeated patterns of integration and what Harrison and Rouse call “de-
integration” (p. 1274) that shed light on how dancers work alone and together.  
The first stage in their model, surfacing boundaries, merges Amabile’s (1996) task 
identification and preparation phases as dancers realize their autonomy and 
choreographers impose constraints. The second stage, discovering discontinuities, relates 
to Amabile’s response generation phase as the dancers use their domain expertise to 
respond within the constraints as choreographers loosen the restrictions to entertain new 
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possibilities. In the third stage, parsing solutions—which unites Amabile’s response 
validation and communication and outcome phases—limits are mutually reinstated so the 
group can move forward with the dance. 
Like Amabile (2013), Harrison and Rouse (2014) find the creative process to be a 
reiterative cycle rather than a linear trajectory. They differ from Amabile in finding 
constraints to be a generative force in the cycle; indeed, they saw in the dynamic between 
limits and freedom an elastic impetus for creativity: 
 [T]he dance groups . . . relied on subtle interactions, sometimes increasing their 
autonomy and sometimes limiting it, during rehearsals to create a rhythmic ebb and 
flow, effectively generating enough constraints to guide action but also allowing 
enough flexibility for pushing against these constraints to recognize and refine 
novelty (p.1271).  
The notion of dancers bumping up against constraints brings to mind the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962) as well as Ingold’s (2000, 2010) construct of 
textility. Seen from both perspectives, the limits make the troupe, and the troupe makes the 
limits. For the person experiencing everyday creativity, this could mean that the 
individual, social, and cultural barriers to creativity are internalized and externalized in 
ways that could alternatively enhance creativity as well as inhibit it. 
 
Hennessey’s Telescoping Systems Model  
A research paradox sparked the refinement of another model that extends 
Amabile’s Componential Model (1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile & Mueller, 2008). Social 
psychologist Hennessey (2015) sought to clarify the sometimes-contradictory data she 
accumulated over several years from school children in various countries.  
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Her theoretical work with Amabile on the model (Amabile et al., 1994) encouraged 
Hennessey to conduct further studies in the United States and Saudi Arabia giving 
children tasks of telling stories with and without rewards. She expected that the salutary 
effect of participants’ intrinsic motivation without rewards would be similar, regardless of 
culture. The American participants were judged to make more creative stories and be more 
highly intrinsically motivated when they were offered no rewards. However, the Saudi 
participants’ creativity was less influenced by task motivation and external rewards though 
they found both the task and the rewards more compelling than the Americans 
(Hennessey, 2015).  
Through these and other research projects in various cultures, Hennessey devised a 
model that features the components of task motivation, domain expertise, and problem 
solving. Her model begins with what she calls “‘Big C’ Culture” (Hennessey, 2015, p. 14), 
complete with values, norms, power distance, social cognition, and psychology of self. 
The model cascades to the “‘Little c’ culture” of the immediate environment, and then to 
individual differences before arriving at last at the componential trio (see Figure 3).   
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Figure 3. Hennessey’s telescoping systems model incorporates broad cultural factors; 
these impinge on differences between people and an individual’s stores of task 
motivation, problem-solving abilities, and domain expertise. Adapted from “Creative 
Behavior, Motivation, Environment and Culture: The Building of a Systems Model” 
by B. A. Hennessey, 2015, Journal of Creative Behavior, p. 14. 
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Interestingly, Hennessey began tinkering with the model when she was working 
with Amabile on the aforementioned article (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010) calling for 
more creativity research that involves society and culture. Her analysis, she says, led her 
from a binary individualist/group point of view to a more inclusive vista requiring a 
systemic approach (Hennessey, 2015). 
By looking beyond the classroom’s interior climate, Hennessey (2015) attempts to 
address what Amabile (2013) considers a shortcoming of the componential model. As it 
incorporates the expanses of culture in the mix, Hennessey’s variation allows more latitude 
for thinking about the effects of cultural values and norms—something Amabile argues the 
componential model needs. With its emphasis on “Little c” culture, Hennessey’s revision 
could even obliquely account for the kinds of physical environments that support 
creativity—a detail that might well matter in the work of everyday creators. Yet 
Hennessey’s alteration does not address the effects of time and affordance on the creative 
process. Furthermore, the model appears to not yet have prompted research studies to 
confirm or contradict it. 
 
Glăveanu’s Updated Sociocultural Model  
 Exploring many of the same transdisciplinary aspects of creativity as this thesis, 
Glăveanu (2017) revisited earlier models of psychology that he suggested privileged the 
psychological vantage point over the sociocultural. Not quite an outright response to the 
work of other social psychologists, his model integrates components of other schema he 
has devised to describe a cultural psychology of creativity. Indeed, a further discussion 
about Glăveanu’s model of creative affordances—a element of the following model—
appears in the next chapter. 
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Glăveanu (2017) built this systems model around his five As framework. 
Mentioned in Chapter 2 as a counterpoint to the person/process/product/press schema, the 
five As refer to the necessary components of creativity as actor, action, audience, artifact, 
and affordances.  
Glăveanu (2017) also includes a variety of ways to describe the artifact as a 
creative product, from the general cultural reception to the rarer new and original. 
Furthermore, the model typifies the creative process in terms of action (doing) and 
perception (undergoing) as well as making the unfamiliar familiar, and vice versa. Action, 
in this model, is innovative, improvisational, and habitual; affordances are uninvented, 
unperceived, and unexploited.  
The triad of action, actor, and artifact at the center of the model provides the locus 
of creativity (Glăveanu, 2017). The other elements provide points of contact within and 
around the triad, with the creator transacting with each in the cycles of action (See Figure 
4).  
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Figure 4. Glăveanu’s revised systems model of creativity draws on his five As—
artifact, action, actor, audience, and affordances—to describe the relationships crucial 
to making. In the model, the artifact is flanked by how it is viewed outside and inside 
the creator’s experience. Bordering the triad between action, actor, and audience are 
qualifiers that describe the cycle of creativity, orientations for creative action, and the 
affordances that characterize how action is pursued. Adapted from Thinking through 
Creativity and Culture: Toward an Integrated Model by V.-P. Glăveanu, 2017, p. 277. 
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The model (2017) clearly evinces Glăveanu’s approach as a cultural psychologist. 
It incorporates his contention that creativity is both psychological and contextual, that 
audiences and actors relate in various creative roles from ideation to evaluation, that 
ecological affordances mediate the physical environment for creativity, and that the entire 
system of cycles is embedded in time.  
Glăveanu holds that the proof of the model (2017) is in how well it can explain 
instances of creativity, and he uses his mixed-media studies of Romanian Easter egg 
decorators (2012) to ponder its utility. As Glăveanu makes the case that the decorators 
superficially hewed to the contours of the model, he also calls for the model to be 
considered through other contextual examples of creativity, “from micromoments of 
creative production to the development of lifelong creative projects” (2017, p. 278). Such a 
perspective takes both the long and short view of creative pursuit and underscores an 
adaptability that applies to the eminent creator as well as the everyday maker.  
Although the model (2017) intriguingly encapsulates a robust description of the 
social, cultural, and psychological bounds of creativity, it is not perfect. Its very 
expansiveness makes it difficult to trace the track between the five As and/or the four Ps of 
creativity. Its design also seems to emphasize the artifact over the making or the feeling 
engendered by creating. Furthermore, the temporal aspect of making is implicit, rather than 
explicit, in the model. That said the model represents an important step in articulating the 
dynamic between the personal and contextual bounds of creativity that the present research 
also explores.   
While Glăveanu’s model (2017) is beginning to gain traction from the larger field 
of social psychology, it is too new to have been verified by independent research. That 
said, he posits the model could inspire research into how people interact with audiences as 
well as the role affordances in play in limiting or permitting action.     
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Glăveanu and Tanggaard’s Toblerone Model 
A nuanced sociocultural systems model that more specifically accounts for the 
individual, social, and cultural forces involved in shaping identity could be central to 
understanding the barriers and affordances that must be negotiated before someone thinks 
of her or himself as creative. Markus and Kitayama (2003) call for “really social social 
psychologists” (p. 277) to work on these.  
To that end, Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) take social discourse into account 
within their model of creative identity. While theories relating to creative identity will be 
covered in the next section of this review, Glăveanu and Tanggaard’s model relates to the 
present discussion because it proposes a snapshot of a dynamic phenomenon overlaid with 
social and cultural context.  
The prismatic creative identity schema by Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014)—they 
call it the Toblerone model—borrows its shape from a schematic explaining representation 
by Bauer and Gaskell (1999). One face of Glăveanu and Tanggaard’s prism denotes 
creativity while the opposite face denotes self. The third face represents multiple 
interactions with others, gatekeepers and audiences alike. The spine of the prism extends, 
say Glăveanu and Tanggaard, like a candy bar as each segment denotes societal discourses 
about creativity through time (See Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. This prismatic Toblerone model of creative identity (2014) represents a 
trajectory over time of the relationship between self, other, and creativity. In it, a 
person’s creative identity is negotiated over time by interactions with others, as well as 
society’s ongoing exchanges about creativity. Adapted from “Creativity, Identity, and 
Representation: Towards a Socio-Cultural Theory of Creative Identity” by V.-P. 
Glăveanu and L. Tanggaard, 2014, New Ideas in Psychology, 34, p. 14.  
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Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) maintain that their model delineates how a 
creative person perceives him or herself in context to the greater world. However, they 
caution that the model centers on the concept that a person’s creative identity is one 
sociocultural project among many. Identity is performed and reformed within a gamut of 
social contexts, though “the project we are referring to here is a much more diffuse reality, 
a general direction the self takes in relation to his or her creative potential and expression, 
based also on communication with others” (p. 15).  
 
The Toblerone Model, Considered 
Like Glăveanu’s (2017) updated sociocultural model, this one, too, is recently 
developed to have sparked independent research. Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) 
substantiate it with examples from interviews they conducted with well-known makers in 
Denmark, focus groups with Danish teachers, and interviews with folk-art egg decorators 
in Romania. Reflecting on these interviews, Glăveanu and Tanggaard propose a typology 
of promoted, denied, and problematic creative identities “based on the premise that a 
creative identity is both acquired and maintained in a social context that can be more or 
less favorable to its formation” (p. 15).  
Though Bourdieu is never mentioned, these distinctions certainly bring to mind the 
push and pull of habitus, field, and practice (Bourdieu, 1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). More to the point, the later work more closely fits Dalton’s (2004) sociological 
description of creativity as an interchange of habitus, field, practice, and action.  
Indeed, Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) maintain in analysis that the construction 
of a creative identity is simultaneously personal and social. Moreover, it is ongoing—a 
creative project that has no end as long as the maker keeps making. In that way, this model 
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also subtly draws on Sternberg and Lubart (1999) with the contention that creativity is an 
evolving, emergent phenomenon that is at least partially dependent on context. 
Intriguing as it is, this model is also a work in progress. Unless the societal 
discourses about creativity incorporate the cultural aspects Hennessey (2015) finds 
important—and that figure so prominently in the work of Ingold (2000, 2010), Wilf 
(2014), and Moeran (2014)—the creative identity model (2014) is incomplete.  
Moreover, the model neglects to account for the approach a creative person takes in 
her or his work (Negus & Pickering, 2012), the experience of making, and the role of 
artifacts in how creative identity is shaped. In other words, it could help explain how 
people form creative identities, but not what they do with them. That is a key reason 
Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) call for basing fresh research on it.  
 
Summaries of Systems Models 
This section began by discussing the role systems theories have played in 
elucidating complex subjects in the social sciences, including creativity. Five relevant 
sociocultural models—Csikszentmihalyi’s domain-field-individual model (1988); 
Amabile’s componential model (1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile & Mueller, 2008); 
Hennessey’s telescoping model (2015); Glăveanu’s revised model (2017); and Glăveanu 
and Tanggaard’s creative identity model (2014)—were examined. Several studies that 
extended the reach of these models were reviewed, which led to a deliberation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each model.  
While systems models come closer than single-dimensional versions to explaining 
a broadly considered vision of creativity, one model does not fit all cases. As noted earlier, 
Mumford and Antes (2007) warn against relying on any single model of creativity, and 
that caution certainly applies here. While these models incorporate some of the factors 
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across psychology, sociology, and anthropology that could account for the birth of the 
creative actor, none is a perfect fit. That said, each has elements that are worthy of 
consideration. Ideally, the most appropriate model for explaining the affordances and 
barriers people face as they pursue everyday creativity would draw from the models 
discussed here. 
Perhaps, as the work of Hennessey (2015) suggests, the ultimate utility of systems 
theories of creativity is that they offer tools for reconstructing what is known in multiple 
disciplines about creativity. Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) agree. Their model intends to 
further the field by encouraging researchers to “consider it in a more comprehensive 
manner, one that might not be amenable to easy quantifications but nevertheless can guide 
the construction of novel research designs” (p. 19). Indeed, systems theories might 
eventually demystify what Mountouri (2011) calls “the vexing problems confronting 
researchers, and shed light on hitherto ignored dimensions of creativity” (p. 421).  
To be sure, identity is one of those neglected dimensions. Glăveanu and Tanggaard 
(2014) claim that it is a crucial matter for those who want to examine what it means to be 
creative. Creativity, they augur, is “most of all about the integration of one’s ability and 
actions into an identity project co-constructed by self and multiple others” (p. 19). 
Consequently, the next chapter of this thesis analyzes theories across disciplines that shed 
light on what happens when people begin to think of themselves as creators.   
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE, PART 2: 
THEORIZING CREATIVE IDENTITY 
 
Having examined the social, psychological, anthropological, and systemic 
views of creativity, the focus of this review now shifts to research that deals with an 
individual’s construction of a creative identity. As with the theories of creativity that 
emanate from the different fields discussed in this review, theories of identity tend to 
fit within the foundations constructed by the disciplines. To be sure, even the terms 
used to describe identity vary from discipline to discipline and can be used to discern 
shades of differences in meaning (Elliott, 2012).  
In psychology, for example, the personality-based construct of self-efficacy, 
derived from Bandura’s social cognitive theory (1986, 1997), is the starting point for 
studies of creative self-efficacy (Jaussi et al., 2007; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). In 
sociology, and to a degree in anthropology, the threshold concept is the agency-and-
structure-based structuration, based on work by Giddens (1991). Like all people, 
creative actors tell their stories in narratives (Gauntlett, 2007; Pachuki et al., 2010) 
that in various ways exemplify both creative self-efficacy and reflexivity.  
As it outlines these concepts, this section considers a multi-strand approach. 
Taken altogether, personality and social theories of creative identity—and the 
empirical studies that examine them—can help capture a panoramic view of how 
adults come to view themselves as creative.  
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Getting to Creative Self-Efficacy 
Constructed as a learning theory, social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997) 
asserts that people are capable of understanding and generating symbols, possess the 
ability to apply forethought, and can learn vicariously by watching others. Further, they 
can direct their actions and ruminate over the results. These capabilities, Bandura (1986) 
claims, set the stage for dynamic action that combines the personal and the social: “Seen 
from the social cognitive perspective, human nature is characterized by a vast potentiality 
that can be fashioned by direct and observational experience into a variety of forms within 
biological limits” (p. 21).   
Accordingly, Bandura’s explanatory model of triadic reciprocity (1986, 1997) 
incorporates behavior, the environment, and individual aspects such as cognition, 
personality, and affect. Already interdependent at the outset, these factors interact over 
time in fits and starts rather than simultaneously, Bandura maintains (1986): “Because of 
the multiplicity of interacting influences, the same factor can be a part of different blends 
of conditions that have different effects. Particular factors are, therefore, associated with 
effects probabilistically rather than inevitably” (p. 24). In other words, human outcomes 
are more likely to be kaleidoscopic rather than laser-fine.  
That said, Bandura (1986) posits that self-efficacy—a person’s belief in his or her 
abilities—is one of the most important determinants of outcomes in human behavior. In 
light of social cognitive theory, however, self-efficacy is not a straightforward matter:   
Efficacy in dealing with one’s environment is not simply a matter of knowing what 
to do . . . Rather, efficacy involves a generative capability in which cognitive, 
social, and behavioral subskills must be organized into integrated courses of action 
to serve innumerable purposes. Success is often attained only after generating and 
testing alternative forms of behavior and strategies, which requires perseverant 
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effort. Self-doubters are quick to abort this generative process if their initial efforts 
prove deficient (p. 391). 
The making and learning that are keys to self-efficacy are also central to creativity. 
An extension of Bandura’s work (1986, 1997) called creative self-efficacy (Tierney & 
Farmer, 2002) observes that self-judgments have a bearing on creative expression.  
As an illustration, consider the maker of the tire swing discussed earlier. Whether 
she or he finds the outcome to be a novel and useful gesture of creative self-expression—
that is, whether it aligns with a general definition of creativity—depends first on a set of 
personal evaluations. If the risk-taking that creative action demands is successful, the 
episode enhances the maker’s feelings that he or she can be creative at that particular task.   
 
Creative Personal Identity and Creative Metacognition 
One such episode is not usually sufficient to cement the related construct of 
creative personal identity (Jaussi et al., 2007), which happens when someone considers 
creativity central to her or his self-concept. Instead, creative personal identity is built over 
time and indicates how much of a premium that person puts on creativity in thinking about 
him or herself.  
Jaussi et al. (2007) describe its construction as a personal and contextual bricolage 
composed of memories and opportunities: “The importance of creativity to the self-
definition in creative personal identity comes from one’s past experiences and formative 
opportunities to engage in creativity, either experienced alone or through relationships” (p. 
248). 
Because people constantly act to reaffirm their identities, Jaussi et al. (2007) 
consider creative personal identity malleable enough to fit into an array of situations and 
contexts. Indeed, Kasof, Chen, Himsel, and Greenberger (2007) venture that the social 
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value ascribed to creativity is a potential driver for an individual’s creative personal 
identity.   
Researchers identify further connections. In a study looking at the relationship 
between creative personal identity and creative self-efficacy in the work environment, 
Jaussi et al. (2007) noted that the constructs were related, but their interaction could not 
predict creativity. In a longitudinal study of employees at a state social services provider, 
Tierney and Farmer (2011) found that when creative performance increased, so did 
creative self-efficacy. Similarly, Karwowski (2014)—examining middle and high school 
students to discover the relationship between creativity, creative personal identity, and 
creative self-efficacy—contends that creative personal identity is a foundation for creative 
self-efficacy.  
One criticism of such research is that both creative personal identity and creative 
self-efficacy might be markers for facets of personality. Findings from a large (n = 2,674) 
sample of Polish men and women aged 15-59 (Karwowski, Lebuda, Wiśniewska, & 
Gralewski, 2013) assert that personality factors such as extraversion and openness to 
experience positively relate both creative self-efficacy and creative personal identity. Yet 
the authors tie their research to the construct of self-rated creativity. They contend that 
creative self-efficacy describes creativity as a potential aspect of the person, while self-
rated creativity describes the belief that he or she is creative.  
 
Assessing the Creative Self 
To more precisely determine the relationship between constructs, Karwowski et al. 
(2012; in press) built on the lead author’s previous work (2012) to devise the 11-item 
Short Scale of Creative Self. Using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely not; 5 = 
definitely yes), the measure scores respondents on creative personal identity with 
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statements such as “I think I am a creative person” and “Ingenuity is a characteristic which 
is important to me” (Karwowski et al., 2013, p. 217). Confirmatory factor analysis found 
that self-rated creativity was correlated to both creative personal identity and creative self-
efficacy, though it seemed more closely linked to the former.  
Wondering about the associations between creative self-efficacy and creative 
personal identity, Karwowski then developed the 10-item Creative Mindset Scale (2014). 
He administered the measure in three online studies to more than 1,191 Polish men and 
women panelists registered with a research firm to look specifically at whether people 
who rated themselves as creative had fixed or growth mindsets.  
In the study aimed at exploring creative self-efficacy and creative personal identity, 
the results suggested that those people who scored higher thought of their creativity as 
changing with time or practice. That not-altogether-surprising result suggested to 
Karwowski (in press) a new, higher-order construct involving both creative self-efficacy 
and creative personal identity—creative self-concept. As a social cognitive extension of 
creative behavior, creative self-concept could be a valuable tool to identify how confident 
makers are of their potential. 
Creative self-concept also relates to the construct of creative metacognition 
(Kaufman & Beghetto, 2013). An elaboration of the metacognitive thinking skills 
addressed earlier in this review, creative metacognition is described as “a combination of 
self-knowledge (knowing one’s own creative strengths and limitations) and contextual 
knowledge (knowing when, where, how, and why to be creative)” (p. 155). Kaufman and 
Beghetto consider their definition of creative metacognition broad enough to incorporate 
the metacognitive traits of self-reflection, self-regulation, and self-monitoring, as well as 
the matter of domain specificity. By extension, they say, it may also apply to everyday 
creators. Correlating creative metacognition to psychological assessments such as the 
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Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, Ball, & Safter, 2003) is a chief concern of 
Kaufman and Beghetto. However, creative metacognition could also clarify the thinking 
processes of the everyday maker, which could be relevant to the present research.  
The absence of consistent terms and clear assessments might explain why 
Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) note that identity as a topic of study has received uneven 
attention from psychology-based creativity scholars. “This can be due to the fact that 
identities are less stable than personality traits, and by comparison to cognitive abilities, 
are considered to be a ‘background’ element in creative production” (p. 13).  
It could also be that these methodological challenges fail to consider fully the 
social, cultural, and temporal aspects of creativity that bear out the systems theories 
detailed in the previous section. Beyond describing how individuals construct identity, 
these aspects can help clarify the meaning of creative identity. 
 
Structuration and the Self 
Creative self-identity and metacognition do not happen in a vacuum. As previously 
noted, the contexts of society and culture are inevitable, and individuals are enmeshed in 
ways both meaningful and mundane in accommodating these facets of creative life. Under 
these circumstances, making a personal creative identity is a continual self-actualizing 
project—or, somewhat fittingly for makers—a series of projects. Indeed, Elliott (2012) 
maintains that social theory describes a multiplicity of “narratives of self as a site for 
reconfiguring relations between society, culture, and knowledge” (p. 7). Considered 
alongside Dalton’s (2004) synthesis of action and habitus, these narratives enable people 
to render interpretations about themselves, others, and society—and make changes that 
influence one, some, or all. 
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Dalton’s (2004) middle path combining structure and agency in describing the 
sociology of creativity hews to Gidden’s (1984) theory of structuration, a key social 
identity concept. At its essence, the theory characterizes people’s actions as framed by 
rules—laws, regulations, and orders, and the general sense of what things are or should be 
like—and resources. Social interactions test rules and resources. From that, new rules and 
resources can emerge, and which get tested in ever more social interactions. The repeated 
cycles have a continual and lapidary effect: Social interaction changes or reinforces rules 
and resources, while the rules and resources change or reinforce social interaction. Small-
scale change can, in turn, become societal-level change. 
Individuals filter this constant change. In the process of busily constructing their 
identities, they survey their thoughts, actions, and emotions in what Adkins (2002) calls 
reflexive modernity. Giddens (1984) maintains that the dynamic between self and society 
can manifest its reflexivity at varied levels of consciousness. He details three of them: 
discursive consciousness, which could be considered top-of-mind; practical consciousness, 
which incorporates the commonly held understandings of the activities and procedures of 
social life; and the subconscious.  
Structuration theory maintains that people tread between these states of experience 
because much of what happens in social life is routine. However, not all of it is, and 
therein lies an opening for creativity, both in the view of Joas (1996) as well as Giddens 
(1984, 1991). Identity-shaping change transpires over the course of a life: “Fateful 
moments are those when individuals are called on to take decisions that are particularly 
consequential for their ambitions, or more generally for their future lives” (Giddens, 1991, 
p. 112). At these instances, Elliott (2012) asserts, sweeping changes in the greater world 
interweave with intimate senses of self. “In Giddens’s sociology, the capability for 
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autonomous thought and reflexivity permits a sort of emotional regrooving of self in the 
broader context of contemporary social transformations sweeping the globe” (p. 52).  
 
A Series of Tipping Points 
The implications for the incipient creative actor present two intriguing scenarios. If 
a person’s rules, resources, and social interactions do not offer sufficient scope, he or she 
might not think of him or herself as creative. Then again, if one’s social interactions allow, 
one’s identity as a creative person can be transformed.  
In that light, consider again the tire swing maker. Suppose she or he had never 
attempted such a project, and never considered her or himself creative, at least in making 
tire swings. Suppose further that she or he, for whatever reason, ventured a first foray 
using the rules (swings should be functional, sturdy, and safe) and resources (tire, rope, 
tree, time for making, expertise) considered necessary for the task. If the effort is 
successful—at least by the maker’s personal standards—the person’s identity as a creative 
tire swing maker might well be conceived.  
If the maker’s social interactions are supportive—say, if the children using it were 
pleased, or if the neighbors found it a handsome example—then that nascent creative 
identity might be burnished. If support were not forthcoming, the maker’s creative identity 
might (or might not) be diminished. Perhaps the tire swing maker would stretch the 
boundaries of rules and resources with the next iteration. She or he may paint flowers on 
the tire, or use patterned macramé knots to secure the swing, or even rig it to a playhouse 
overhang rather than a tree. When the project was complete, the maker would self-assess 
its viability, and other social interactions would ensue to influence her or his creative self-
identity.  
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The Ongoing Undertaking 
Clearly, the continual process of an individual’s creative identity is predicated on 
making and nourished by that person’s ongoing reflexivity. To that end, Giddens (1991) 
maintains that people frame identity as a kind of biographical project, an evolving story 
that incorporates personal, cultural, and societal contexts.  
The existential question of self-identity is bound up with the fragile nature of the 
biography which the individual ‘supplies’ about herself. A person’s identity is not 
to be found in behavior, nor—important though this is—in the reactions of others, 
but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. (p. 54; emphasis in 
original) 
Seen under the light of Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) 
constructs of habitus and field, keeping the narrative going could be a considerable, if not 
at times forbidding, task. To be sure, the social sphere can cast an outsize and amorphous 
shadow over the personal motivation to create. As Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) relate, 
some creators are induced to create so they can maintain their creative identities while 
others are enticed to create so they may not be marginalized. On the other hand, it might 
be said that those two conditions are not mutually exclusive. 
Compelling though it may at times be, the identity project is not always top of 
mind, a reality that conforms to Giddens’s (1984, 1991) delineation of the levels of 
consciousness. Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) agree that creative identity does not wax 
when it is thought about and wane when it is not. It does, however, come into focus when 
someone undertakes a mode of creative expression, and then communicates with others 
about that expression.  
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Creativity Self-Narratives 
It is difficult to disentangle the actions, understandings, and meanings that define 
creativity. That said, a person’s narratives can offer insight into the tacit knowledge and 
local understandings not just of the actors themselves, but their social interactions, too.   
A pertinent empirical example comes from Pachucki, Lena, and Tepper (2010), who 
analyzed college students’ narratives about their contributions to campus life. Looking at what 
they call “creativity narratives” (p. 122), the researchers asked 128 students from an American 
liberal arts college to complete surveys and write descriptions of where and how at school 
they felt they were most creative. The authors’ content analysis revealed 40 dimensions of 
self-reported creativity, which ranged from writing (42 counts) to academic work (39 counts), 
to conversation (31 counts). Everyday creativity—defined by the students themselves—
received 15 counts.  
The ensuing factor analysis (2010) uncovered six dimensions: networking (event 
planning and group activities); renaissance (travel, art appreciation, athletics); nurturing 
(children, crafts, volunteering); idealistic (social change and religion); social media (media, 
computer, writing); and gregarious (conversation and humor). Not all dimensions appeared in 
the factor analysis, and the researchers examined those that remained with nonmetric 
multidimensional scaling. This analysis indicated separate blocks of what the authors label 
intellectual/artistic-based creativity (such as dance, theater, and visual arts) and everyday 
creative activities (such as cooking and fashion).  
The study (2010) is useful in that it indicates how readily individuals identify creative 
experience, and that it suggests the students forge creative identities within their social 
interactions at school. However, the study’s applicability to the present question is limited. 
Chiefly, it doesn’t address the how the participants began to see themselves as creative actors 
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although the college students discovering pursuits that make them feel creative might prove 
fertile ground for that.  
Moreover, the sample’s homogeneous composition (2010) does not allow for the 
bigger and different picture that might emerge from a more diverse population. The use of a 
simple survey points to another shortcoming; it could be that students reported what they 
thought the researchers wanted to know, or what seemed relevant at the moment but not in the 
longer run. Indeed, the high incidence of writing as a self-reported creative activity may have 
emerged because the students were, in fact, writing about their creativity. 
Gauntlett (2007) reviews social theories, constructs from the philosophy of science, 
and neuroscientific research to give context to his own work that unites the act of making 
objects with that of constructing identities. Three of his studies, discussed in detail in the 
following chapter, ask participants to be not just the descriptors of their identities but the 
creators of everyday works as well. The resulting narratives are richly revealing about the 
individuals’ inner lives. Taken altogether, Gauntlett’s studies suggest that in the process of 
selecting components, building models, and talking about what they made, participants also 
built new perceptions about themselves. 
Gauntlett’s (2007) research offers a logical extension of Malafouris’s (2013) 
explanation of how people are shaped by the things they make. When individuals answer a 
question by making something—be it an essay, a video, a drawing, or a Lego metaphor—and 
then reflecting on the process, the process frees them to become the chroniclers of their 
stories, the experts of their experience.  
 
Summarizing Theories of Creative Identity 
The theories of creative self-identity explored in this chapter began with an accounting 
of social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1997), and traced how the creative personal 
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identity (Jaussi et al., 2007) and self-rated creativity (Karwowski et al., 2013) models emerged 
from direct inquiries into creativity. From these stem the overarching, more recently devised 
models of creative self-concept (Karwowski, 2014) and creative metacognition (Kaufman & 
Beghetto, 2013). They attempt to accommodate further the contexts of social action into 
psychological interpretations of making. By reviewing Giddens’s (1984, 1991) structuration 
model, this section investigated the recursive nature of building a creative identity and noted 
the importance of narrative in augmenting that process.  
These various explanations of creative identity call to mind Rumi’s (2006) parable of 
the elephant in the dark. In the story, a series of people enter a blacked-out room to examine 
the animal. Each emerges with a different conception about its entirety: The trunk must be a 
water spout; the ear, a fan; the leg, a pillar; and the back, a throne. Each person was partially 
right but ultimately wrong. The poet’s point is that while discrete perspectives are limited, the 
collective, enlightened view brings the whole picture into clearer relief. 
In terms of creative self-identity, all of these theories help make sense of what happens 
when a person starts thinking of him or herself as a creative being. Like creativity itself, 
creative self-identity is neither a psychological nor a sociocultural matter. As an ur-creative 
project, it is both. 
Perhaps because they elaborate and build on larger ideas, these explanations coalesce 
with many of the others discussed in this review, including Dalton’s (2004) description of a 
sociology of creativity. Creative self-concept (Karwowski, 2012) and creative metacognition 
(Kaufman & Beghetto, 2013) help clarify Sternberg and Lubarts’s investment theory of 
creativity (1995), as well as Hennessey’s telescoping systems model (2015) and the prismatic 
model of Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014). Each takes into account the stores of knowledge 
creating demands and places context on the social environment.  
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Similarly, Giddens’s (1986, 1991) structuration theory amplifies the recursions 
essential to both Csikszentmihalyi’s (1986) domain-field-individual model, Amabile’s (1983, 
1988, 1996; Amabile & Mueller, 2008) componential theory, and Glăveanu’s (2017) revised 
model. Moreover, the constructs of structuration, metacognition, and creative self-concept 
also accommodate Ingold’s (2000) construct of textility, and Lévi-Strauss’s (1996) 
interpretation of bricolage.  
Furthermore, the narratives that arise through making illustrate aspects of 
phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and Warnier’s (2001) description of praxeology. Both 
underscore the fact that an artifact makes its creator as much as the creator makes the artifact. 
Taken altogether, these facets of creative identity reiterate Douny’s (2014) point about 
material culture arising from everyday practice. As it happens, creative self-identity does, too. 
A web of influences must secure studies that involve identity and creativity. 
Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014) maintain that these influences include the making self 
who engages with others in social interaction, a common (if evolving) sense of what 
creativity is and what it means, and the identity project of the making self played out over 
time in the social context. With those considerations in the foreground, the next section 
addresses a critical waypoint in the fashioning of a creative self-identity: negotiating the 
affordances that seed a person’s creative identity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE, PART 3: 
AFFORDANCE THEORY AND CREATIVITY 
 
What enables a maker to create? Who helps? What hinders? What combination 
of supports and constraints conspire in the birth of the creative actor? To more fully 
understand the social, cultural, and psychological forces that encourage and discourage 
creativity, this review turns now to affordance theory (Gibson, 1977, 1979). The 
theory has influenced the field of human-computer interaction, neuroscience, and 
robotics (Şahin, 2008), and is beginning to permeate the study of creativity (Glăveanu, 
2012, 2017; Moeran, 2014). This section explores the theory’s precepts and scope and 
details its potential to explain creativity in a way that both accommodates and 
amplifies the creativity theories already outlined. 
 
Affordances Explained 
Gibson (1977, 1979), a psychologist whose primary interest was in the ecology 
of visual perception, coined the term affordance to label perceived aspects of the 
environment, both positive and negative, that affect an organism’s function. In 
Gibson’s definition, an affordance incorporates those parts of the environment’s 
physical properties that suit the organism’s movement, feeding, and actions. The crux 
of an affordance is what it offers the organism, Gibson maintains. His example is a 
stool, which affords sitting:  
If an object that rests on the ground has a surface that is itself sufficiently rigid, 
level, flat, and extended, and if this surface is raised approximately at the 
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height of the knees of the human biped, then it affords sitting-on (1977, p. 68; 
emphasis in original).  
Anything in an organism’s environment can be an affordance, from substances 
and surfaces to designs and configurations. “Affordances act as attractors drawing 
humans into action. . . The world acts, makes occur and initiates possibilities. 
‘Affordance’ is a word for this activity” (Letiche & Lissack, 2009, p. 61).  
Affordances relate in myriad ways. Water, for instance, can be a physical 
feature or a medium for washing, moving, or lubricating. Light can reveal the contours 
of the natural environment as well as the actions of another person; it can also blind. 
Interactions between people and their environments—including other people—further 
influence these actions. Yet until the affordances are duly sensed, the actions 
affordances bring only exist in potential, their meanings unclear. “The animate object 
can give you caresses or blows, contact comfort or contact injury, reward or 
punishment, and it is not always easy to perceive which will be provided” (Gibson, 
1977, p. 77).  
Therefore, a person’s perception of an affordance is as important as the 
affordance itself. Gibson’s (1977, 1979) theory builds on the precepts of valence, 
invitation, and demand inherent in Gestalt psychology (Arnheim, 1974). It makes 
implicit the organism’s perception of the whole, sensing what Edwards (1999) calls 
“the ‘thingness’ of the thing” (p. 96). Values and meanings can be directly perceived, 
Gibson holds, and these perceptions in turn fuel an individual’s actions. Because these 
perceptions take place in the context of a person’s surroundings, Gibson argues that 
studies on affordances should incorporate an organism’s environment. For people, that 
means the personal, social, and cultural aspects that surround them. 
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Affordances Expanded 
Since its inception, other scholars—frequently, those who specialize in human-
computer interaction—have elaborated on Gibson’s  (1977, 1979) theory. Many of their 
papers endeavor to attune real and potential action. Norman (1988, 1998), for instance, finds 
the theory relevant in incorporating affordances into software design so a user can infer what 
they offer. Gaver (1999) maintains that a person’s perception of affordances is influenced by 
experience and will as well as culture and society. Weiser and Seely Brown (1995) consider 
an affordance in relationship to a person’s intentions, perceptions, and capabilities. 
McGrenere and Ho (2000) suggest that a person’s capabilities dictate the potential of an 
affordance, though the affordance exists regardless of those capabilities. Indeed, though a 
person’s goals and needs change over time, they propose that the affordance does not.  
Kelso (2008) theorizes about the relatedness of affordances and how they appear in 
dualities, such as organism and environment, or nature and nurture. Şahin (2008) suggests 
regarding affordance relationships from perspectives of the agent, the observer, and their 
shared environment. Writing about robotics, he further asserts that the perception of 
affordance relationships for both the agent and observer resides inside the agent. An agent’s 
internal dialog holds the key to unlocking the interaction between him or her and the 
environment.    
This diversity of these assertions offers a robust picture of affordance theory’s 
evolution since Gibson’s death in 1979. Although it began as a description of environmental 
perception, the theory now considers social and cultural contexts—for the creative actor, for 
the other, and for their shared environment—and the internal and external relationships they 
yield. Indeed, it appears that affordances invite human action while human assumptions about 
perceptions and society help define affordances (Letiche & Lissack, 2009; Withagen et al., 
2012).  
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As it has become more fully developed, other disciplines have incorporated and helped 
popularize Gibson’s (1977, 1979) theory. In ecological psychology, Warren (1984) conducted 
tests in which people climbed stairs of varying risers; he concludes that people detect physical 
affordances in measurements that correspond to human proportions. Explorations of the 
mirror neuron system (e.g., Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Iacobini et al., 
2005; Rajmohan & Mohandas, 2007) indicate that its primary purpose is representing 
affordances in terms of action.  
Morganti (2008) and Constantini and Sinigaglia (2011) assert such research appears to 
support the triadic reciprocity of behavior, environment, and individual cognition of social 
cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997). In education, affordance theory rationalizes curriculum 
design (Brown, Stillman, & Herbert, 2004), distance learning strategies (Olofsson & 
Lindberg, 2006), and systems of disciplinary affordances (Linder, 2013).  
Helpfully, for those studying how creative identity is formed, ecological 
psychologists Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) draw affordances into a broad 
phenomenological tableau. They contend that the perception of affordances in an 
individual’s environment is refracted by his or her skills. The resulting variations 
could also account for the genesis of someone’s creative self-identity: “By virtue of 
our many abilities, the landscape of affordances we inhabit as humans is very rich and 
resourceful” (p. 325).  
Human movement scientists Withagen et al. (2012) venture that the landscape itself 
has a beckoning character. They look to architecture and industrial design to suggest that 
affordances themselves invite agency. Recalling the work of Dalton (2004), Joas (1996), and 
Ingold (2010), they make three observations as to how affordances can invite action. First, 
affordances can be leveraged only if the agent perceives them. Second, because an invitation 
can be turned down, the decision for action lies with the actor. Third, agents do not necessarily 
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need to make rational decisions about whether to act on an affordance; they can unreflectively 
react to its invitation. It is, they assert, a case of the environment proffering the creative actor 
a summons to do something. 
Understanding what various disciplines consider affordance theory to be is crucial for 
applying it to the study of creativity. The array of research affirms that the construct captures 
the empirical imagination. However, critics maintain that research often fails to account for its 
breadth. Şahin (2008) discusses several reasons in his review of Gibson’s work. He calls the 
theory “an elusive yet confusing notion” (p. 2) that invites misapprehension. “Different quotes 
from Gibson’s writings are often used to support different views on the concept” (p. 7). 
Further, Şahin claims, Gibson’s interests in visual perception colored his image of the theory. 
In practice, he says, “Affordances apply to all types of perceptual modalities” (p. 8).  
Therefore, it is important to consider the ongoing discussions that further the scope of 
affordance theory. It is also imperative to discern ways the developments can inform research 
in specific fields, such as creativity. 
 
Two Views of Creativity and Affordances 
In the field of creativity, work tracing the implication of affordance theory is fairly 
recent. Glăveanu (2012, 2017) and Moeran (2014) assume different vantage points to survey 
how affordances might explain how people perceive their environments as supporting or 
constraining their creative self-identities. 
 
Glăveanu’s Environmental Perspective 
Glăveanu (2012, 2017) holds that one of the limitations of affordances is that 
they are not necessarily perceived by the creative actor. In his sociocultural model of 
an affordance theory for creativity, affordances represent action a person could take, 
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while intentionality is the action she or he would, and normativity is the action she or 
he should take. Affordances confront norms and intentions, he holds, which can limit 
the creativity exhibited by a person through a made object (See Figure 6).  
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What is 
usually 
done 
Normativity or what 
the person should do 
Intentionality or 
what the person 
would do 
Affordance or 
what the person 
could do 
“Uninvented” 
affordances 
“Unperceived” 
affordances 
‘Unexploited’ affordances 
Figure 6. This sociocultural model for an affordance theory of creativity highlights the 
potential for creative action in its margins, where unperceived, unexploited, and uninvented 
affordances lie. Adapted from “What Can Be Done with an Egg? Creativity, Material 
Objects, and the Theory of Affordances” by V.-P. Glăveanu, 2012, Journal of Creative 
Behavior, 46, p. 197.  
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Glăveanu (2012) proposes his model as a way of visualizing the way that environment, 
objectives, and cultural standards form the backdrop for an individual maker’s action. In the 
model, they intersect in the center to represent what is ordinarily done in everyday action, 
“considering physical, personal, and sociocultural constraints” (p. 196). The adjacent 
unperceived affordances are those that are not noticed by the maker and therefore unused, 
while the nearby uninvented affordances are those not yet available to the maker because they 
have yet to be developed, and the close-at-hand unexploited ones are unused because of 
cultural imprimaturs.  
The model is dynamic, Glăveanu (2012) contends, because the sociocultural specter of 
creativity itself is dynamic. “As such, creativity is not ‘in’ the newly perceived, invented, or 
exploited affordances themselves, but ‘in’ the very acts of perception, invention, and 
utilization” (p. 199).  
The model’s empirical foundation lies in Glăveanu’s (2012) mixed-methods research 
with Romanian Easter egg decorators. This folk art tradition is being disrupted by economic 
forces, he asserts, because practitioners are beginning to produce eggs for other holidays in a 
bid to make money throughout the year. In decorating eggs with Santas and Christmas trees, 
such makers are changing the constraints of tradition. Simultaneously, developments in the 
tools and materials for egg decoration are also changing traditional ways of working. In 
subject and media, both traditional and disruptive practitioners are finding in affordances the 
means to discover new ways of working, invent new forms, and redraw the idea of what egg 
decoration should be. 
In those ways, Glăveanu (2012) contends, the boundaries of what is possible in a 
creative pursuit are recast. “What creativity offers the concept of affordances . . . is a more 
dynamic, supple account of what we, as individuals and a species, can do in relation to our 
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environment” (p. 206). The iterative drafts of constant, creative change brought about by 
affordances shape a creator, he maintains, as well as her or his perception of the environment. 
While the sociocultural model of creative affordances (Glăveanu, 2012) clearly applies 
to the circumstances surrounding the birth of the creative actor, it does a better job of 
delineating the work of eminent creators than it does little- and mini-c creators. For example, 
at the beginning of a maker’s experience in a particular medium, many affordances are 
unperceived and seemingly uninvented. Indeed, the maker could do “what is usually done” (p. 
197), and still feel creative in that context and be recognized by friends and family as such, 
which Gauntlett (2007) affirms in his definition of everyday creativity. Ultimately, the model 
appears to offer more of a strict constructionist view of Gibson’s (1977, 1979) theory than one 
that allows, as Şahin (2008) urges, for broader implications. 
 
Moeran’s Circuits of Creative Affordances 
One creativity theorist sketches a vividly inclusive vista of the ways the theory depicts 
the life of a creative actor. Moeran (2014) superimposes affordance theory over the processes 
involved in producing Japanese fashion magazines, ad campaigns, pottery, and art exhibits. As 
a business anthropologist, his emphasis is often economic. His observations detail how 
affordances also help describe the ways amateur makers find their creativity both constrained 
and enabled, and how the experience of negotiating affordances imbues identity.  
Drawing from Gibson (1977, 1979), Moeran (2014) also taps into Bourdieu’s (1984, 
1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) ideas of habitus and field as well as descriptions of 
circuits of commerce by economist Zeliger (2011). Moeran claims that makers in various 
fields confront perceived techno-material, temporal, spatial, social, representational, and 
economic affordances of creativity. As with the later affordance theorists, Moeran finds that 
the relationships that enmesh these affordances are dynamic and highlight the positioning, 
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creative capital, and social conventions of the actors who live them. Furthermore, he 
maintains that their social practices, along with material practices, generate culture as well as 
cultural conventions that can be made or broken. 
 
Techno-material Affordances 
Moeran (2014) considers these to begin with understanding the rules of a particular 
domain. A writer, for example, must know the precepts of grammar and syntax while a 
photographer has to apprehend how to compose, light, and focus a shot. The rules can be 
adapted—that is one opening for creative results—and the writer’s text and the photographer’s 
images are subject to the dynamics of production. The tools used in production afford the 
introduction of ever more tools as disciplines and potentials evolve. Moeran (2014) uses the 
development of digital publishing as an example:  
Digital technology affords art directors, photographers, and cameramen new ways, and 
new conventions, of carrying out their work. It also affords the introduction of new 
materials, such as the use of flat liquid display screens in the work of video artists . . . 
as well as constraining, materials and technologies enable. Yet, in enabling, they also 
constrain. That is the explanatory power of affordance. (p. 41)   
Ultimately, material affordances (i.e., media) dictate the often multi-layered technical 
choices the maker must select. From this “ensemblage of technical affordances” (Moeran, 
2014, p. 42), the creative actor assumes a social identity. In short, the materials make the 
maker. 
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Spatial Affordances 
Obviously, a maker’s choice of materials and techniques affect the size of the 
outcome. Spatial affordances also come into play when the maker chooses a place to create. 
The classroom affords different parameters than the kitchen table for the beginning jewelry-
maker, for example, and a corner of the garage a different set than a full workshop for the 
woodworker. 
Moeran (2014) suggests that the physical and digital locations of display and 
performance can have both practical and symbolic import. Audience size is often contingent 
on these locations. He cites the matter of terroir in the production of French wine. The 
burgeoning farm-to-table movements in the US and UK incorporate the old concept of what a 
particular natural environment can do for the taste and authenticity of food. These movements 
increasingly draw from the participation of home cooks and backyard gardeners as much as 
they do entrepreneurial chefs and farmers (Schoenfeld, 2011). 
 
Temporal Affordances 
As in the systems models of creativity discussed previously, Moeran (2014) sees time 
as an element in this model, too. Time is a both constraining and enabling factor in making—a 
scarf can take weeks to knit, a pot days to cure, a fly minutes to tie. If you have the time to 
devote to making, producing any of those things is possible. Further, if any of those items is 
made as a gift or for a particular event, deadlines influence the time spent planning, making, 
and sharing as well as the actual production. Shortcuts may be taken, collaborators brought in, 
and the initial product might be altered to meet a narrow window of opportunity. In this way, 
Moeran says that time “affords both style and content” (p. 46). 
More broadly, everything makers create is a part of the series that has come before it, 
both in the maker’s frame of reference as well as in the larger cultural sense. Time, then, bears 
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upon the creativity that others see in a creative product. “In other words,” Moeran (2014) 
points out, “the affordance of time in the broader sense of historical continuity means that 
creative expression is not ‘created’ so much as ‘renewed’” (p. 47).  
 
Representational Affordances 
With Moeran’s (2014) emphasis on context in creative expression, it follows that 
genre, form, and aesthetics constitute a class of related affordances. There is, in most modes of 
creative expression, a typical way of doing things. For instance, a haiku has three lines and 17 
syllables, a silver bangle fits around a wrist, and flour baked with water and yeast yields a loaf 
of bread. Each of these representational affordances carries constraints that help define the 
products.  
At the same time, however, representational affordances can be shoved, if not toppled 
outright if conditions warrant. Moeran (2014) states: 
Just how far borders can be pushed would seem to depend on the personality of the 
creator, the nature of the product, genre, or communicative style; and the social world 
of which they are a part . . . The looser the aesthetic constraints, the easier it is to 
innovate, and vice versa (p. 50). 
 
Social Affordances 
As important as time, materials, space, and format are, other people also matter to the 
creative actor. They constitute the human networks that influence creativity: audiences, 
mentors, colleagues, and collaborators. In Moeran’s (2014) view, the “other” that features in 
all the systems theories of creativity—and that is central to Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993; Bourdieu 
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& Wacquant, 1992) discussion of habitus and field—is perhaps the most crucial affordance 
for a maker to negotiate.   
In seeking equilibrium between the capriciousness of habitus and a particular field’s 
rules, a maker contends with other people who can inhibit or enable the creative process. 
Social affordances can be interpersonal, organizational, or both. In the case of an amateur 
painter, for example, friends or family might voice opinions about a piece being entered in a 
community show. The exhibition jury will render another judgment, as will the audience at 
the show and the critics attending the opening. Whether the piece appears in the exhibit, 
formal or informal social networks may persuade the painter to produce similar work, pursue 
a new direction, or try another hobby altogether. In ways both subtle and bold, such social 
affordances influence the form, styles, and directions of creative products as well as the 
creative identity of their makers. 
 
Economic Affordances 
When markets are booming, and personal accounts flush, Moeran (2014) says, a 
creative actor may find it easy to spend on classes, materials, and studio space. When a 
recession plods along, however, buying even basic supplies might seem like an indulgence, or 
worse, a misappropriation of funds.  
While the availability of money might seem to correlate with creative expression, 
Moeran (2014) stresses that this is not necessarily the case. A larger budget does not ensure a 
creative result. Lack of money can spur radical adjustments in techno-material and 
representational affordances that yield new modes of expression.   
 
 
115 
 
Circuits of Affordances 
These six affordances connect for the creative actor in multiple ways, Moeran (2014) 
contends. Consider, for example, those that the maker of an oak basket must pass through, 
around, or over to produce a basket to give her granddaughter. First, she must go to the woods 
in the spring and find a straight oak sapling to harvest when the sap is rising in the tree. She 
must use an ax, a mallet, a drawknife, and wedges to cut a log from the tree, strip the bark, 
and split it in half, and then quarters, then eighths. After that, she must take a pocketknife and 
narrow the splits to the right size for weaving, smoothing each one with finer and finer grades 
of sandpaper. Then she must soak the splits in water so they will be pliable enough to work. 
Only after those tasks are finished can she begin weaving the handle and ribs, following a 
pattern her grandmother taught her, one that originated in the region many years ago. 
Each selection in this series impinges on the maker’s circumstances and choices. The 
choice of oak means that she must have access to land that grows suitable trees. She has to cut 
the sapling at the optimum time. Time, too, factors into the days she devotes to the basket. 
She must also have the means to buy and possess the tools and workspace, and be proficient 
in the techniques of working the wood. Her choice of a traditional pattern has some bearing 
on the techniques she uses, as well as in the worth of her gift to her granddaughter. Moreover, 
making this particular basket links her to generations of her family and the coterie of oak 
basket makers in her circle.    
In this example, each indelibly affects the other. Like the basket in question, they are 
woven in a way that is specific to this maker’s context. Regardless of maker and medium, 
these connections—what Moeran (2014) calls “circuits of affordances” (p. 35) plot the 
enabling and constraining conditions a person must confront in the process of becoming a 
creative actor (See Figure 7). “Each affordance is entangled in the others to such an extent 
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that the only way out of their enmeshment would seem to be to refer to them all by an 
overarching . . . concept like ‘creativity’” (p. 59).  
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Morean (2014) interprets a maker’s ongoing appraisals of affordances to mean  
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Social 
 
Techno-Material 
Spatial 
Temporal 
Figure 7. Moeran’s circuits of affordances model maps the multifaceted connections 
between the aspects of the environment that both constrain and support the creative 
actor. In connecting, affordances lead from possibility to action. Adapted from The 
business of creativity: Toward an anthropology of worth by B. Moeran, 2014, p. 59.  
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Moeran (2014) interprets a maker’s ongoing appraisals of affordances to mean that 
creative products descend from a succession of transitions that ultimately transform. The 
product is not the only result when someone makes something, however. Social relations and 
individual experience connect at specific points in time to establish and re-establish a person’s 
identity as a creative being.  
 
Summarizing Models of Creative Affordances 
Affordance theory offers a way of thinking about the limits and allowances that a 
person necessarily confronts on the way to becoming a creative actor. This section details the 
interactive and iterative processes between organism and environment first described by 
Gibson (1977, 1979). It relates how affordance theory has been refined to support the 
development of human-computer interaction and explain action in fields as diverse as 
psychology, neuroscience, and education. The section then considers the applicability of 
Glăveanu’s (2012, 2017) theory of creative affordances as well as Moeran’s (2014) circuit-
based schema in clarifying the types of affordances creative people encounter. 
Interestingly, the concept of affordances brings this review back to the creative process 
described by Wallas (1926), through the neuropsychological realm, into social and 
anthropological spheres. It leads to the integration of these disciplines attempted by systems 
theory. In particular, it brings needed detail to the creative identity model of Glăveanu and 
Tanggaard (2014) and helps contextualize the identity building described by Karwowski 
(2012, 2014) and Giddens (1984, 1991). 
As Small (1998) contends with musicking, the perception described in affordance 
theory is that of possibilities and relationships. Pursuing those relationships constitutes the 
action that is at the core of creativity. Because affordances are potentialities, the outcome of 
that action is never fully known until the maker processes it. Building the narrative of creative 
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self-identity might be a vital way for people to reflect on where affordances have led them, 
and at the same time perceive where the relationships they map may take them next. Indeed, 
the agency underscored by affordances could well promote an individual’s identity as a 
creative being. That possibility and the promise it holds for understanding how someone 
develops a creative identity are considered next. 
 
Conclusions from the Reviews of Literature 
 The winding route to the process and feeling of creativity, of making 
something that “evokes a feeling of joy” (Gauntlett, 2011, p. 76) has many aspects. 
Those aspects outline the everyday creator’s interior, social, and cultural selves—and 
form the structure of this chapter. This section summarizes the most pertinent points 
made in this and the previous two chapters. It ends with a statement, informed by this 
review, of the central questions of the present research.  
 
An Ordered Procession 
 The initial section of this review identified the need for a consideration of 
creativity that spans the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. 
Levels of creative significance were discussed. The interplay between mini-c 
(Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007) and little-c (Richards, 2007) creativity—that is, the path 
between building knowledge and actually making something—was identified. Some 
definitions of everyday creativity were deliberated, and Gauntlett’s version (2011), 
which accommodates the personal and contextual perspectives on making, was chosen 
for this review.  
 Heeding Mumford and Antes’s (2007) admonition not to rely on any single 
model of creative achievement, this review examined psychological theories that 
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attempt to explain the process and personal attributes of creators. Creative cognition 
(e.g., Finke, 1996; Finke et al., 1992) and creative metacognition (e.g., Flavell, 1979; 
Hargrove, 2013) help make sense of the deliberate and intuitive ways people think 
about solving problems. However, psychological theories of the creative person are 
sometimes limited by reliance on personality, intellect, or other traits. Sternberg and 
Lubart’s (1995) investment model transcends those limits by accounting for those as 
well as for knowledge, environment, motivation, and cognitive style.   
 The review then proceeded to discuss sociological approaches to creativity. 
Williams (1976, 2011) contended that a theory of creativity should evince the social 
dynamics that both people and societies require to function properly. Joas (1996) 
construed that human action is creative, while the work of Bourdieu (1984, 1993; 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) offers insights into the social routines of creativity in 
terms of habitus, capital, field, and practice.  
Dalton (2004) resolves the contradictions in the earlier work by allowing that 
creativity lies in both the imprecise structural element of habitus and the freedom of 
human activity. The interplay of these theoretical positions was discussed. It was 
determined that Dalton’s framework shares common ground with some psychological 
theories, notably the geneplore model by Finke et al. (1992), Sternberg’s (1985) 
triarchic theory, and Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) investment theory. 
 The anthropological theories examined in this review suggest that artifacts and 
processes can shine a light on the individual and social vagaries the creative actor must 
negotiate. Cultural anthropologists (e.g., Hallam & Ingold, 2007; Naji & Douny, 2009; 
Negus & Pickering, 2012) track the rhythms of making. They maintain that material 
culture emerges in the tension between tradition and innovation and necessarily occurs 
in a social context. Ingold (2010) and Malafouris (2013) assert that makers, materials, 
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and artifacts act to change one another, a step towards bridging the social and 
psychological models discussed earlier.  
 Further consolidating the differences, the systems theories of creativity 
appraised in this section amplify what multiple disciplines consider important about 
creativity and creators. Csikszentmihalyi (1988); Amabile (1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile 
& Mueller, 2008); Glăveanu and Tanggaard (2014); and Hennessey (2015) all devise 
models that scrutinize makers and their contexts. Their work acknowledges that 
creativity not only takes place on multiple levels simultaneously but is an action that is 
constantly repeated.  
 That repetition is crucial to the creative actor’s identity. Relevant theories 
deliberated in this review (e.g., Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; Kaufman & 
Beghetto, 2013) attempt to pin down the ways that people assume identities as makers. 
As Giddens’s (1984, 1991) structuration theory intimates, makers’ narratives—indeed, 
their very actions—are bounded by the rules and resources they encounter in creating.   
 Indeed, those rules and resources constitute the affordances an individual must 
negotiate on the way to becoming a creative actor. This review explores the genesis 
and evolution of affordance theory (Gibson, 1977, 1979) employed in fields as diverse 
as human-computer interaction and education to clarify thinking about perception and 
environment. Withagen et al. (2011) relevantly depict affordances as affordances as 
invitations to agency. 
In creativity research, the literature specifically points to Glăveanu’s (2012) 
sociocultural model depicting perceived and unperceived affordances and to Moeran’s 
(2014) constellation of techno-material, temporal, spatial, social, representation, and 
economic affordances. Moeran holds that these operate in circuits. The sequences 
could well map the creative actor’s terrain of identity and making. 
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The Case for Knowing More 
 As has been noted elsewhere in this review, many theories of creativity have 
yet to be fully explored by empirical research. There are, for example, far more studies 
of eminent creators than everyday makers, and more research on the psychological 
aspects of making than the social and cultural ones. Therefore, the present research 
aims to break needed new ground by broadly considering theoretical implications that 
cut across academic disciplines to discover the affordances everyday people confront 
on the way to feeling creative.  
The sense that one is creative is built; that construction—indeed, the 
construction of individual identity itself—is a continual, reflexive process (Giddens, 
1984, 1991). What is the foundation of the building? Is it a chance remark that gets 
shaped into a facet of identity? Or is it an internal conviction that one’s actions are 
novel and meaningful, as befits someone who is, by extension, novel and meaningful? 
In short, what makes some people say they are creative?  
The present research examines creative people and the contexts through which 
they maneuver. It aims to resolve yet-unanswered questions with the objective of 
clarifying what happens when an adult begins to think of him or herself as creative. 
Based on the empirical research outlined in this literature review, the central research 
questions are these: How do the internal and external affordances to creativity 
influence an individual maker’s evolution toward seeing her or himself as a creative 
actor? How do people identify and perceive these affordances? How does being 
creative change people’s lives? 
Answering these questions is intellectually significant because individual 
creativity has the potential to catalyze change in society, particularly as culture begins 
to facilitate what Richards (2007) calls the “greater social valuing of creativity” (p. 
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15). Richards’s colleague Goerner (2007) envisions a societal reset integrating 
individual creativity with collective creativity and collaborative learning. Gauntlett 
(2011, 2014, 2016b) often amplifies that position, seeing the societal beginnings of a 
world-changing cultural transition toward creating and making and the individual and 
group empowerment those actions entail.  
This research, then, has the potential to make a compelling contribution to 
knowledge. If more is known about the transition into creative selfhood—that is, what 
flips the switch toward creativity—then the transition might be eased.  
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
The previous chapters in this thesis surveyed a diverse landscape to examine 
the theories that inform how and why people develop creative identities. Those 
theories ground the methods used in the present research, and this chapter examines 
them in detail. Beginning with a description of the research design, the chapter 
describes the rationale for the selection of a mixed-methods strategy. The matters of 
sampling and participants are delineated, and the pilot study conducted to develop the 
research design is explained. The details of data collection, processing, analysis, and 
the proposed dissemination of results are outlined. Ethical considerations, strategies 
for establishing credibility, and methodological assumptions and limitations are 
articulated. The chapter ends with conclusions. 
 
Research Approach 
Pinpointing the birth of the creative actor is congruent to Faulkner’s (1959) 
description of recognizing the moment of inner peace: He called it  
[a] condition in retrospect, when the subconscious has got rid of the gnats and 
the tacks and the broken glass of experience and has left only the peaceful 
pleasant things—that was peace. Maybe peace is not is, but was. (p. 67)   
The key to getting an answer to the question about the beginnings of a creative 
identity is to find someone who already thinks of her or himself as creative, and ask 
this individual to articulate that was. The approach of the present research centered, 
then, on finding adults who already viewed themselves as creative and asking them to 
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reflect on the events and forces that led them to construct self-identities as creative 
individuals.  
 
Achieving Fitness 
The selection of the components of the research design was informed by work 
from Edmondson and McManus (2007). In their review of the processes of conducting 
qualitative research in organizations, they examine studies that exhibited to them an 
internal consistency between the research question, constructs and methods, the type of 
data collected, and the methods used to collect and analyze them. When those elements 
are “congruent and mutually reinforcing,” the resulting theoretical contribution is a 
product of this “methodological fit” (p. 1156).   
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
To achieve that state, Edmondson and McManus (2007) recommend a holistic 
approach to assembling the components of a research project. As noted in the previous 
chapter, for example, the central questions of the present research are exploratory. 
Rather than choosing one method of answering them, Edmondson and McManus 
propose mixing qualitative and quantitative methods to yield multiple ways of 
producing relevant data. 
Consequently, the present research was conducted using both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a mixed methods convergent parallel design. In this strategy, 
Creswell (2014) stresses that quantitative and qualitative data collection should occur 
simultaneously, as should analysis. Results are compared or related, and subsequently, 
all data interpreted (See Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Convergent parallel mixed methods strategy. The design requires simultaneous 
collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. They are related and interpreted in 
analysis. Adapted from Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches by J. W. Creswell, 2014, p. 220.  
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Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala (2013) recommend this strategy for three reasons. 
First, it offers complementarity, a means of comparing qualitative and quantitative 
points of view. Second, it attempts to corroborate and evaluate the credibility of 
inferences made in one method with those in another. Third, it allows for cross-
elaboration of key findings in the data.  
There is also a longstanding precedent in psychology for selecting a convergent 
parallel design. Campbell and Fiske (1959) chose a multitrait-multimethod strategy—a 
quantitative forerunner of convergent parallel design—to validate their studies of 
schoolchildren’s psychological traits. Because the present research seeks to explore 
psychological as well as cultural and societal aspects of creative identity, it likewise 
points to the need for a multifaceted means of yielding data.   
The method of the present research was consequently composed of two parts. 
The qualitative process was influenced by narrative-based studies mentioned earlier 
that Gauntlett (2007) conducted to highlight aspects of creative identity. The 
qualitative method also drew from research on reflexive practice (Schön, 1992) that 
suggests the act of making animates a practitioner’s tacit knowledge. The quantitative 
instrument was adapted from Karwowski (2012) and Karwowski et al. (2012, in 
press), whose work on creative identity is also outlined in Chapter 3.  
Before proceeding with the present research, I proposed a general outline to the 
Graduate School Board of the University of Westminster as a part of the application to 
register in January 2015. The proposal was approved in June of that same year.   
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Qualitative Rationale 
Gauntlett (2007) recounts three studies that proved instructive for the 
qualitative phase of the present research. In his “Video Critical” study, Gauntlett asked 
53 English schoolchildren to make videos on their attitudes about media and ecology. 
In the process of learning how to make and then produce videos, Gauntlett found, the 
schoolchildren were able to articulate their opinions to a degree that had not seemed 
possible when the project began: “My observation of them making a video over a 
number of weeks provided a rich seam of information which would otherwise have 
been inaccessible to a researcher” (p. 100).  
In a second study, 100 English 14- and 15-year-olds sketched a celebrity in 
action; Gauntlett (2007) then asked them open-ended questions about whether their 
drawings reflected something about themselves. His analysis of the drawings and the 
responses suggested that the act of drawing gave respondents time to think about their 
answers.  
In a third study involving the facilitation methodology Lego Serious Play, 
Gauntlett (2007) asked 79 respondents from England and Norway to make 
“metaphorical models of their identities in Lego” (p. 151). Gauntlett identified 140 
themes in the metaphors, and 100 influences on identity. In addition, respondents 
completed a questionnaire at the end of the workshops about their models and their 
perceptions of reality. Their narratives yielded abundant detail that added context to 
the themes. Taken altogether, this trio of studies indicates that making something—
and talking about what was made—are valid steps in soliciting reflexive thinking.  
That point is underscored in earlier work by Shön (1992), who suggests that 
makers not only engage in reflective practice but also possess knowledge beyond their 
ken, developing tacit reserves of perception that come into play when they make. 
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Among the several case studies he conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Shön observed four students playing design games and building 
prototypes with Modula, Tinkertoys, and Lego. From these sessions, Schön proposes 
that the socially constructed contexts bracketing the process of making are rarely 
completely articulated; it is up to the maker to construct the world in which he or she 
makes and create strategies to find solutions. Schön offers that the prototypes, too, are 
heir to these individual constructions of reality. He asserts that their ultimate value lies 
in the maker’s reflection on the process. 
Taking cues from Gauntlett (2007) and Shön (1992), as well as incorporating 
Malafouris’s (2013) idea of materials and making as a form of “enactive cognitive prosthesis” 
(p. 175), the qualitative phase of the present research required participants to make creative 
products in their chosen media while they thought about the time when they first felt creative. 
Participants were asked to photograph their objects and send me the digital images. I then 
interviewed each participant about his or her experience as a creative actor, with a focus on 
the creative affordances the participants negotiated.  
Through one-on-one interviews, as well as extending the purposes of photo 
elicitation (Rose, 2012) to include craft elicitation, the present research aimed to reveal 
a wealth of verbal and nonverbal information about creative actors, their networks, 
affordances, and cultural worldviews. 
 
Quantitative Grounds 
Gauntlett’s (2007) Lego project combined the qualitative aspect of making with the 
quantitative tool of a questionnaire. Building on that combination, the present research focused on 
adapting a quantitative instrument that focused on the creative identity of the participants in the 
sample.   
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Creswell (2014) notes that the quantitative instrument in the convergent parallel mixed 
methods design should measure parallel constructs. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Short 
Scale of the Creative Self (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012, in press) attempts to 
quantify creative personal identity, along with creative self-efficacy. Six statements (3-6, 8, and 9) 
are concerned with cognitive self-efficacy; the remaining five (1-2, 7, 10-11) deal with creative 
self-identity. Their 11-item measure used a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely not; 5 = 
definitely yes) to ask respondents whether they agree with statements such as “I think I am a 
creative person” and “Ingenuity is a characteristic which is important to me” (Karwowski, 2012, p. 
217). The internal consistency of the scale for creative personal identity was high (α = .90), as was 
the scale measuring creative self-efficacy (α = .81). Confirmatory factor analysis established a 
two-factor structure, and that finding was echoed by exploratory structural equation modeling 
(Karwowski et al., 2013). 
Even though the measure surveys creative self-efficacy as well as creative self-
identity, it was chosen for the present research for a compelling reason: Not only does 
it provide additional demographic data, it can be seen as a way of confirming that 
participants do feel creative when they work in their chosen media, neutralizing a 
potential criticism that the participants might be prone to confirmation bias. While the 
items of the scale addressing creative identity are of chief interest in the present 
research, the items concerning creative self-efficacy could provide more in-depth 
insight in later analyses.  
 The purpose of the survey was to verify the creative identity of the participants 
in the qualitative segment. Consequently, it was decided to limit the survey sample to 
them as the sample is not intended to be representative of a wider population. 
Surveying the participants in this fashion ultimately delivers a fuller picture of the 
people taking part in the research than would either segment alone.  
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Lessons from a Pilot Study 
 To audition the method of the present research, a pilot study (n = 6) was 
conducted in October 2015. Six amateur makers—three men and three women, four of 
whom were in the US, and two in the UK—were recruited from local classes and 
word-of-mouth inquiry. Pilot participants had a median age of 48.2 years. All 
answered yes to the question, “Do you feel creative when you make something in your 
preferred medium?” and agreed to participate in the pilot project. None of the pilot 
group participants were involved in the interviews that became the focus of the present 
research. 
 Once they agreed to take part in the project, the members of the pilot group, 
acting individually, made and photographed a range of objects, including silver 
jewelry, an oil portrait, a pine kitchen stool, a decorated birthday cake, a blog post, and 
a pan of cinnamon rolls to fulfill the first portion of the qualitative interview. Each 
participant was interviewed about his or her experience in making the object. Five 
interviews took place in person, and one via Skype. Five interviews took place in the 
makers’ homes, while one occurred in the interviewer’s home. Interview questions 
were broad and open-ended, touching on the creative process in general and more 
particularly on the various affordances each maker encountered on the way to feeling 
creative.  
Pilot interviews took between 45 minutes and an hour to conduct. They were 
simultaneously transcribed as participants talked, a method often used by journalists 
for field notes (Powers, 2005).   
Participants were then asked to complete an initial version of the Creative 
Identity Questionnaire at their convenience and were told at the time of the interview 
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that completing the survey was optional. Four participants completed the survey, while 
two did not.  
 
Emergent Motifs 
Once interviews were completed, transcripts were reviewed individually and 
together to discover the rough outlines of themes that might emerge. The review also 
served to identify any procedural changes that should be implemented in the primary 
project.  
Foremost, the pilot project confirmed the decision to solicit a variety of makers 
as a way of understanding overarching patterns in individuals’ creativity. Their 
disparate media yielded parallels in terms of the makers’ motivations and rationales. 
For example, a number of participants discussed how long and how seriously they 
pursued their media before they felt creative. The painter put it this way:  
Sometimes, someone in class will say, ‘Painting is fun, isn’t it?’ No, sometimes 
it is not. It’s hard work. Besides, I’m not doing it for fun. I’m doing it because I 
want to excel. If I wanted to have fun, I’d eat chocolate instead.  
In addition, participants revealed various affordances, often without being 
asked. “I work in my kitchen,” the cake decorator said about her workspace. “That’s 
one reason we bought the house we did. There’s an island in the middle of the kitchen. 
If you have a big cake to decorate, you need a lot of space.” The baker talked about his 
social support: “My son always encouraged me to bake. [My wife] does, too. Her 
office mates like my cinnamon rolls. During the holidays, they’re always asking if I 
can make more.”  
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 When explicitly queried, participants vetted the experience of having made an 
object before talking about their creativity. The woodworker explained it in terms of 
clarity:  
Making [the kitchen stool] actually helped me think about why I enjoy 
woodworking. Working on it, I decided that it really comes down to an internal 
sense of satisfaction in making something. Then, getting to the heart of it, I 
admitted I want to always continue to learn and learn.  
The blogger reported that the method yielded an unexpected but welcome 
consequence:  
Just talking about why I feel creative about working on this blog has had the 
effect of making me more deliberate about [writing] it. Being more intentional 
about how I express myself is one of the biggest gifts to have come from really 
thinking about my creativity.  
 The results of the survey also assented to its utility. Of the four respondents, all 
scored between 4 and 5 on the items that measured creative self-identity. This 
confirmed the participants’ assertion that they did indeed feel creative in their media. 
In review, it was decided that the chief benefit of the survey was to offer a group 
portrait of respondents as creative individuals.  
 
Practical Results 
 The pilot project was instructive in evaluating the working procedure for the 
present research, identifying both strengths and weaknesses. For example, though 
everyone asked to participate in the pilot project readily agreed, making their objects 
took as long as eight weeks, which was longer than initially anticipated. Deadlines 
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needed to be elastic to compensate for this timeframe. For more complicated projects, 
it was decided that future participants could make a portion instead of a whole object.  
Likewise, the interviews appeared to be productive, but the method of 
capturing them needed to be standardized. It was determined that interviews should be 
digitally recorded and then transcribed. I could then redact the manuscripts, editing, 
masking, and inserting them into qualitative software for analysis, a procedure 
encouraged by Kuckartz (2014) for clarity and security.  
 As for the survey, participants reported liking its brevity and the ease of filling 
it out online. With an eye toward generating more textured data, I decided that giving 
respondents the option to disclose demographic information could result in a more 
accurate picture of the group.  
Importantly, a necessary change to the Creative Identity Questionnaire became 
apparent in the pilot project. Because all items in the original Short Scale for Creative 
Identity (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012, in press) were phrased positively, 
it was adapted for the present research by reverse-coding item 10. The original 
“Creativity is an important part of myself” became “Creativity is an unimportant part 
of myself.” Weems and Onwuegbuzie (2001) suggest that making such a change in 
self-report questionnaires prevents the occurrence of automatic response patterns and 
enhances reliability.   
Considered in its entirety, the pilot project indicated that the mixed method 
convergent parallel design (Creswell, 2014) was appropriate for learning more about 
the questions that sprang from the review of the literature: How do the internal and 
external affordances to creativity influence an individual maker’s evolution toward 
seeing themselves as a creative actor? How do people identify and perceive these 
affordances? How does being creative change people’s lives?  
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By illuminating the fine-tuning needed to ensure a workable method, the pilot 
project highlighted the benefit of contrasting the data-rich individual qualitative 
interviews with the mosaic of quantitative data from the survey. In aligning makers, 
their objects, and their thoughts in this strategy, the present research developed a 
growing sense of internal consistency, approaching the “methodological fit” of 
Edmondson and McManus (2007, p. 1115).  
 
The Present Research: Sampling and Participants 
 Insights from the pilot project informed the more formal research project. For 
example, to mirror the diversity within the adult population of makers, I intentionally 
sought variety in participants as well as media. For the present research, purposive 
sampling (Barbour, 2001) offered a means of including the most comprehensive array 
of makers, allowing for participants to reveal with their stories the rules and resources 
that figure into the formation of their creative identity. 
The point of purposive sampling is to encourage close examination of a group 
of people with a specific set of characteristics (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). Its  
parameters suit the close-textured nature of qualitative and mixed-methods research:  
Simply put, the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find 
people who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of 
knowledge or experience. [The technique] is typically used in qualitative 
research to identify and select the information-rich cases for the most proper 
utilization of available resources. This involves identification and selection of 
individuals or groups of individuals that are proficient and well-informed with 
a phenomenon of interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, note the 
importance of availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to 
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communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and 
reflective manner (p. 2). 
In other words, participants in a purposive sample are chosen based on the 
presumption that they might bring acuity to the qualitative project. The goal is depth of 
understanding, not generalizability. By contrast, a probabilistic sample—one whose 
goal is to provide the researcher with a group that enables the drawing of 
generalizations about the broader world—would not necessarily require individuals 
with the narrowly specified set of characteristics a purposive sample demands.   
Following the example of the Lego study (Gauntlett, 2007), the present 
research also surveyed makers in two countries—in this case, the US and the UK—to 
attempt a broader view. This approach addressed shortcomings in a study by Glăveanu 
(2012), who looked solely at the work of Romanian Easter egg decorators. It also takes 
a different approach than Moeran (2014), who examined specific Japanese 
organizations (e.g., a pottery, a fashion magazine, an advertising agency) in his work 
on creative affordances. In the current instance, 42 people—21 from the US, and 21 
from the UK—participated in the study. 
 The present research aimed to discover more about the motivations that drive 
everyday creators; therefore, only amateur makers were recruited. In the interest of 
developing a broad pool, some potential participants were recruited on online maker 
forums (such as https://forum.yoyogames.com/index.php) others at hobbyist 
newsletters (such as www.learning-to-see.co.uk), and in-person community classes 
(such as https://www.camdenartscentre.org/whats-on/courses). Others were referred by 
people who had previously participated in the research. Working through varied 
platforms to uncover makers proved an effective means of finding qualified 
participants. 
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 In addition to having an amateur standing—that is, not earning a living from 
their work in the media they felt creative in—potential participants had to answer 
“yes” to the question, “Do you feel creative in your particular medium?” The 
precedent for having participants define creativity for themselves—a fitting direction 
for something as individually construed as creative identity—was set by Pachucki et 
al. (2010).  
If a participant in the present research responded in the affirmative, she or he 
was asked more about her or his medium to make sure it did not too closely duplicate 
others already in the study. After the discussion, each potential participant was emailed 
a letter (see Appendix B) detailing participation in the project, including instructions, 
confidentiality information, and contact information. Agreeing to take part in the 
project evinced participant consent. 
 To obtain a balanced sample, I deemed it important to interview men and 
women. I also decided that talking to people representing a range of ages would 
provide additional bases for comparison. To that end, 17 men and 25 women took part 
in the study; their ages ranged from 20 to over 55, with most respondents (n = 20) 
falling into the middle range. Identifying three racial categories (Asian, Black, and 
White) provided further structure to the potential sample. Those considerations imbued 
the data with built-in points for comparison and deeper perspective. Table 1 displays 
the details of participant demographics. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the Sample Population (n = 42) 
Characteristic UK (n = 21) US (n = 21) Total 
 n % of UK 
sample 
n % of US 
sample 
n % of total 
 sample 
Sex       
     Male 9 43 8 38 17 40 
     Female 12 57 13 62 25 60 
Age       
     20-29 8 38 3 14 11 26 
     30-54 10 48 10 48 20 48 
     55+ 3 14 8 38 11 26 
Race       
     Asian 4 19 1 5 5 12 
     Black 1 5 2 10 3 7 
     White 16 76 18 86 34 81 
 
Note. Percentages rounded off to the nearest decimal point. 
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 Additional insight into the demographic makeup of the sample population 
came from the Creative Identity Questionnaire. In the participant letter, makers were 
directed to https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CreativeIdentity. Once at the site, they 
were asked to complete the questionnaire (see Appendix A) that comprised the 
quantitative segment. During interviews, I told participants that completing the survey 
was an optional step.  
Of the 42 participants, 30 completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 71%. 
In addition to items from the Short Scale of the Creative Self (Karwowski, 2012; 
Karwoski et al., 2012; in press), the 16-item survey featured five questions concerning 
respondent demographics. Beyond standard questions about sex and age, the survey 
asked participants for country of residence, household income in their country’s 
currency, and employment status. Because the survey did not ask for names, 
respondent data were labeled R1, R2, etc. Table 2 details the demographic breadth of 
this information. 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of the Questionnaire Participants (n = 30) 
Characteristic n % of respondents 
Sex   
     Male 13 43 
     Female 17 57 
Age   
     20-29 4 13 
     30-54 17 57 
     55+ 9 30 
Country of residence   
     UK 15 50 
     US 15 50 
Employment   
     Employed full time 12 40 
     Employed part time 5 17 
     Not employed 6 20 
     Retired 4 13 
     Prefer not to answer 3 10 
Income   
     Up to 24,999 6 20 
     25,000 to 49,999 4 13 
     50,000 to 74,999 3 10 
     75,000 to 99,999 3 10 
     100,000 to 149,999 6 20 
     150,000 and above 6 20 
     Prefer not to answer 2 7 
 
Note. Percentages rounded off to the nearest decimal point.                                      
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A well-constructed purposive sample has the potential of “enhancing sample 
coverage and providing a framework for analysis” (Barbour, 2001, p. 1116). By 
drawing a sample that sought variety in age, sex, nationality, race, employment, and 
income, the present research endeavored to shine the most informative light on the 
research questions. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Participants were free to decline to participate in this study. There was no 
financial compensation for participation. For those who did take part, its benefits were 
intrinsic. Makers reported finding the interview process pleasant and seemed pleased 
with the knowledge that they were contributing to research. Many expressed 
enjoyment in making the object required for the project.  
The study offered little inherent risk to participants beyond those encountered 
in everyday life. Beyond the time spent on making an item, participating in the 
interview, and completing the questionnaire, the risks to participants were minimal.  
 Information from the study was purposely shared with participants. They were 
informed about how the research would be disseminated in the participant letter (See 
Appendix B), which functioned as a means of informed consent. 
I maintained participant confidentiality by assigning alphanumeric designations 
(P1, P2, etc.) to those who participated in the qualitative research. That designation 
appeared in the analysis software with the participant’s interview and object photo.  
My complete interview log—a record of participants’ names, contact 
information, and stage in the project—was maintained on a different laptop computer 
than interview transcriptions. Access to both computers was password protected. 
Likewise, the digital recordings were tagged with each participant’s respondent 
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designation, and filed in a secure password-protected account on the cloud storage 
service Dropbox. Moreover, participant IP addresses were made anonymous in the 
online assessment by the survey site: (www.surveymonkey.com). Interviews, 
transcripts, photos, and assessments will remain under password protection in my 
personal files for a minimum of three years. 
 
Data Collection, Processing, Analysis, and Presentation 
Figure 9 outlines the process of the present research. It began with the 
literature, incorporated the pilot study, and iteratively tracked between data collection, 
analysis, and the literature.  
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Developing key questions 
 
Referring back to literature 
 
Pilot study 
 
Interviews, photos and questionnaire 
 
Pilot study analysis 
 
Preliminary analysis 
 
Formal analysis 
 
Literature review 
 
Data analysis  
 
Data collection 
 
Figure 9. The path for the present research. The iterative steps of the empirical process trace an 
arc that begins and ends with the literature review. Adapted from “Let’s Dance! Elastic 
Coordination in Group Work: A Qualitative Study of Modern Dancers” by S. Harrison and E. 
Rouse, 2014, Academy of Management Journal, 57, p. 1263.  
144 
 
Interview Mechanics 
Much the way that a metalsmith alloys copper and zinc to make bronze, the 
qualitative research interview renders participants’ narratives to create a composite 
picture framed by the research questions. Because the present study sought to make 
explicit participants’ implicit views on creativity, participants were asked about 
previous and current experiences of making objects in their chosen media. In this way, 
both participants and the researcher were able to evince the individual qualities, 
practices, and evaluation of creativity (Patton, 2002).  
The mechanics of the interviews—that is, how and where they were 
conducted—were central to the research outcome. Most interviews took place in 
makers’ homes or making spaces (n = 27; 64%). Other locales included restaurants, 
coffee shops, bars (n = 12; 29%), and schools (n = 2; 5%). One interview (2%) took 
place in the participant’s car. When practical, interviews were conducted in person (n 
= 27; 64%). When that could not happen, they were conducted and voice-recorded 
over Skype (n = 6; 14%), Google Hangouts (n = 2; 5%), or telephone (n = 8; 19%).  
The longest interview was 88 minutes, while the shortest—which ended 
prematurely because of Skype issues—was 14 minutes, a range of 74 minutes. The 
average length, as well as the mode of interviews, was 44 minutes; the median was 43 
minutes. Altogether, there were 1,840 minutes of interviews in the project (See 
Appendix C for the anonymized interview log). 
Initially, I transcribed the first recordings (n = 3; 7%). In the interests of time 
and efficiency, I then used Rev.com, a professional transcription service, to transfer 
the remaining interviews (n = 39; 93%) into a written format. Kuckartz’s (2014) rules 
for computer-assisted transcription, a straightforward framework for assisting the 
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accuracy and transparency of the results, provided a working template for all the 
transcriptions. Once they were completed, I edited, formatted, and masked the data.  
 
Analytical Strategies 
Qualitative coding and data analyses were performed using MAXQDA 12.1 
software, which manages multimedia data and provides tools for writing comments 
and coding. Each prepared transcription was downloaded into the program.  
Qualitative data were analyzed in a thematic qualitative text analysis process 
(Kuckartz, 2014). Thomas and Harden (2008) detailed how they successfully used the 
process to review constraints and facilitators to children’s selection of healthy foods—
a matter that echoes the creative affordances at the core of the present study. The 
iterative framework they describe suggests that the researcher survey the text in waves 
for topical categories and subcategories. At every new phase of coding, themes are 
recalibrated to the research questions (See Figure 10).  
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3. First coding process: 
Code available data using 
main categories 
4. Compile passages assigned 
to each main category 
5. Determine subcategories 
Research 
Questions 
1. Initial work with the text: 
Highlight important passages, 
make memos 
2. Develop main topical 
categories 
7. Category-based analysis and 
presentation of results 
6. Second coding process: 
Code all data using the 
elaborate category system 
Figure 10. In the thematic qualitative text analysis process, the steps relate at critical points to 
each other and to the research questions. Adapted from Qualitative Text Analysis: A Guide to 
Methods, Practice & Using Software by U. Kuckartz (2014), p. 70. 
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In addition to the use of the mixed methods convergent parallel design, which 
Creswell (2014) maintains is a means of establishing credibility in qualitative research, 
two other procedures were used to strengthen the project. Validity in keyword and 
denotative coding was assisted by peer review, a practice Creswell also recommends. 
The peer reviewer for this project is a professional sociologist with several years’ 
experience in conducting and evaluating qualitative research. In addition, the peer 
reviewer and my director of studies were privy to the research audit trail—including 
interview logs, field notes, and data—following the suggestion of Rodgers (2008) to 
promote transparency.  
Quantitative data were analyzed using Excel 2016 software. The primary 
purpose of that analysis was to corroborate the participant group’s demographic 
information and creative identities. As with qualitative data, quantitative data were 
kept in password-protected, cloud-based storage and laptops. 
 
Presentation Aims 
The present research will be shared in a series of written reports: This thesis, 
which will be published on EThOS, the British Library’s electronic repository for 
theses, as well as journal articles, conference presentations, and book chapters. 
Moreover, in 2018 I will document the study in a blog, “X Makes Y,” which highlights 
participants’ narratives and images of their objects. The audience for the blog will be 
the participants themselves, as well as other creativity researchers and makers.  
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Methodological Limitations and Assumptions 
Mixed-methods research customarily dictates the identification of the 
researcher’s values and biases. In disclosure, I hold creativity to be a universally 
distributed human trait with a neutral ability to aid or hinder. I also believe amateur 
makers filter a number of personal, cultural, and societal influences to produce their 
work, and that no maker works in a vacuum removed from these contexts. I could be 
said to have inside knowledge about making; I spent 30 years as a nationally 
recognized journalist in the US, covering various aspects of popular culture, including 
fashion, interior design, architecture, handcraft, and cuisine. In the process, I became 
adept in the practice of interviewing as well as familiar with a range of various art and 
craft pursuits. I also make objects in a variety of media as an amateur, similar the 
participants in this research.  
This experience can be viewed as a benefit because I can relate to other makers 
and effectively interview them; in that way, my background presents another tool for 
methodological fit (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Nonetheless, incorporating a 
researcher’s firsthand experience in a study’s method requires self-awareness, and I 
have made every effort to remain objective.  
Other limitations, many of them stemming from the necessity of capturing 
data, bind this research. For example, written transcripts are a generation removed 
from the voices of participants, but careful preparation renders them an effective tool 
for transparent analysis. Likewise, powerful software could be said to offer a range of 
pre-set ways of looking at data, though it offers an unparalleled means of helping a 
researcher examine material both close-up and at a distance to better identify patterns.   
Another potential shortcoming is that this mixed methods research is 
exploratory; there are limits to its generalizability. While indeed it provides insight, 
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and it is hoped, will spur ideas for future studies, the study is nonetheless investigative. 
Yet Kuckartz (2014) acknowledges that theory development—and not 
generalizability—is the goal of such research. Moreover, the present research offers at 
least one other important benefit: Involving participants in this first foray into craft 
elicitation explores the contours of this untested methodology.  
 
A Pair of Preconditions 
The research method is predicated on two assumptions. The first is that asking 
participants to make something while they think about what happened when they first 
felt creative will yield richer data than just asking them outright. The second is that 
having a range of participants working in varied media will offer more insight than if 
the research centered on those who make only one type of object.   
The initial assumption was defused by Gauntlett (2007), reflecting on his 
identity studies. “If participants are invited to spend time in the reflective process of 
making something, however, they have the opportunity to consider what is particularly 
important to them before they are asked to generate speech” (pp. 182-183; emphasis in 
original). The time for incubation is a by-product of making, he contended, allowing 
for whole-brain processing that allows a participant to come closer to what Gauntlett 
called “. . . an often-complex matrix of feelings and impressions” (p. 186). The true 
value of the experience of making is beyond language, he maintained. By absorbing 
motion, thought, intention, and memory, making allows a participant to express 
aspects of identity verbally as well as nonverbally.  
The second assumption hearkens back to Kaufman’s (2009) call for more 
multifaceted creativity research. “I highly anticipate studies on the relationship 
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between creativity and blogging, aesthetic sensibilities and Facebook and MySpace 
homepage creation, group creativity and Wikipedia entry production, and how 
imagination is used in creating role-playing game characters” (p. 171). Studies that 
cast a broad net might not definitively answer universal questions about creativity, but 
that is not the point. “There is unlikely to be any one test or theory, or even one 
finding, that everyone agrees with, gets behind, and supports. But where’s the fun in 
that, anyway?” (p. 174).  
 
Conclusions about Methods and Procedures 
 The central research questions for the present study focus on creative 
affordances and how they relate to an individual maker’s creative identity. How do the 
internal and external affordances to creativity influence an individual maker’s 
evolution toward seeing him or herself as a creative actor? How do people identify and 
perceive these affordances? How does assuming a creative identity change a person’s 
life?  
Investigating the answers to those questions requires a strategic combination of 
methodologies, and reflects the broad influences that color the study of creativity 
itself. This chapter examined the method behind the present research. Specifically, it 
described the research design and made the case for the selection of a mixed-methods 
convergent parallel design. The rationales for sampling and participant selections were 
explained, and the pilot study was described in detail. Data collection, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination were discussed. Ethical considerations, ways to establish 
credibility, and methodological assumptions and limitations were recounted.  
Throughout the chapter, the components of the research method were 
compared to the paradigm of methodological fit (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). The 
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field research aligns with the research questions at various points in the process: the 
use of mixed methods, the choice of interviewing as a means of data collection, and 
the development of craft elicitation as a way of achieving a portrait of sorts of the 
study’s participants.   
The intention is that somewhere in the junction of the selection of these 
methods, my background in interviewing and making, and participants’ experience in 
making meaning along with their objects, patterns will emerge that will aid in the 
collective understanding of what it means not just to create, but to create a creative 
identity. Those patterns will become clearer in the following chapter, which describes 
and analyzes the data of the present research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CREATIVITY IN PROPORTION: 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
 
 
As detailed in the previous chapter, two streams of data fed the convergent 
parallel mixed methods research strategy (Creswell, 2014) behind this project. In the 
qualitative phase, which will be presented in the next chapter, I cultivated the stories of 
people who make things and feel creative when they do so. The Creative Identity 
Questionnaire (based on Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; in press) that most 
participants completed—an instrument chosen due to its ability to confirm 
participants’ creative self-identity—formed the quantitative branch. This chapter 
considers the results of the questionnaire in detail and moves through the interlude 
between quantitative and qualitative phases.  
 
Quantitative Results: The Creative Identity Questionnaire 
After gathering the qualitative demographic information discussed in the previous 
chapter from the questionnaires, determining the distribution of respondents’ (n = 30) 
questionnaire scores was my next concern. For the positively worded items in the survey, the 
Likert-like scale scoring awarded the response “totally agree” with 5; “agree somewhat,” 4; 
“neither agree nor disagree,” 3; “disagree somewhat,” 2; and “totally disagree,” 1. The 
negatively worded items (items 8 and 10) were scored with an opposite scale (i.e., “totally 
disagree” scored 5, while “totally agree” scored 1).  
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Eleven non-demographic items comprised the survey, and four respondents skipped 
one question each. Table 3 displays these skipped as well as the median and standard 
deviations of participants’ net scores for each question.   
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Table 3 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Respondent Scores by Question 
Item Mean SD 
  1. I think I am a creative person.  4.33   .98 
  2. My creativity is important to who I am. 4.33   .87 
  3. I know I can efficiently solve even complicated problems. 4.07   .68 
  4. I trust my creative abilities.a 4.24   .82 
  5. Compared to my friends, I am distinguished by my imagination and ability.  3.73 1.03 
  6. Many times I have proven I can cope with difficult situations. 4.37   .66 
  7. Being a creative person is important to me.a 4.55   .72 
  8. I am unsure I can deal with problems requiring creative thinking. 4.03 1.12 
  9. I am good at proposing original solutions to problems. 4.03   .71 
10. Creativity is an unimportant part of myself.a 4.17 1.23 
11. Ingenuity is a characteristic that is important to me.a 4.38   .67 
 
Note: Per Karwowski et al. (2012, in press), items 1, 2, 7, 10, and 11 are concerned with 
creative personal identity, while the remaining items address cognitive self-efficacy.  
a Item skipped by one respondent; n = 29. For all other items, n = 30. 
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 While the descriptive statistics attempt to address whether participants saw themselves 
as creative beings, a review of the analysis in Karwowski et al. (in press) spurred a secondary 
but possibly related question: How strong is the relationship between creative personal 
identity and creative self-efficacy? 
Finding the answer necessitated using fully completed questionnaires. Of the 
initial 30 respondents, one had an erratic answer pattern and was excluded from the 
calculations as a respondent error. Four respondents who did not answer items 
included in the subscales—as noted in Table 3—were also excluded. Both kinds of 
exclusions are recommended by Abell, Springer, and Kamata (2009) in rapid 
assessment instruments for ensuring reliable analysis. Therefore, n = 25 for this 
analysis. 
To convert raw scores to a more meaningful representation, I created indices by 
summing the subscale scores for creative personal identity and creative self-efficacy. I 
then divided those numbers by the maximum score possible to create an index whose 
values ranged from 0 to 1. For the creative personal identity index, the median was .9, 
the mean was .84, and the mode was 1. For the creative self-efficacy index, the median 
was .81, the mean was .79, and the mode was .83. 
Next, I calculated a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to 
compare the relationship between these two constructs. There was a positive and 
moderately strong correlation (r = .61) between the two variables. Squaring the 
coefficient (r2 = .377) indicated that creative self-efficacy explained approximately 
38% of the variation in creative personal identity in the sample. A scatterplot graph 
illustrates the results (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11. Plotting the points of questionnaire respondents’ values for creative 
personal identity and creative self-efficacy illustrates their moderately high scores. The 
clustering of points in the upper right-hand quadrant of the graph also indicates the 
positive correlation between constructs. 
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Summary of the Quantitative Results 
The results of the Creative Identity Questionnaire indicated that respondents 
confirmed having the attributes of a creative self. This result echoes earlier findings 
(Karwowski, 2012, 2014) that suggest how people perceive their creative abilities has 
a substantial bearing in their motivations and how they act on them. 
The aligned results of creative personal identity and creative self-efficacy 
assessment also seem to agree with the contention of Karwowski et al. (2012, in press) 
that the two constructs are somehow related. While creativity is a complex subject that 
has benefitted from the examination by different perspectives, for simplicity’s sake, 
one construct was considered sufficient for the purposes of the present research. The 
chief interest for this segment of the project was creative personal identity as a means 
of vetting the creative identity of the recipient. The qualitative results appeared to 
corroborate the contention that the individuals who participated in the present research 
were likely not simply saying so merely to take part in the study but instead did (and 
do) consider themselves creative. 
 
Comparative Interlude: Of Numbers and Constructs 
 Thinking through the qualitative results was the first part of the 
comparison/relation segment of the convergent parallel mixed methods strategy. It 
then fell to me to devise the codes for the qualitative portion of the research that would 
encourage the side-by-side comparisons that Creswell (2014) suggests for this research 
design.  
 Just as Kuckartz (2014) maintains, this process began with the first interview. 
“If the researcher conducts the interview him or herself, he or she will automatically 
analyze certain statements according to his or her previous knowledge as well as the 
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interview question” (p. 132). That was certainly the case with this project. Listening to 
participants, whether in coffee shops or their homes or studios, I felt that I could hear 
the codes as they talked. In a real sense, I found myself reflexively “coding” while the 
interview was underway, keeping the research questions—and my own experience as 
an amateur maker—in mind.   
Kuckartz’s (2014) process for thematic qualitative text analysis outlined in the 
previous chapter prompted my formal analysis. My initial work with the text—which 
occurred during transcription, re-reading, and formatting the transcripts—focused on 
highlighting important passages and making memos that summed the thrust of each 
interview. I also initiated memos reflecting research notes and emerging questions at 
this point. I maintained and added to these running notes throughout the project using 
the analysis software. 
Returning to the research questions, I assigned three main topical categories, 
which I came to think of as meta codes: Creativity, Identity, and Affordance. In turn, I 
assigned each meta code a set of sub-codes suggested by my initial review of the 
interview transcripts.  
The sub-codes for Creativity were Physicality and Inspiration. For Identity, the 
sub-codes were Education and Age. Taking a cue from Moeran (2014), the sub-codes 
for Affordance were Time, Space, Money, Techno-material, Social, and 
Representation. Constituent sub-codes for Social (Family) and Representation (Far, 
Close) were also created. Table 4 reports the codebook definitions used in the primary 
analysis of the participant interviews. 
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Table 4 
Code System and Working Definitions 
  Code Sub-code Constituent 
sub-code 
Codebook definition 
Creativity   Mentions of creativity, including 
definitions 
 Physicality  Involving the body in making 
 Inspiration  Mentions of ideas, people, things that 
inform creative identity 
Identity   Relating creativity to identity 
 Education  Mentions of school, classes, learning 
 Age  Mentions of how old/young someone 
is 
Affordance   Those things in the environment that 
affect creative identity 
 Representation  Relating to how an inner vision 
affects making 
  Far When representation is far removed 
from mental ideal 
  Close When representation matches mental 
model 
 Social  Relating to social forces  
  Family Mentions of a family member 
 Techno-
Material 
 Relating to how technology, tools, 
technique, skill, and materials act as 
affordances 
 Money  How financial resources affect 
creative identity 
 Space  How space (or the lack) influences 
creative identity 
 Time  Relating to how time operates as an 
affordance 
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Coding took place in January and February 2017. Many passages in the 
interviews touched on multiple codes, and I coded these to reflect each one 
participants addressed, as recommended by Kuckartz (2014).   
In this interlude between phases, the quantitative results provided a framework 
for exploring the numerical aspects of the qualitative interviews. Indeed, the numbers 
illustrate the scope of the project: Using the 16 codes of the first round, I identified 
4,894 segments. Figures 12 and 13 detail these findings. 
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Figure 12. During the interviews for this project, participants were prompted to talk 
about affordances, the things that helped and hindered their creative identities. That 
they felt creative was already established by their participation, which might account 
for the relatively low counts for creativity and identity. Instead, the two variables could 
be considered the subtexts for the passages that explored affordance.  
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Figure 13. A closer examination of the counts for affordance sub-codes suggests that 
while participants discussed money, space, and time, they talked far more about their 
materials, social networks, and their conceptions of their work. “Affordance,” a word 
that most participants were initially unfamiliar with, was only mentioned 18 times in 
the 42 interviews. 
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Summary of the Comparative Interlude 
 In one of their problem-solving protocols, Torrance and Safter (1999) 
recommend taking a step back when one episode ends to prepare for the next. The 
interval, they say, serves to “stimulate thinking to a higher level of creativity” (p. 29) 
necessary for the upcoming stage. So it was with the interval phase of this project.   
 I noted that I could hear codes falling into place during interviews with 
participants, and the time between phases enabled me to clarify my vision about the 
coding process described in this section. It also provided me the distance to specify the 
meta-, sub-, and constituent sub-codes I used in the analysis.  
 Thinking more clearly about creativity, identity, and affordances—and the 
various aspects of each meta-code that participants talked about—was time well spent. 
Not only did it allow me to link the numbers of the statistical analysis with the codes 
of the qualitative phase, but it also helped give shape to the dissection that follows. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VARIABLES EXPRESSED IN EXPERIENCE:  
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA  
 
Numbers of codes describe one aspect of the data. Other meaningful facets lie 
within the insights, opinions, and creative experiences participants shared. Hearing 
what they had to say about the ideas behind the codes revealed both strong and subtle 
distinctions about the interplay between creativity, identity, and affordance. It also was 
crucial to seeing how the constructs are lived, and, I hope, to getting to the essence of 
what happens to facilitate the generation of creative identity.  
As I accumulated their stories about the delights and irritations of making, it 
occurred to me that the often-powerful ways that participants relayed their experiences 
vividly brought to life Moeran’s (2014) contention that creative affordances occur in 
circuits. I came to feel that creativity and identity must also cast their webs because 
participants frequently interlaced their comments with references that indicated that 
few, if any, of these constructs happen in isolation. 
Yet, looking closely at what they said about specific codes—meta, sub, and 
otherwise—was an instructive means of seeing if the structure held up. This section, 
then, considers each in turn. 
 
The Primacy of Creativity 
Reading the interview transcripts, it was evident that participants understood 
that the text and subtext were their creative self-hood. Perhaps because they had 
already identified themselves as creative in order to participate in the project, they 
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more often spoke implicitly rather than explicitly about creativity. Nonetheless, they 
confidently expressed opinions on this key variable.   
In so doing, they often underscored Gauntlett’s (2011) definition of creativity, 
which this research operationalizes. As noted in Chapter 2, it emphasizes creating 
something novel in a specific context and the resultant joy that comes from making 
and sharing. Participants, too, explored issues of connection and process that Gauntlett 
delineates. For example, P40, an amateur novelist, linked context and communication: 
“If you’re going to write a novel, first and foremost, you write a novel because you got 
a novel in you. And you want to write it. You want to share it with the world.”  
Likewise, P4, who practices the Japanese stitching pattern sashiko, made a 
point about sharing and creativity: “I thought about . . . when I feel most creative, and 
it’s usually when I want to create something for someone. It’s the gift-y thing, or if I 
get emotionally charged about something.”  
Cupcake baker P25 understood the individual nature of creativity, and her 
assessment reiterated Gauntlett’s (2011) contextual definition. “I have a friend [who] 
works on motorcycles. To me, that’s not creative, but I know it’s his creative outlet. 
It’s like [he’s] fixing it, creating pieces for [his] motorcycle.” Costume maker P7’s 
view was similarly contextual and more inclusive. “I think a lot of people are creative 
without really realizing it because there are lots of ways to be creative,” she said. 
Creativity, for some participants, was a quality that satisfies an otherwise 
unmet need, and it was often characterized as integral to their lives. P1, a knitter, said 
the contentment she felt when working on a project caused her to realize a more 
general truth. “I think anything you do, whether it is painting or whatever art thing you 
do, it has to resonate with you in some way, fill some kind of thing that you feel like 
you need.”  
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Her observation and others like it recall Taylor’s (1991) assertion that making 
is how people come to define themselves. They also tie into the way Pickering and 
Negus (2004) typify creativity as being important because it helps people feel 
complete. Additionally, these insights relate to identity and reiterate how intertwined 
the concepts seem to participants. 
 Addressing creativity more generally, some participants said they felt creative 
from the beginning of their pursuits. Others talked about the coming of creativity only 
after they had gained what they considered sufficient experience and could push past 
the boundaries of their media. Such points of view are consistent with Sternberg and 
Lubart’s (1995) investment theory of creativity. While these participants could 
produce outcomes that others recognized as creative, they felt they first needed to 
master their chosen pursuits.  
Songwriter P16 affirmed that years of practice had a tangible payoff. “For me, 
it was only when I became proficient technically that I really thought I was genuinely 
able to be creative.”  
That accumulating experience is brought to bear in every project that occurs 
after that, and for some, the creative bar is set higher with each one. As P18, a crazy-
quilter, related:  
. . . [T]o me, creativity happens . . . when you put something [of yourself] into 
it. So it’s not enough to go get a pattern, to choose the wool and work it. It’s 
more like, ‘OK, I have this pattern; what can I do? Can I put a different stitch? 
Can I put two different wools together?’ 
Some interviewees linked creativity with completed projects. While boat-
maker P23 animatedly talked about plans for renovating an old skiff, he was equally 
excited about a smaller project fresh off the woodworking bench. “I just finished 
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[something else] I think is creative. I call it my ‘artisanal American craft project,’ a 
small little funky chest that fits in a spot in the house.” Perhaps because he had just 
made it, the chest loomed as large in his interview as the much more extensive project 
in his future. Ingold’s construct of textility (2000), explained in Chapter 2, is apparent 
in this combination of experience, time, product, and process.  
A few participants equated making with unmaking. When P5, an oil painter, 
recalled being creative in her childhood, she described a decisive moment: “I wanted 
to know how a clock worked, so I threw it [against a tree], and my mom was really 
angry at me . . . I still feel creative when I’m trying to destroy something.” 
Her youthful curiosity grew into an adult tool for knowing the world, which 
calls forth the precepts of phenomenologists such as Csordas (1990) and Merleau-
Ponty (1962). By unmaking the clock and following through on her curiosity, she was 
constructing a persistent way of inhabiting her creativity. 
My field journal suggested two creativity sub-codes. I noted that the people I 
talked to regularly referred to inspiration, as well as to a bodily sense of making, which 
I called physicality. While I did not subsequently code these categories often—
inspiration received 78 mentions, and physicality 21—I nonetheless found that they 
shed additional light on aspects of participants’ descriptions of creativity. 
 
The Bolt from the Blue 
Those who did talk about inspiration said that people and places most often 
fired their ideas. Photographer P29 said she could rely on friends who were chefs for 
meals and more. “Just to watch them do something that they love to do and are so 
good at—that also is creative, and I can feed off that.” Likewise, P40 found herself 
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surreptitiously taking notes during conversations with her friends to fuel plot twists for 
her novel.   
Cities were often-cited creative inspirations; London, in particular, was spoken 
of almost like a person in its ability to get creative juices flowing. Dancer P36 went 
into the city several times a week to visit museums, take photographs, and “feed off 
what I consider inspiration.” 
An underlying reason for the city’s importance occurred to P14, whose creative 
pursuit was getting dressed every day:  
When I walk around, especially in London, I may notice some details . . . I’m 
thinking, “Maybe I should get something of that color.” I think it’s also human 
nature. If you find something nice, you want to attach it to yourself in some 
way. 
 
Embodied Knowledge 
Similarly, participants whose creative pursuits were physical were likely to 
become excited by their processes. Pianist P41 said that he was aware of his hands 
making shapes on the keys as he played. “You can feel the notes,” he said. “When it’s 
going well, you’re aware that you’re making pretty shapes. It looks good as well as 
sounds good, and the two go hand-in-hand.” 
Rhythm was also a key to the experience of potter P30: “I’m all about the 
centering, the beginning step, getting my hands into it and finding that rhythm, that 
motion, and getting it to where it can actually start to form something.” 
By cultivating source material from people, places, their work—indeed, even 
their ways of working—these participants were invoking Lévi-Strauss’s (1966) 
construct of bricolage. They were using some of the most changeable materials at 
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hand—their social circles, city streets, their senses—and turning them into tools for 
making.  
 
Identity: The Contours of Creative Selfhood 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the quantitative portion of this research 
sought to verify that participants in this research have creative identities. Identity is the 
second of three project variables in the qualitative phase of research for a powerful 
reason. If—to paraphrase Giddens (1991)—identities surface in people’s ability to 
speak their truths through the stories they tell, passages in the interviews that mention 
identity outright could be even more revealing.  
That point was voiced by costume-maker P7 when she talked about how 
inextricable creativity is with identity: 
Creativity is just kind of core force inside that has lots of ways of expressing 
itself . . . I don’t really see any particular difference between creativity as 
making a thing, and creativity as generating ideas, or generating connections 
with other people, or figuring out good ways of carrying out even everyday 
tasks. It just comes out.  
That said, a creative identity cannot commence, assert Jaussi et al. (2007), until 
a person believes in her or his powers of creativity. For some participants, that is 
hardly a straight path. Videographer P13 recalled in hindsight a series of experiences 
in school that led him gradually to acknowledge his creativity for the first time. 
Because he had not identified himself as creative before, the net effect was 
galvanizing: “To be honest, it was sort of like coming out.” 
Drone-maker P8 began describing his creative identity by saying that he was 
not “good” at art while growing up, and “struggled with wanting to make things, to 
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create things in the world that I could see and say, ‘I made that.’” Then he found 
photography, which he enjoyed; wanting to take aerial photographs led to his current 
creative pursuit of making drones with his 3-D printer. He discovered, he said, “that I 
could use technology to be creative with, and [have become] very liberated through 
that.” 
Printmaker P9 took a circuitous route to creative identity, thanks to a prompt 
from her daughter at a drawing class. While P9 was in the room, the teacher admired 
her daughter’s sketches and asked if she drew often:  
 [My daughter] said, “Well, no, but my mother is an artist.” I stood there going 
quite red. I have never even said it myself, but for her, it’s clear. Then I 
realized, yeah, that’s what I am now. I can say it easily. 
The notion that creative identity, once acquired, can change over time was 
voiced by several interviewees. P9 worked as a creative director in films before she 
had children, but felt at a loss when she stopped working. “I thought, as much as I like 
to be a mother, there [was] another identity in me that I didn’t have . . . now that I’m 
creating my own [prints], that’s my identity.” 
Cupcake baker P25 more abruptly changed directions in her creative evolution. 
A few years ago, she was acknowledged by family, friends, and followers on social 
media as a scrapbooker of note. However, that changed for reasons she could not fully 
explain. She said: 
One day I just didn’t want to do it anymore. I have so many scrapbooking 
supplies. I have thousands of pieces of paper that I just don’t even look at. 
Now, I’m a baker. It’s like, people would have said that I was born to 
scrapbook, but I couldn’t go back to it.  
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 Both P9 and P25 had sufficient stores of creative self-belief in one field, and 
they seemed unsurprised that they would have that in other fields, as well. Indeed, P25 
was not sure how long baking would hold her focus, but she maintained because she is 
creative, some aspect or another would always surface. Her core identity—being 
creative—was stronger and more pervasive than the things she happens to be doing. 
 The route to developing a creative identity can begin at home. P2 makes fly-
fishing ties. He recalled learning about making from his father, who gave him what he 
called “a jury-rigged heritage.” The drive to wind snippets of fur and yarn around a 
hook to mimic an insect is a small thing, he said, but because of his father’s ability to 
improvise repairs “from virtually nothing,” he felt he was carrying on something of a 
birthright.  
However, like paths to a creative identity, birthrights are not always easily 
assimilated. Poet P12 worked in a liminal space, treading between cultures on his route 
to creative identity: 
In terms of poetry, I am not sure what I am . . . I [would have] said, “I am an 
Urdu poet writing in English.” If there is such an identity, that’s my identity, 
because English is a way to communicate to a larger audience. But in terms of 
how my mind is organized, or my metaphors, or how I see the world, [that] is 
more informed by Urdu than English, and it’s a tension always happening. 
In varying ways, both Gauntlett (2007) and Malafouris (2013) describe how 
people are shaped by the things they make. These vignettes of creative identity suggest 
a full range of their claims. Drones helped P8 believe in his creativity, while printing 
and baking confirmed the creative identities of P9 and P25. Making flies no bigger 
than a thumbnail brought P2 closer to his roots while making poetry allowed P12 to 
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travel between cultures. In each case, as they create, they are forging creative identities 
as well. 
When participants talked about themselves, they often referred to their schools 
and classes as well as their ages. In my working notes, I observed that these 
disclosures were a form of shorthand addressing aspects of identity that interviewees 
felt were important in talking about themselves.  
With that observation, I invoked the sub-code education (118 mentions) 
whenever participants referred to any school, from casual instruction to formal 
education. I awarded the sub-code age (51 mentions) whenever participants made any 
reference to their age, past or present.  
 
Lessons from Learning 
Perhaps because people spend so many of their formative years in school, the 
place loomed large in the descriptions of some interviewees. The place—and the 
people within it—can help round out a pupil’s learning, notably who they are and how 
they see the world. For example, videographer R13 credited his classes with opening 
his eyes to how to collaborate with others successfully. In particular, he said, one 
professor fired his ambition for expressing his creativity in a larger group: “He was 
like, ‘Pick people who you can actually believe in their standard of work.’ Ever since 
then, instead of creating stuff that I think is great, I create stuff that’s absolutely 
formidable with a good team.” 
Novelist P40 also credited her university classes in English and literature with 
infusing her desire to be a novelist. As she began to write, however, she decided she 
needed more direction than she received as an undergraduate. “I realized that a novel 
has different facets to it, so it’s not as easy as just sitting there and writing,” she said. 
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“You need to have structure; there needs to be a plot, you need to have protagonists, 
your characters need to have depth, et cetera. My way of tackling it was to do a 
master’s [degree] in creative writing.” 
For P42, whose creative pastime is mimicry and voice imitation, a six-week 
stint at art school when she was a teen set her up for a more substantive education as 
well as a creative identity. “I guess from that, my creativity . . . [started] because I was 
able to literally sit down with a piece of paper, and have a brief, and therefore create 
and get recognized for it.” The expertise she gained was largely positive because her 
teachers and classmates recognized her ability. However, it never felt like an organic 
process to her: “[I]t was almost like I was getting a tick, like ‘Yes, that is you being 
creative,’ as opposed to it just coming naturally.”  
Cartoonist R35 made an off-curriculum observation about herself: “I 
discovered that if I turned in an assignment that was very creative—even if it didn’t 
fulfill all the other requirements—I would get a good grade.” For her, creativity 
offered a way out of the more troublesome parts of her education, even as it reinforced 
her lasting identity as a creative person. 
Of course, not all learning takes place at school. Sometimes, family offers the 
impetus. Pianist P41 said that his uncle taught him the basics of playing 12-bar blues, 
while family bandleader P37 had his initial creative epiphany when his wife bought 
him 10 weeks of painting lessons. “I had a lot of fun,” he remembered. “I’m like, ‘Oh, 
maybe I can do this.’”  
Friends can also catalyze learning, a principle that will be more fully explored 
further in this analysis. When R28 saw a friend’s handsewn leather handbag, she 
wanted to try making one for herself: “I asked, ‘Will you teach me?’ So we traded 
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skills. I photographed her daughter in exchange for her buying the leather and teaching 
me how to make that bag, that simple bag.” 
Several participants sidestepped formal learning for lessons from YouTube or 
other social media platforms. Fly-tier P2 expressed relief that he had taken up the 
hobby relatively recently so he could learn online instead of spending hours 
apprenticing at the bench of a master. Virtual classes helped sharpen the techniques of 
P32, who learned to hand-embroider satin-stitch borders on his silk pocket squares. 
Yet he yearned for in-person guidance to take him to the next level in his making: “I’m 
actually going to be taking a couple of hours with [a tailor], learning some other 
construction techniques for clothing so that I can start working on larger projects.” 
Obviously, education and making coalesce into something of a never-ending 
story. Spreadsheet maker P3 spoke of how rewarding it was at first to teach himself 
how to use financial software. From there, he learned to code and began to create his 
widgets. Then, to his amazement, a creative world sprang up around him: “I’m 
learning technology all the time. I’m learning formulas. I’m learning graphing. It was 
just this little project that kept growing and growing, and suddenly I’ve got my life 
focus in this one spreadsheet.” 
 
The Life in One’s Years 
It is understandable that some of the participants mentioned their ages during 
our interviews; it is, after all, how most people chart their progression through time. 
More to the point, some interviewees—in a range of ages—bound together the 
construct of age with creative identity. Certainly, no one felt too young to be creative, 
and no one felt too old to be creative, either. 
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That distinction illustrates how a once-radical idea from mid-20th-century 
creativity theorist Osborn (1953) has become mainstream. “Even if our native talent 
should not grow, our creative ability can keep growing year after year in pace with the 
effort we put into it” (p.60; emphasis in original). 
In trying to recall when they first felt creative, participants frequently thought 
back to when they were children, often while remembering something about a creative 
parent. For example, card-maker P27 said that her mother, an artist, always had 
drawing materials lying around the house, which made it easy for her to develop her 
skills. “I’m not saying I was born and I immediately started doing things,” she 
cautioned, though she has sketchbooks she made when she was three years old.  
Because participants ranged in age from 20 to over 70, their comments offer a 
real-time record of opinions regarding how the matter of age tracks throughout a 
person’s creative life. As the youngest person in the project, P31 talked about how 
keeping a journal was especially helpful at her age:  
I think just writing down your thoughts, even if no one hears them, [enhances] 
your ability to go back and review what you thought once. Oftentimes my 
feelings are repeated because I feel that I’m a relatively consistent human 
being, but also I’m just an angsty post-teen girl. 
R12 started writing poetry about the same time—“late teens, early 20s,” he 
said—as he sought a reprieve from the burden of the family responsibilities he 
assumed after his father’s death. He felt he had almost begun too late, though he found 
one night that he was compelled to begin anyway. “Something came to my mind, and I 
just woke up, and I started to write. That night, I wrote seven poems.” 
Life brings fresh ways to think about age and creative identity. For some, like 
landscape painter P21, the passage of time means developing a new resilience, a 
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recommitting to one’s creativity. Affordances mattered less to him, he said, than 
persistence. “I think that once we get to a certain age . . . it comes down to grit and a 
willingness to stick with it, even when you suck.” 
Similarly, just a few weeks shy of her 63rd birthday, P10 said she considered 
creativity a way to stay young, at least in outlook. “I think that [continually making 
things] should be a treat in discovery—discovering what we are, and what we have 
inside—and this certainly happened to me.” 
 In other words, she felt that her creative sense of self became stronger with age. 
Birthdays often trigger similar waves of reflexivity, causing people to reflect on the 
complexity of factors that constitute their identity, creative and otherwise. In this case, 
making fashioned her reflections into a bright, optimistic outlook. 
 
Affordances: Encounters on the Way to Creative Identity 
The geography of creative affordances sits at the sometimes-chaotic crossroads 
of cultural forces, interior perspective, interpersonal relationships, and, it could be 
said, people’s ongoing relationships with the construct of creativity and things they 
make. The third and final qualitative project variable, it is the primary focus of the 
research questions for this project; accordingly, is where the largest number of codes 
fell.  
That said, “affordance” is hardly a common word, and the construct took a 
good deal of explaining. Beginning with the participant letter and continuing with each 
interview, the word and the theories behind it (Glăveanu, 2012, 2017; Moeran, 2014) 
were frequently described. Participants uniformly asked basic questions about it and 
the half-dozen aspects that Moeran in particular highlighted. (“Now, what are those six 
things again?” asked movie-maker P19, echoing many others.) Once the working 
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definition was sufficiently clarified, however, participants could easily talk about the 
aspects as well as the construct itself—even if very few of them repeated the word 
“affordance” outright. To be sure, it was only coded 18 times. 
The people who did use it independently seemed to claim it as their own. That 
was the case with mimic P42, who playfully talked about the relationship between 
affordances of time and money. She mused: 
Let’s face it . . . if you’ve got enough money, maybe you’d have enough time. 
If you don’t have enough money, maybe you have too much time. Or maybe if 
you’ve got too little time, you’ve got a lot of money. Yeah . . . you’ve either 
got a lot of one and a complete lack of the other, I think. Although those six 
things, they 100% do come in to play because of course, they would. 
A more serious instance of understanding-while-talking occurred during the 
interview with P21, a former physician who immersed himself in landscape painting a 
few years ago after being diagnosed with cancer. During our interview, he pronounced 
“affordances” carefully, as if to weigh its etymology, and then began to consider in his 
own experience how they operate in networks: 
Here’s an affordance intertwining issue: [When I became ill], I took a 
humongous pay cut . . . losing my practice. But I had reasonable disability 
coverage so that, even though we took a humongous pay cut, we [were] not 
going to lose our house. We had to live differently, but when you get a stage 
four diagnosis, that’s not really a stressor in terms of what car you drive or 
what your income status is. I don’t have to paint for money because I have 
more than I need to live, so I’m able to explore and practice and not worry 
about results, and because of that my learning has accelerated dramatically. 
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P21 cast a positive view of a terrible situation. In the parlance of creativity 
theory, he had successfully negotiated the affordances he encountered, emerging as a 
creative actor. His observations of how affordances relate to each other present a 
framework for the following examination of participants’ views of representational, 
social, techno-material, economic, spatial, and temporal affordances.  
 
Representational Affordances  
In Moeran’s (2014) definition, representational affordances relate to aesthetics 
“and give rise to formal properties based on such concepts as genre, form, and style” 
(p. 48). The delineation is well-suited to his investigation of professional designers, 
potters, photographers, and editors working under the constraints of deadlines, 
software, physical specifications, and audience demand.  
For the present research, however, that definition seemed both too narrow and 
overly professional for this group of amateur makers. In the participant letter (see 
Appendix B), I used the term “how things look and feel” to stand in for representation 
during the interviews. In reading the transcripts, however, I began to construe 
representational affordances as relating to participants’ worldviews. The concept of 
worldview refers to the assumptions people make about their psychological, social, 
and cultural realities (Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Gabora, 2000). While it is related to 
Karwowski’s (2014; Karwowski & Brzeski, 2017) similar construct of mindset, the 
difference is one of degree. 
Worldviews, explain both Koltko-Rivera (2004) and Gabora (2000), are self-
organized and self-mending, requiring little in the way of reflexivity. In contrast, 
Karwowski claims that mindsets are comprised of an individual’s beliefs about “the 
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fixed-versus-growth nature of creativity” (2014, p. 62). Indeed, I had taken both 
mindset and worldview under advisement when I devised my craft elicitation method 
for this project. Ultimately, I came down on the side of worldview, since the concept 
was more adaptable to the range of participants’ demographics in this study, and did 
not require additional assessment. It was instrumental in my decision to let participants 
define creativity for themselves.   
Glăveanu (2012) claimed that creativity lies in how people perceive it. As 
noted earlier, Şahin (2008) claimed that affordances lay in perception. Internalized 
perceptions of affordances, I reasoned, could be labeled representational affordances. 
Rereading the interviews before coding, I decided that this was an appropriate way to 
consider how people think and feel about not just the things they make, but how they 
go about making them. When people said, “I think,” or “I feel,” or made a judgment 
about what they were doing, I used the code for representational affordance.  
 
Looking within Representation 
Personal judgments were inevitable as participants talked about themselves, 
and their insights occasionally felt hyper-revelatory while we were talking. The bland 
typeface of the resulting transcripts did nothing to diminish their perspicacity, 
variously imbued with humor, honesty, and sometimes poignancy.   
Even fairly straightforward examples of representational affordances revealed 
the pervasiveness of worldview. Family bandleader P37 developed confidence through 
exposure to multiple means of making: “Eventually, as I messed around with different 
paintings or sculpture, at some point I just became confident that if I wanted to create 
something, I could.” 
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P33, whose creative pursuit is origami, arrived at confidence through a 
different route. After acknowledging that his repertoire had grown since his first 
childhood projects, he discussed how he decided to tackle a challenging project. “[I]n 
order for it to even kind of have life to it, I had to one, convince myself that it was 
worth doing, but also convince myself that I could do what I had envisioned in my 
head.”  
It is interesting to note that he felt that his origami would not “live” if it could 
not align with his assumptions of what it could be; his worldview would not allow it.  
P26, whose creative pursuit is delivering one-liners, built on that concept: “I’m coming 
around to thinking that unless you can envision yourself as being creative, it’s not 
going to happen.” Their convictions hint at the relationship between creative identity 
and creative self-efficacy (Jaussi et al., 2007).  
However, not everything about creative identity can be predetermined, and a 
few participants felt that accommodating unexpected outcomes sharpened their 
faculties. Boatbuilder P23 remembered projects that strayed far from what he had in 
mind. Over time, he said, he had learned to drop back and see where a mistake might 
take him. “It leads you to make a different decision about the next step in the project,” 
he said. “[Y]ou were forced to deter from the original path you were on because you 
screwed up something, [and] you end up on a better path.” 
 
Representational Uncertainty 
Coping with similar creative indirection elicited more diffuse feelings about 
representational affordances from several participants. Cartoonist P35 recalled 
struggling with a direction after deciding that she would start drawing on her own, 
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without mentors. “[I] just got rid of the notion that I need to do it according to how 
somebody else is telling me,” she said. Only after that point, she said, did she hit what 
she felt was her stride with her pursuit.  
Creative uncertainty is bearable with the conviction that one has chosen a 
fitting pursuit. P16 described writing music as his keystone in an irresolute world. 
“You’ve got to get through your life. What music gets to—at a point that I’ve never 
found anything else—it gets me to the point where none of that stuff matters.”  
Certitude evolves along with worldviews, reflected P29, who takes 
photographs of things like stones, clover leaves, or random patterns that look like 
hearts. The best course of action, she decided, was not to resist what could be 
inevitable. “Once something you loved and how you loved to do it changes, maybe it’s 
time to revisit . . . and get into something else.” 
That was the case with embroiderer P10. She progressed in her medium for 
years, working in one specific style. Then, without warning, it began to pall. “I stopped 
maybe 18 months ago because I felt that I needed something else,” she said. The 
resulting change of direction, she claimed, revived her creative drive. 
While P17 once found creative satisfaction in cooking and gardening, she now 
felt that the better part of what she called her “creative juice” should go to painting 
flowers. “It’s why I let weeds go now and other things, like hair on the kitchen floor, 
because I’ve got to let that go if my energy is going to focus on this one thing.” In her 
representation, a meaningful creative practice requires devotion; concentration is the 
surest way of attaining it. 
Representation also surfaced in the way several participants talked about 
making as a retreat from the world, to make something that—as worldview would 
have it—more closely conforms to their reality. R38 could not quite put her finger on 
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why drawing was satisfying to her. “I don’t know if it’s the total absorption or doing it 
more kind of ...” She paused, then caught her thought.  “It’s kind of a bit of a release 
for me.” 
P3 echoed her point. Part of the appeal of his spreadsheets was that his world is 
perfectly ordered, at least on paper. He stated: 
It’s not necessarily working out in other areas of my life in terms of satisfaction 
with a job and just pressures and family. I don’t know that I’m accomplishing 
anything every week as I dive into this thing but it is an escape and [I have] this 
grasp of, at least, this is going to work for me. 
P5 likewise discussed the daily necessity of dealing with life, and how eagerly 
she seized a respite at the easel. “[W]hile I’m doing the painting, it’s like I’m creating 
something just for myself,” she said. “I’m creating a new world.” 
Ultimately, the aspects of a representational affordance are bounded by what 
someone thinks about her or himself and what she or he is doing. For some, the 
process was more important than the product. Potter P30, for example, claimed that 
time spent with her hands in the clay was more important to her than what she was 
making. Similarly, P35 found the cumulative effect of making many cartoons more 
satisfying than any one cartoon could. 
Others, however, privileged the product. P15, who makes jewelry, said the 
rewarding way the representational affordance plays out is when it confirmed she’s 
creative: “The best feeling for me is to spend hours doing something and stand back 
and think, ‘Wow . . . I made that.’” Her declaration speaks to the power of a creative 
product to elicit feelings in its creator. In fact, at least one-third of participants kept 
photos on their phones to remind them of their creative progressions. 
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Representations Close and Far 
Another coding distinction stemmed from my interview notes. In the process of 
coding, I became aware that the passages I coded as denoting more general 
representational affordances dealt with the interior life of the participants. 
Occasionally, participants described representational affordances that rendered 
outcomes that came close to what they had in mind, as when P38 said as she doodled, 
“I’m so happy right now drawing this.” I coded these “representation-close” (75 
codes). Conversely, I coded those passages “representation-far” (131 codes) where 
participants—such as P38 again—said things like, “I didn’t like perspective, which 
was something I wasn’t brilliant at.” 
To be sure, when things worked out, participants were pleased that their visions 
had been matched or exceeded. Baker P39 explained how she enjoyed baking when 
she is happy because the outcome is usually tasty: “[Baking is] just something you can 
do, and there’s a nice result at the end of it.” 
Quilter P34 echoed her sentiments and rationale. She recalled the first quilt she 
made without a specified plan. It was a creative gamble that paid off. “I didn’t quite 
follow a pattern,” she said, but the product pleased her. “I’m like, ‘Okay, hey, that’s 
not bad, you know,’” 
Potter P30 was less concerned about the product and more interested in the 
feeling of creativity: “I think pretty much anything where I can let my mind focus on it 
and let everything else melt away gives me satisfaction.” With that observation, she 
comes close to the insights from those who saw that they were creating a new world 
with what they make. The difference for her is one of focus, which recall’s 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) concept of flow—interestingly, a word none of the 
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participants mentioned outright. Perhaps, like “affordance,” these makers experience 
“flow” more than they talk about it.   
When representational affordances come close to or exceed the vision their 
makers have for them, the result empowers, said knitter P1. “[W]hen things turn out 
like you like them, or you envision them, it is motivating to keep trying other things,” 
she said. When that does not reliably transpire, however, the representational 
affordance feels far indeed. “Well, I’ve also made some things that didn’t work,” she 
quickly admitted. 
Many paths lead to the decision that participants disliked their creative 
processes or products. Occasionally, as landscape painter P21 noted, the process does 
not even begin before it is aborted. “You could go through any category [of pursuits], 
and you could find examples of people who say, ‘No. I don’t think I can handle that,’ 
‘I’m not up for that,’ or, ‘I can’t do it’.” 
Most often, backing away from making something has to do with other 
affordances—time, space, money, materials, or social connections—that go awry. 
Perhaps because these makers already consider themselves creative, those who 
mentioned far representational affordances described them with a degree of resilience. 
They told stories of learning something from their encounters.  
One lesson is that others might want the things you would rather not see again. 
Sashiko embroiderer P4 enjoyed making blouses, though “I just can’t stand it if they’re 
not just so,” she said. She had a friend who was delighted with her rejects. While 
giving them to her friend made her happy, she was quick to add that it would still 
bother her to wear something that had, in her estimation, turned out imperfectly. 
Fly-tier P2 said that in the long run, it was worth persisting through some less-
than-satisfying experiences because he eventually understood the process and 
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materials. That hardly changed his opinion of his early efforts, though. “They were so 
bad, but I’ve learned a lot from going out and using them.”  
P8, who made drones, felt frustration about never having learned how to draw. 
In talking through what might go right as well as what could also go wrong with 
figuring out how to sketch on an iPad, he predicted the spread of his representational 
affordances. “Maybe we could have another conversation in a year about the fact that I 
realized, ‘Ah, it actually isn’t that tricky,’ or I’ve gone, ‘Oh, bloody hell. I still have no 
idea how to make things look like what they do in [my] head.’” In bringing up the 
extremes—and suggesting an indirect path might be best for him—he described an 
open and expansive worldview. 
 
Social Affordances 
Who you know can be said to at least partially determine the ideas you have, 
how you envision problems and solutions, and even, to a real degree, what you make. 
Douny (2014) notes that this is why people fashion their social selves from their social 
relationships, and why the subjectivity needed to forge a creative identity results from 
interacting with the sociocultural forces that make up social affordances. Dinner-maker 
P22 observed: “Some people really need the acknowledgment that they’ve done 
something from somebody else . . . I think that’s human nature.” 
Such is their power that in outlining his theory of how creative affordances 
work, Moeran (2014) made the case that social affordances are arguably the most 
crucial of all for a person to navigate. “If there is a single overriding theme in creative 
people’s discussions of their work, it is the role played by other people, specifically by 
social connections, in the numerous projects that plot their careers” (p. 51).  
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Even though it was written with an eye toward describing people who work in 
organizations, Moeran’s (2014) observation also holds for the everyday makers of the 
present study. By discussing how they came to feel creative, these participants made 
implicit and explicit observations of their social networks. Friends, bosses, teachers, 
mentors, and casual contacts from social media all played integral parts in their 
creative lives. 
 
 The Social Worth of an Audience 
Many participants related experiences about making things for other people. 
Describing the reception of a recipient to one of her machine-made quilts, P34 said the 
reaction was in part a reward for her efforts. “I liked seeing the look on her face,” she 
said.   
Similarly, P29 shared familiar insights when she talked about photographing 
street performers. “It’s really cool to watch them, but it’s also cool to be able to go to 
them, [show them the photograph], and say, ‘Hey this is you performing.’ They’re 
like, ‘Wow, what?’”  
Enthusiastic responses frequently proved to be a heady result. Getting a laugh 
in high school launched the creative identity of P26. He said: 
I always had some kind of wry comment or something to say . . . If there was 
any contention or discord in the classroom, I’d try and find some way to relieve 
the tension and get people laughing. I just felt great satisfaction in doing that.  
The fulfillment he still found in making people laugh inspired his yet-to-be-met goal to 
test his mettle during an open-mic night at a comedy club. 
Some participants discovered that their ability to make things was occasionally 
alluring to people who do not have creative pursuits. P11 found an eager audience for 
187 
 
his pop-art paintings after he produced a fresh canvas for a woman he was dating. “It 
[made] a cheap present, but that [relationship] didn’t work out,” he recalled, though he 
said it was no fault of the painting.  
I met another girl, made her a cheap present as well. I don’t think any girl I’ve 
dated since 2007 hasn’t received a painting . . . Every girl I’ve ever dated has 
found [receiving a painting] incredibly sexy, that’s for sure. I mean, they’re 
always very supportive in that respect. 
Embroiderer P10 began reading embroidery blogs because she was intrigued 
with the work she saw and the way others shared ideas online. Eventually, she created 
her blog as “a way to take note of my creativity.” It became for her a journal of sorts, a 
way to record what she made, and share what she was thinking of doing with family 
and others who visited her site. 
For all five of these makers, having warm receptions to their work from friends 
as well as relative strangers informed ongoing creative efforts. There are limits to 
making things for those in one’s immediate social networks, however. P1 cautioned: 
“If you have knitted as long as I have, you have made everything in the world. I can 
only make so many potholders and give friends or family so many scarves,” she said. 
“So I think the next thing I’m going to be doing is knitting for homeless people.” 
 
The Social Outcomes of Collaboration 
Apart from making things for others, participants sometimes mentioned the 
pleasure in making things with others. As observed earlier, P23 enlisted his childhood 
friend in making a sailboat; through the months they spent on the project, he said, their 
relationship reached new levels of mutual trust and respect.  
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Several participants mentioned the importance of digital media in supplying 
them with ideas and feedback. Cartoonist P35 shared her work on Twitter, sometimes 
making GIFs of process photos or video flipbooks of completed drawings. Flower 
painter P18 loaded in-progress photos of her work on Instagram, finding the exchange 
of knowledge powerful. “I posted [myself] doing an egg tempera yesterday because I 
think it’s a cool thing to share technique . . . and just build on each other instead of 
being threatened by it.”  
Social media is also a means of finding new collaborators, occasionally taking 
care of other affordances in the process. Songwriter P16 recalled how his current 
performance group located a key colleague: “[Our] drummer we found on Craigslist, 
and not only is he an excellent drummer, he also owns the studio that we’re playing 
in.” 
Unlike other participants, collaboration occurred both in real-time and virtually 
for P21. To paint portraits of friends or family, he said, he more often worked from 
photographs or sketches than from live sittings. Just because a sitter was not physically 
in the studio, however, did not mean that he or she was absent from the process: 
When I do a portrait of someone, and I know them, I feel like I’ve spent a week 
with them. When I send them a [digital] image, I’ll say, “Hey, here’s what I’ve 
gotten done. I feel like I’ve spent three days with you. It’s been fun, but you 
haven’t always been in a good mood” . . .  I’ll throw some humor in there, but 
it really is like they’re on my mind, either consciously at times and then not, 
but I’m looking at them. But I’m not just looking at them; I’m looking at the 
visual pieces that make up their image as I sort of sculpt them. Emotionally, 
I’m with that person for [all] that time. 
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Going Solo 
Making was a meditation for landscape painter P21 and other participants. Not 
every meditation-in-making is a social occasion. Sometimes, participants said, solitude 
better primed the creative pump. Potter P30 preferred it because “You know how, no 
matter what you do, other influences are going to creep in, but it’s how you draw upon 
those influences that make it yours,” she said.  
Nosy outsiders were just what P31was hoping to avoid when she was 
journaling. “I try not to [write] outside my apartment just because I’m scared I’ll 
stumble upon someone I’m not super comfortable with reading my journal.”  
For the potter and the journal-keeper alike, privacy was next to productivity. 
While they appreciated the creative ideas from their peers and friends, they were keen 
to process the source material by themselves so their products would be more 
completely their own. 
 
The Social Benefits of Tutelage 
Nonetheless, mentors and teachers can broaden a maker’s creative perspectives 
by explaining the technical and material affordances in a given métier. Crazy-quilt 
maker P18 received motivation from her teacher and classmates to finish a lingering 
project. “She was going to have a show at her house and have all [our] quilts out 
there,” she said. If it were not for the ensuing short deadline, “I’d still be working on it. 
It’d be like that wall hanging down there pinned up on the shelf that I’ve been working 
on for two years.” 
Modern dancer P36 preferred taking instruction from another kind of teacher—
a choreographer—rather than starting from scratch with her dance steps. “I prefer just 
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working with somebody on their idea and perfecting it for them. It might be because 
I’m not a professional-level dancer,” she said. Operating with a choreographer and 
other performers, she said, proverbially put her in the shoes of her collaborators and 
helped her find pleasure in “telling their story.” 
Pocket square maker P32 credited his mentor, the owner of a high-end 
menswear store, with cueing him in on helpful connections. “We have very great 
conversations together, and I use him as a resource for a lot of things that I do,” he 
said. For example, his mentor introduced him representatives of fabric companies who 
have agreed to sell him exotic silk remnants at wholesale prices so he can continue to 
make his pocket squares. 
That said, mentors do not always have to be familiar. A week before our 
interview, P2 was trying out his flies from a river bank while another fisherman just 
upstream appeared to be catching far more fish. “When I was about ready to leave, he 
eyed me walking back towards the car,” he remembered. “He knew I was wanting to 
ask him, ‘All right, what did you do?’ So, he showed me what he did. But it was 
interesting because, you know, we essentially fished with . . . the same thing but we 
fished it differently.” 
 
The Social Place of Family  
Most people’s relationships with creativity begin with their families, and the 
way those relationships play out reverberate through an individual’s life. In the present 
study, some of the participants’ most compelling stories of social affordances involved 
their families. It became clear during the interviews that family would be an important 
sub-code; as it happened, it was mentioned by all but three participants. These 
191 
 
observations about parents, grandparents, siblings, children, and extended family 
illustrate how support—and sometimes the lack of it—can help forge a creative 
identity. 
 
Father figures    
Participants frequently named their parents as creative role models, if not 
exactly mentors. Mothers were occasionally brought up as teachers and creative 
presences, though fathers were mentioned more often. For instance, mimic P42 
remembered childhood suppers where she and her father would linger at the kitchen 
table imitating TV stars. “It was just me and him that could do accents really well,” 
she said.  
Oil painter P5 remembered playtimes when her father stoked her curiosity 
about how toys were built. He brought her kits for snap-together model cars, and 
together they would assemble and race them. From that, she said, she learned, “I really 
like doing that, assembling things. . . My dad encouraged me a lot.” She found the 
making and the competition with her father to be equally important in her drive as an 
adult to continue painting.  
As the teenage stepson of a professional musician, songwriter P16 learned 
more surreptitiously. While he was welcome to play his step-father’s bass guitar, he 
never applied himself to learning on it. That changed one day: 
I was really angry, and he’d go, “Play scales,” and I’d play a scale and I’d say, 
“Now what?” because I was hoping he’d teach me. But [then] he’d say, “Now 
play in broken thirds,” and I would play in broken thirds. [He’d go], now play 
in fifths and I’d play in fifths, play in sixths . . . [all the way to] double octave . 
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. . It took about half an hour to play a double octave. And after that, he [said], 
“You still angry?” 
Even though P16 prefaced his story by saying that his stepfather “never taught me how 
to play bass,” he was sure the method helped turn him into a musician.  
It was hardly incumbent on fathers to have participated in the same pursuits as 
their offspring to inspire them. When she began making handbags, P28 was surprised 
to recall lessons in creativity from her father, who restored antiques.  
I [have] memories now of when I was a kid working with him. [They’re] 
almost like flashbacks when I’m working in here to the same thing that we did 
when I was a kid. [I] never would have ever guessed that those experiences 
would play out somewhere in my future.  
Making her bags was, she said, a way of being with his memory even though he had 
died years before.  
Even hard times with a parent provided the spark of a creative pursuit. A 
difficult period in his father’s life—and his family’s—steered P3 into creating 
financial planning spreadsheets years later. His father, a philosophy professor, was left 
without a job after his university closed the department during a recession. P3 
remembered being embarrassed to qualify for free lunches at school and vowed never 
to be in that position again. He learned accounting and financial management in the 
Navy before teaching himself how to build the software for tracking his family’s 
finances. His project relieved him of the fear that he could not follow where his money 
was going. “I found [after that] that it was just a game,” he said.  
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 Being parents  
Perspectives from parents raising families formed an interesting counterpoint to 
these memories from adult children. Flower painter P18 recalled deciding in her 20s 
that she wanted to have children. “I knew from the get-go that [there] was going to be 
a gap [in my painting]. I was able to make the choice to stay at home with the kids,” 
she said. With her children now in college, she had time to herself and, “I don’t regret 
any of it.” 
Teaching is a way of passing on creativity to a new generation, said some 
parents. For instance, boat-maker P23 spoke about how making his first boat as a 
teenager with his father became a tradition he wanted to repeat with his son. As they 
made a skerry together, P23 was surprised and then gratified as his son learned to work 
with wood so well that he surpassed his father’s skills. “Halfway through it . . . he said, 
‘Okay, Dad, I’ve got it from here.’ Then I would just come in to solve, [or] to try to 
help him solve problems.” Almost a decade later, he said, they still sail the boat they 
built together.  
 Sashiko embroiderer P41 claimed that the learning went both ways for her and 
her twin daughters. She gave them sewing machines for their ninth birthday, and the 
three of them had regular sewing classes at home. “What I love is that when they make 
something, [they wear it to school],” she said. “I would never have done that. I 
wouldn’t have had the confidence to do it.” 
 To keep his four-year-old son engaged, R24 frequently changed their creative 
sessions. Sometimes they would draw, sing, or find themselves “making a helicopter 
with blankets. Of course, if I’m getting the chance to say, ‘Let’s do drawing,’ he gets 
to choose the subject.” The payoff, he said, was the chance to see things through his 
son’s eyes: “His ability to slow down and notice beauty in a little weed or little 
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flowers, or looking at the street, is much more developed than mine is. I’ve got used to 
filtering stuff out.” 
 With older children, the outcomes can be more challenging. P37, the family 
bandleader, said that his group was at a crossroads because to his teenaged daughter 
objected to a song he had written. “Our lead singer is thinking about going solo. She’s 
not so interested in singing with the band anymore,” he said. As a result, the band, 
which had been making videos for YouTube and posting music on Soundcloud for 
about 10 years, was on indefinite hiatus. Now, P37 said he was experimenting with 
other media—welding, painting, and furniture-making—to keep his own creative 
identity intact.  
 
 Withholding and providing support  
 Some participants found it necessary to come to terms with their families’ 
perceptions of creativity. Jewelry-maker P15 said that her parents were so forceful in 
directing her to activities that would enhance academic work in law or engineering that 
they did not tell her about her grandfather’s talents at building furniture, a pursuit she 
would eventually try as an adult.  
 Similarly, there was little early family support for the creative efforts of 
embroiderer P10. She said: 
When I was young, I was never encouraged by my parents to be creative. It 
was just not part of our family, [nor] the school in a certain way. And so I 
never felt encouraged, and I felt that I had no creativity at all.  
It was only after a mid-life divorce that she felt free to devote time to creative pursuits. 
Reveling in that freedom, she began to embroider and blog about her work. 
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 Printmaker P9 said that her parents were usually noncommittal when she 
showed them her pieces. She used to think they would eventually come around, but in 
time decided that it did not matter. “Now, if I want to ask somebody, ‘What do you 
think?’ . . . I have to actually figure out what do I think and what do I feel first.” 
 Participants’ stories of support from spouses, grandparents, siblings, and others 
who offered encouragement underscore the benefits of close collaboration. Costume-
maker P7 collaborates with her husband on embellishing her creations with colorful 
LED lights that flash like sequins. Cupcake baker P25 said she was put on a creative 
path early on with a craft kit, a Christmas gift from her grandmother. “She always 
thought everybody should be creative,” she said.  
 P8 recalled how his mother sewed toy animals for her sons. Her example 
influenced the whole family: “My oldest brother is a crazy software tinkerer,” he said. 
“My middle brother is a wood botherer, and I’m a sort of mad scientist tinkerer.” The 
way he saw it, making ran in the family, thanks to their mother.  
Crocheter P6 found friends and family a willing fan base for her linen face 
towels. The fiber, she said, was both luxurious and good for gifts. “I did [one] for 
myself, for my husband . . . my mother-in-law, aunt-in-law, all the girls next door, 
everybody.” In this case, the past and present properties of her social affordances 
helped complete a circuit with the material one. 
 
Techno-Material Affordances  
Creative identities depend on making, observed theoreticians as diverse as 
Small (1998), Ingold (2010), and Glăveanu (2017). The success (or lack thereof) of 
any made thing depends on how the maker has negotiated the media, tools, and 
techniques at hand.  
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 Already possessing creative identities, participants in this project were well 
versed in talking about the rules and resources of the diversity of media they enjoyed. 
Indeed, perhaps because they had in many cases spent years working with their 
materials and tools, they understood inherent properties of their chosen media, 
describing them with words such as “love” and “beauty.”  
 
Material Satisfaction    
Several participants spoke of the pleasure of using high-quality materials. 
Journal keeper P31 had recently received her latest blank book from her artist/designer 
parents, who were adept at sourcing the first-rate materials she craved. She stated: 
I really love blank paper, very thin sheets of paper. I will seek that out. I also 
have a very specific kind of pen I love . . . Pilot G-207s . . . They’re so smooth. 
I love writing with that on blank paper. I think it’s awesome. I can doodle on 
the sides, which I love. 
Pianist P41was convinced that a good piano was responsible for making him a 
better performer. “You play better with a beautiful piano, there’s no doubt about that,” 
he said. “If it’s got a fabulous tone . . . you’ll find something there which you perhaps 
haven’t been able to produce before.” 
Correspondingly, P22 reveled in the ingredients she pulled together for dinner. 
“Last night we had peaches and goat cheese . . . I got out a big blue-and-white platter 
and did little baguette toasts [with] . . . sliced avocados, sliced tomatoes, and olives,” 
she said. Even though she considered the meal more an assemblage than something 
she actually cooked, the materials nonetheless moved her: “It’s just a beautiful thing, 
and it just makes me happy to put that together,” she said. 
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Sashiko embroiderer P4 spent part of our interview going through the stacks of 
old and new fabrics in her collection. Every piece seemed to have a story; something 
about the fiber attracted her, or the print was fanning her desire to make something in a 
particular style, or she had bought it someplace special. Each design spoke to her. As 
she unfolded a newly acquired cotton print, she asked, “Isn’t it great?” 
 
Using Materials at Hand 
The flip side of indulging in carefully curated materials is using whatever 
happens to be around and improvising in the process. When cartoonist P35 traveled for 
work, she made sure to carry black markers and a compact sketchbook. At home, 
however, the former teacher relied on a ready material she could spread out: “I’ve been 
drawing on colored paper because . . . when I was teaching, people would give me 
paper because I went through a ton of it.” Now pursuing another career, she estimated 
some “10,000 sheets” should keep her going for years. 
Source material surrounds P38, a florist, every day at work. When the shop is 
quiet, she said she would pull a bloom and draw it with whatever pens and paper were 
at hand. These odd moments allowed her to break down her technique to better render 
individual flowers. “[I say to myself], ‘Okay that’s an anemone. It’s got five petals and 
a black middle and the little eyelash center.’” Although she knew her varieties by 
heart, the moments spent drawing them enabled her to see them more intimately. 
For family bandleader P37, the materials at hand were song parodies; the tools 
were the Garage Band application as well as Soundcloud and YouTube. Beginning 
when his children were three and five years old, he wrote songs in various genres for 
them—jazz, soul, punk, “even rap, hip-hop, and a Beastie Boys song.” 
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The Technical and the Material 
In his case and others, a fine line separates tools from materials. For instance, 
both P39 and P25 enthused about their Kitchen Aid stand mixers, a tool which has 
become a status symbol in creative kitchens in both the US and UK: “It’s super-heavy, 
but we use it for everything,” baker P39 said. “Anything we can put in there, we’ll just 
whisk up.” Evidently, the mixer not only powers through food, but also through 
identities: “I really started calling myself a baker probably six months into [making 
cupcakes],” P25 said, “when I got my big mixer.” 
The tools necessary for other pursuits have similar effects. Quilter P34 talked 
about the difficulty in getting the desired results for her quilts with improvised tools. 
Over the course of cutting out hundreds of quilt pieces, she said, a homemade 
cardboard square can shrink from six inches to five. By the same token, twin-bladed 
scissors make precision cutting—a necessity for precision quilting—somewhat 
elusive. Some tools she had seen in the quilting store saved the day. “For this one 
[quilt], I bought a 6-inch square [plastic template] to use with a rotary [cutter],” she 
said. 
Sometimes, however, moving forward requires a maker to strip the requisite 
tools to the essentials. For pocket-square maker P32, that meant learning how to make 
satin stitches with a needle and thread instead of the sewing machine he could not 
afford. The benefit was that he developed a “signature stitch,” he said, which became a 
way to make his work more distinctive than it might have been otherwise. 
 
 
 
199 
 
Materials Beckoning and Restraining 
Making distinctive work was important to P20, who said that his experience in 
making turkey calls included an education in wood. When he first started, he typically 
used local varieties such as cedar and walnut that friends had given him. Once he 
became proficient, however, he wanted to work with exotic woods, such as Central 
American bocote. “It’s a beautiful wood. It has black and kind of a cream/tan colored 
stripes going through it,” he said. He found the patterns in a board of bocote so 
arresting that he wanted to take all his calls in a new, more decorative direction. 
P14 decorated her daily outfits with items from the cache of accessories that 
lined her dresser drawer. “It’s the easiest thing to just put together jeans or a skirt with 
a shirt or a jumper,” she said, “but then it’s the accessories or jewelry like silver or 
whatever that bring a personal touch to the day.” She would think about how she felt, 
she said, and then choose more or fewer items, depending on her mood.  
As Gibson (1977, 1979) might have observed, her silver necklaces were an 
affordance whose import lay in their potentiality: Would they complete her look or 
detract from it? What would she choose tomorrow? That is a point that embroiderer 
P10 understood with her medium. “I have this feeling that the embroidery is already 
there,” she said, waiting for her to discover it in the pristine fabric.  
Discovery is part of the pleasure of making, said P9. She talked about 
experimenting with her printmaking tools and materials to push her conception of what 
a print is. Once, the after-image on a printing plate intrigued her more than the print 
itself, and she found it led her to experiment with other surfaces as plates.  
Occasionally, the potential offered by a material can intimidate a maker. The 
paradox is familiar—recall the prototypical blank page that every writer faces. 
Similarly, painter P11 stashed a blank canvas behind his sofa while he was waiting for 
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inspiration to strike. It had been there in his last two apartments. Likewise, crazy-
quilter P18 had fabric in her studio that had been waiting for years. “That white cotton 
that I bought six yards of it at $21 a yard?” she asked. “I get down there [to the studio], 
and I could pull out 10 patterns. Then I don’t want to cut into it.” Her self-imposed 
constraint compelled her to move along to less imposing fabrics. 
 
When Materials Confer Knowledge 
According to Ingold’s construct of textility (2010), materials work on makers 
as surely as makers work on materials. While most of the people interviewed spoke of 
what they had learned in their interchanges with the things they made, two participants 
relayed the satisfaction the processes can engender.  
P33 generalized about the genres of origami, “ones that involve glue, and ones 
that don’t involve glue,” and explained that he chose the glued version for a life-sized 
paper sword because it would be more robust. “I wanted to brandish it,” he said, and 
not have it collapse. He had to find a digital design online he could tweak for his 
purposes, and he printed scores of pages onto heavy card stock. Satisfied with the 
resulting product, he acknowledged that the program appealed to his fondness of 
technical nuance; his medium was not just paper, but the program as well. “It was 
probably created for a lot of people like me,” he said. 
P23 felt a similar kinship to wood and described what long years of making 
boats with it had taught him: 
You don’t cut a piece of wood and [see] the result before and the result 
afterward right there. A lot of times with wood, you need to predict what’s 
going to happen to that wood and that shape a year down the road . . . How [is 
it] going to behave in a more humid environment? A less humid environment? 
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When will it be potentially exposed to wet and rain or salt water, for instance? 
Wood . . . it’s a constantly changing thing. That is, I think, a sensibility that just 
happens to you over time.  
Certainly, he did not learn how wood “behaves” in the space of one project, or 
even five. In fact, he said he deepened that knowledge with every one he makes. That 
years-long relationship mingles techno-material affordances with temporal ones in a 
circuit every maker must relate to sooner or later.  
 
Temporal Affordances 
Obviously, making something takes time. Sometimes that is due to the 
materials and techniques used. To cite but one example, potter P30 pointed out that her 
vessels must cure for hours and occasional days before firing. However, crossing with 
materials is only one way the affordance of time inveigles itself in the maker’s actions. 
Plans, sequences, and deadlines all have a reckoning regarding time. Moreover, as 
Moeran (2014) points out, every product takes its place in a long timeline of things 
created not just by the maker, but by the field itself.  
 Coming to terms with how time factors into what they make, participants 
talked about how much they needed to complete the things they made, how little of it 
they sometimes feel they have, and how elastic it can be when they are working. 
Occasionally, they came to clarity on the topic during our interview, as was the case 
with novelist P40. Asked about the affordance, she said, “Time, you can’t just create it. 
You can’t, like, [say] ‘Oh, I’ll just get rid of that little bit, or I’ll just give myself some 
more time.’” As soon as she voiced that opinion, though, she reconsidered. “No, I 
guess you can. You can limit yourself to other things so I could get my work done a 
little bit earlier and have more time for what I want.” She spoke for many of the 
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participants who detailed how they had to juggle their schedules and shift priorities to 
free up stretches of time. 
 
 Fitting in Time to Create 
“I work at odd times,” explained pop-art painter P11, who talked about how he 
fine-tuned his day to keep his pursuit going. “Mostly I work in the evenings. Or paint a 
bit when I’ve got up . . . [thinking] ‘I’d better do an hour before work because 
otherwise it’d never get done’.” 
Participants also mentioned more extreme schedule revisions. Jewelry-maker 
P15 remembered when an idea awakened her at 3:00 a.m. Not that she minded: “I 
spent all night drawing and then went straight to work. I was happier because I got it 
out of my system.” She could bear the fatigue that day because she found the idea so 
valuable. “It would’ve been worse if I’d gone back to sleep and then tried to 
remember,” she said. “Then, you know, it’s too late.”  
There are limits to revamping a day, however. Printmaker P9 was confident she 
could create daily, though obligations at work and home circumscribed her making. 
She said she leveraged days away from her bench by spending spare moments with her 
sketchbook, or visiting museums for ideas. On those busy days, she said, “[T]hat’s all 
the time at the moment I can spare. The rest goes to the family. “ 
A few participants, such as journal-maker P31, spoke of savoring days they 
could spend recharging their creative batteries. A student, she was grateful for the 
easier pace of summers when she could broaden her horizons by taking in a movie, 
drawing, or reading. “[It] is such appreciated time. I realize that . . . it’s gold. Time is a 
treasure now.” 
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Although long days spent absorbing inspiration sound idyllic, the danger of 
waiting for uninterrupted stretches of time is that ideas can evaporate, and places can 
be lost. Sashiko maker P4—a physician with a busy practice and an active family—
knew those limitations all too well:  
If I wait too long between [work sessions], I forget what I’ve learned. That’s an 
older brain talking here. For instance, when I don’t know the technique for a 
garment to look like I want it to look and I know that I could do it if I knew the 
technique or if I had enough practice, it can just be overwhelming. You just 
want to throw something through the window because you've spent hours on 
end with it, and you’re just like . . . over it. But I think that’s because of the 
time. 
Nevertheless, she said, she found ways around the frustration, including 
experimenting with different approaches to sewing. That was what appealed to her 
about the ease of sashiko—its simple running stitch did not require her to remember 
complicated sequences. Picking up the technique meant that she could work on 
handheld projects at her children’s ball games or on commutes to and from work—
and, importantly, still feel creative.  
 At various points, such refocusing is crucial. For modern dancer P36, her 
physical abilities were the peg upon which part of her creative identity hung. Time was 
the reason why she decided to audition in her 30s for an amateur troupe after moving 
to London. “There was something bubbling inside me, like, ‘You’re not going to do 
[this] now? This is it. You don’t have many years left to do this.’” Her successful 
audition was a reminder that, to a real degree, all makers realize that they will 
necessarily create a finite number of things. 
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Time, from Beginning to End 
Be that as it may, most interviewees preferred to concentrate instead on how 
long it took them to complete the projects in front of them. Thinking about the day 
before, P25 said, “It took me three hours to bake about, I would say, 30 cupcakes. It 
really depends on, if I want to rush . . . I can do it in 45 minutes if I have to.” 
Cartoonist P35 figured she “can easily do 10 drawings in an hour,” while boat-
maker P23 estimated that he and his friend “spent probably 600 to 800 hours” 
assembling their cedar guide boat. Fly-tier P22 reckoned it took him “five to 10 
minutes” to wrap a midge the size of a little fingernail.  
 For P20, knowing how long a project took went hand-in-hand with his 
enjoyment. “I can go out [and in one evening] from start to finish and do a turkey 
call,” he said. “[I]t’s almost like instant gratification.”  
 A few participants found there was nothing like a deadline to light a creative 
spark. P22 claimed, “I’m a slow cooker,” yet still managed to have dinner together 
every night because her family depended on it. “[My husband] is hungry when he gets 
home. He doesn’t have time for lunch. If he’s home at 5:00, he is starving.” The daily 
deadline, she said, gives her creative day a center.  
Alternatively, P18 said she preferred to work hard to meet more sporadic time 
limits. “I can remember finishing Easter dresses at, like, 4:00 a.m., just in time to get 
to church,” she said. “I’ve always been inclined to look at the deadline and figure 
backward from it.” For her, the satisfaction of beating the clock rivaled the 
gratification of completing her garments. 
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Time to Revisit   
Some participants found self-imposed deadlines altogether too arbitrary, 
questioning when anyone knew when something was completed. For instance, 
photographer P29 did not regret unfinished projects. Although she might “have to be 
in the same mode” she was originally, she has occasionally salvaged a long-forgotten 
image, which made her feel the dormancy was profitable.  
Post-painting evaluation was a malleable period for P5. She said she was 
usually pleased with a just-completed painting. “But I know that maybe three weeks, 
or four weeks, later it will become a disaster for me,” she said. “I will see it from a 
totally different point of view.” After that, she would either rework the canvas or 
scuttle it all together, preferring to start anew. 
By contrast, not all interviewees were inclined to return to what they had 
already made, despite estimable opinions to the contrary. Poet P12 recalled hearing an 
Indian writer recommend putting a poem away for a while, then coming back to it. “I 
tried that, putting the poem back into cold storage, and then going back and trying to 
develop it,” he said, though he found the extra step unworkable. Instead, he said, in his 
experience “a poem just happens, end to end.” For him, a poem takes precisely the 
amount of time it should. 
 
Connecting Time and Space for Making    
Most participants reported feeling the greatest satisfaction when they not only 
had sufficient time to make things but a space they felt comfortable in as well. For 
example, P1 said she was “not really a sitter”—except when she was knitting, and then 
time flew by as she settled in with yarn and needles. “When I’m working with knitting 
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or crocheting, I find myself relaxing and sitting down, and I’m concentrating on that 
instead of thinking about the 101 other things I could be up doing,” she said. 
Embroiderer P10 related that she looked forward each evening to “the moment 
you reach,” sitting down at last in her easy chair, having finished all the day’s duties. 
Only at that time and in that place could she then proceed with her work. “I will not sit 
and embroider during the day because I would feel guilty,” she said. “It gives me so 
much pleasure.” The affordances of time and space conspire, in her telling, to create 
the ideal setting for her favorite mode of self-expression. 
 
Spatial Affordances  
Like the two needleworkers, all of the participants were as persistent about 
finding places for making as they were about carving out time. I interviewed many of 
them in the spaces where they created—former basements, garages, attics, spare 
rooms, and sheds.  
The ones who were fortunate enough to have these places were proud of them; 
they often expressed relief that they had a spot to themselves to keep in-process 
projects going, to tinker with materials, and to daydream about endeavors to come. 
Those who did not yet possess such places had adapted their creative pursuits to where 
they happened to be. 
For example, one reason modern dancer P36 joined an amateur troupe was so 
she could gain rehearsal space. As a student, movie-maker P19 said he often filmed in 
public and edited his work on his laptop wherever he happened to be. Poet P12 said he 
usually wrote in his room, then recalled an especially productive night on the London 
Underground:  
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I took the tube without even looking at where is it going. I just observed 
people. There was a girl who was very beautiful. I saw her in her green shawl, 
and I wrote immediately about that . . . [The] train is a very good place.  
It could be that for him and the millions of people who ride the tube every day, 
the interior of a carriage is so much a part of the everyday experience that it becomes a 
place at ease outside of the home. Such is the effect of a city that it can nurture 
creativity, as P14 recounted earlier in her observations about how London inspires the 
way she dresses. 
However, not even the largesse of a city could reliably yield a proper space for 
costume-maker P7. Now happily settled into her first home complete with a sewing 
room, she recalled with frustration a series of tiny big-city flats she and her partner had 
shared. They were, she said, “full of his stuff and full of my stuff and there just wasn’t 
really room to do anything.” 
 
Finding Room    
When P20 faced a similar lack of space, he took his turkey call making to the 
porch. As long as the weather was good, all was well. He was fortunate, he said, that 
the scale of his calls was small enough that the space suited his needs. “I had a couple 
of the tools out, a little drill press and [a small lathe],” he said. “I just [kept all of] it on 
my front porch.”  
The spatial affordance of the porch—and of his tools—was only temporary, 
however. As he gained experience, he also gained larger, more powerful machinery as 
well as the desire to make calls regardless of the weather. When he and his family 
bought a new place, he made sure it had a backyard shed.  
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When she needed space to make her crazy quilts, P18’s partner designed a 
basement workshop for her. It worked well until she outgrew it. Now, she said, “There 
is so much stuff down there, and years of accumulation of fabric, and patterns, and 
books, and magazines.” Her solution was to retreat to an out-of-town cottage she 
inherited from her mother. “Sometimes I just have to gather up three or four projects, 
put them in some bags, load the sewing machines, and the bags of stuff, and go up 
there to be able to accomplish something,” she said.  
For those times that wholesale change of venue is not an option, new living 
arrangements sometimes dictate a change. When embroiderer P10 moved in with her 
adult daughter for a year, they compromised. “I have a room my daughter calls the 
dining room, and I call my studio,” she said. “So I understand that when we have 
guests, I have to put everything back, put under the bed, and use the table to serve 
dinner.” This inconvenience, she said, was a tolerable constraint, since she was still 
able to embroider.  
Several participants reclaimed space when their children left home for 
university. Handbag maker P28 said she moved operations to her son’s former 
bedroom. With her daughter at school, card maker P27 was happily working out of the 
attic playroom. Novelist P42 sometimes wrote in her collegiate son’s bedroom, too, 
though she also had a key to her neighbor’s garden hut—his generosity, she said, 
would enable her to claim she had written at least part of her book in the prototypical 
backyard shed.   
 
Reworking Spaces 
Remodeling can also render an old space newly workable. Boatbuilder P23 
recast a former one-car garage into a garage-cum-boatyard. “I’ve got two big bay barn 
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doors that open up out into the backyard,” he said. “When the weather’s nice, you can 
really have a great space there. It’s going to be a little tight if I undertake my next 
project, but we’ll see where that goes.” In a parallel to P20’s porch setting for his 
turkey calls, the garage-cum-boatyard made P23’s commitment to both the scale and 
outsized time frame of building boats possible. In other words, his boat shop abetted 
his sense of himself as a boat-maker. 
Such commitment to a pursuit forced more than one participant to make do 
with a substandard space. The case of P21 was instructive: When he first took up 
landscape painting, he simply painted in his basement.  
It was a basement that is technically used for lawn equipment storage. It had an 
outside entrance and no connection to the house other than it sits beneath it. It 
had no windows, no ventilation and it had fluorescent lights . . . I realized after 
some time that those lights were so bright that everything looked brighter, such 
that when I painted and took it into normal light, it looked like it was in 
shadows. All my paintings looked very moody and dreary. My still lifes looked 
like they were in a dungeon. When I realized that, the pendulum sort of swung 
the other way, so I started to paint in too high a key, such that I ran out of room 
on the light end. My highlights were pure white. I slowly learned how to bring 
it back . . .When [my mentor] came and visited me he said, “Show me where 
you paint.” We went into the basement, and he looked at the space, he said, 
“Wow. You really do want to paint. This space is horrible.”  
Regardless, he said, it was the only place he could carve out time to paint, 
given his career. After his recovery from cancer, he was painting in a downtown studio 
that featured a bank of north-facing windows, and adequate ventilation, storage, and 
space for his family to be with him while he worked. “For me, it’s a dream come true,” 
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he said. “All of a sudden, I’ve got this space where I don’t feel the pull of the dishes in 
the sink or the laundry that needs to be turned over.” 
His story demonstrates several characteristics of space that had a direct bearing 
on his creativity. On the positive side, he was able to log many hours at the easel from 
his basement without leaving home. On the negative side, the basement’s lack of 
ventilation made the fumes from his oil paint potentially more harmful, and the 
inadequate lighting affected his judgment about which colors to use—which in turn 
negatively influenced his progress in the medium. With his mentor’s help and his own 
insights, he was able to correct for the space’s imbalances and eventually overcome 
them. Intriguingly, the basement’s deficiencies informed the amenities of his new 
studio, a space so well-appointed that artists traveling through town would join him in 
painting there. 
For him and any maker, having a space for making things demands more than 
vision and will. One way or another, it also demands money. 
 
Economic Affordances 
From the economic state of the country to the change in one’s pocket, money 
makes itself felt as an affordance in ways both dramatic and subtle. People who make 
things require at least some outlay of capital, which in turn has some bearing on what 
they create. Recall, for instance, that P32 finished his pocket squares by hand because 
he could not afford a sewing machine, and that songwriter P16 was delighted to have 
found a drummer who came with his own rehearsal space. There were few 
conversations about making that did not in some way reference money. 
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Yet for all its cultural pervasiveness, money was mentioned in and of itself 
only 194 times, the lowest frequency of any affordance. Because of the way money 
interweaves with other affordances, perhaps participants felt that it was implicit in the 
cost of classes, say, the expense of materials, or the creation of a studio and did not 
warrant a special comment.  
However, the things participants did say about money were revealing. Pianist 
P41 bluntly stated that he found that the necessary complications of making a living 
had a negative effect on creativity. “I found, certainly, that working for a living and 
having a family and doing all the mundane things that we do with our [lives are] not 
conducive to being creative at all,” he said. Like embroider P10, he returned to his 
favorite mode of self-expression once his children were living on their own and he had 
retired from a 9-to-5 job.  
At the other extreme, 30-something P33 took the exigencies of life in stride; 
having a career, a home, and a family were for him not exclusive to making origami. 
“As long as I don’t think about actually trying to pay myself a wage to make it, yep, 
it’s good,” he said. 
 Between the poles of those opinions were many other points. Some participants 
justified spending money on their creative pursuits as an investment. Quilter P35 
rationalized replacing her old sewing machine that way, and P25 and P39 talked about 
how high-quality ingredients were worth the cost because they would result in better 
baked goods. Dinner-maker P22 joked that she shopped for groceries so often that the 
bag boy at her usual market said goodbye by calling out, “See you tomorrow.” 
Repeated exposure to finer materials turned knitter P1 into a self-described “yarn 
snob.” But for her, there was a balance: “I still look at the super-saver packets,” she 
admitted.  
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The Low-Cost (or Free) Option 
Several other interviewees confessed a fondness for saving money at least 
some of the time. P31 compared her current journal, a gift from her parents, to the 
camera and software she recently bought for her burgeoning photography hobby. “The 
journal most definitely was free,” she said. “I think that’s why I like it.” 
While videography is costly, P13 had managed to acquire valuable tools—and 
the knowledge to use them—in exchange for interning with his mentor. The first time 
they worked together, the mentor spent a week teaching him how to use a clapper 
board. “It’s been two years now, and he’s taken me on every major job since. Every 
job I do with him, he gives me a new piece of kit.” Gaining experience and equipment 
was more than a fair trade for him—it was an economically feasible way for him to 
learn on the best stock-in-trade. 
Potter P30 was almost gleeful when she said, “I have learned where to go dig 
up free clay.” Mountain basins and river banks offered materials that suited her 
purposes. “You know what you’re going to dig up if you go certain places,” she said. 
She was happy about being able to make things from the land under her feet and was 
also pleased with the inside knowledge her expeditions conferred.   
 
Money As a Tool for Making 
While she dug her own clay, others found in money a means of leveraging new 
creative pursuits. The oil painting classes P5 enjoyed fell into this category, as did a 
series of post-graduate writing workshops novelist P40 took.   
P18 recalled that her first painting—George Washington’s horse—won a 
children’s art prize. It came with a social as well as a financial reward: “That was the 
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first time I remember being applauded for my art. It was a reward system that felt 
good,” she said. “I put that money into my first art classes.” 
As noted earlier, money was both explicitly and implicitly behind P3’s drive to 
make spreadsheets. While he initially developed them to track his investments, their 
potential grew with his exposure to the numbers. He said he began to see the power of 
his spreadsheets to help him gauge the amount of money he and his spouse would need 
to retire, or what their savings rates should be. “Suddenly, you start asking these 
questions so . . . the need for answers that are independently verified through your own 
calculations is driving the growth of the project.” 
 
When Making Is Better Than Buying    
Like P3 with his do-it-yourself spreadsheets, some interviewees resorted to 
making things when items they had purchased were somehow deficient. Before he 
began tying flies, P5 had a habit of taking a handful of $2-to-$3 readymade flies 
whenever he went fishing. “Right there you’ve spent, you know, $25,” he said. “And 
when you’re not very good in the beginning, half of them end up stuck in rocks or on a 
tree branch behind you.” After enough of what he called “$3 casts,” he decided he 
could make better flies more inexpensively.  
Cost was only one reason why P28 began making handbags. Before she made 
her first one, she remembered asking if her spouse would buy a costly bag she had 
admired in a store for Christmas. When she got it, she was disappointed to realize it 
was too heavy to carry every day, she said. Making her bags allowed her to tailor 
precisely what she wanted, from the weight of the leather to the length of the shoulder 
strap.  
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Turkey call maker P20 recalled a similar experience. He used a gift certificate 
to buy an expensive call from a sporting goods store. He stated: 
My thought was, well, if they’re charging $85, $90 for their call, it’s got to 
sound so much better than all the other ones. I bought one, and when I opened 
that thing up and played it, I was so disappointed, because to me it didn’t sound 
any better than that $35 or $40 call that I had.   
He deconstructed that expensive call to see how it was made, which eventually led to 
the first call to emerge from his workbench. 
Interestingly, both P20 and P28 were among a handful of participants exploring 
ways to make money on the side from their projects. Friends had seen what they had 
made and asked for more. Sharing photographs of their work, often on Facebook and 
Instagram, heightened the appetite for their handbags and calls. Both were intrigued by 
the idea of making more of the things they enjoyed creating. 
 To get to that point often takes all affordances firing on all cylinders. 
Fortunately, as Gibson (1977, 1979) noted, the lack of an affordance can spur 
creativity as much as the abundance of it. Costume-maker P7 observed that a lack of 
money cut both ways for her. “A lot of my creative projects weren’t really to do with 
making anything [tangible] because I couldn’t afford . . .  to buy the materials.” For 
her, the lack of financial means was not a detriment. “Somehow even if you can’t 
afford that thing, then there is this other thing that is also possible,” she said. Finding 
that possible “other thing” is one characteristic these makers, to greater and lesser 
degrees, all had in common.  
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Summary of the Qualitative Results 
The meta-codes of creativity, identity, and affordances were chosen to address 
if and how they interact to make a person feel creative. While participants in the 
present research spoke knowledgeably about creativity and identity, they were 
particularly voluble about how affordances affected their sense of themselves as 
everyday creators. 
If their stories indicate anything, it is that the circuits affordances travel in are 
so dense they are at times impossible to tease apart. Narratives often eloquently 
described how, money affords materials, materials afford techniques, techniques afford 
time, and so on (Moeran, 2014). Indeed, in more than a few anecdotes, money, time, 
space, representation, materials, and social networks attracted each other like so many 
electromagnets; when that happened, Moeran’s model (Figure 6) hummed to life. 
Fortunately, the group was forthcoming and surprisingly cohesive on enough 
aspects of creativity, identity, and affordances that several themes emerged. For 
instance, participants had a great deal to say about creativity, which reiterated the 
results of the Creative Identity Questionnaire. Together, they voiced an opinion that 
creativity is a common human trait, and they often linked it to the projects they were 
making. They found inspiration in cities and other people and enjoyed the 
expansiveness of inspiration and the comforts of their senses.   
Participants spoke of their creative identities as a reflection of the things they 
made as well as the reactions of others and credited formal and informal education as 
important in helping them see themselves as makers. Whether they felt creative as 
children or as retirees, they seemed to agree that any age is a good one to make 
something.  
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When they addressed affordances, they often appeared to grasp Gibson’s 
(1977, 1979) distinction that affordances (or the lack thereof) can instigate action. 
Accordingly, their thoughts about representation—and they were thoughts, owing to 
my revision of the concept—grasped that finding one’s way as a creative being 
sometimes meant stepping out into the world and at other times retreating. They found 
both succor and conflict within their social circles; were both shaped and discouraged 
by materials and techniques; and found and lost time, space, and money. In short, they 
covered a gamut of thoughts, emotions, and memories to make connections that 
informed this research—and sometimes themselves—about what it means to be a 
creator. 
 
Supplementary Analysis: Agency Ascending 
 The interview transcriptions provided one flow of information for this study. 
They were, however, hardly the only source of insight. My case summaries, initially 
made as notes to myself as I began processing the interviews, proved helpful in finding 
related concepts that complemented the narratives. Moreover, they pointed to an 
important supplementary direction in the present research. 
 As I did with the narrative analyses, I followed Kuckartz’s (2014) direction for 
the case summaries; he suggests that they align with the original texts and remain 
factual rather than interpretive. To that end, I began each one with a quote that seemed 
to me to capture some essence of the interview and continued with a thumbnail word 
sketch of the main points of the participant’s story.  
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 For example, this is the case summary for spreadsheet maker P3: 
Quote: “I think part of the appeal of this spreadsheet is everything is working 
out in the spreadsheet. It’s not necessarily working out in other areas of my life 
in terms of satisfaction with a job and just pressures and family. I don’t know 
that I’m accomplishing anything every week as I dive into this thing but it is an 
escape, and it is this grasp of at least this is going to work for me."  
Note: P3 is a 50-something man in the US whose creative pursuit is developing 
software and spreadsheets that track the financial status of his family. He talks 
about how his experience growing up in a family under financial straits 
contributed to his drive to make these plans. He also talked about how, while 
other people might not feel they’re classically creative, his projects bring him a 
great deal of satisfaction and confer peace of mind. 
I envisioned these matter-of-fact summaries solely as organizing tools for the 
project. Because I created a deductive framework to explore research questions 
focused on identity, creativity, and affordances, it might have seemed that the 
organizing tools were no longer needed once I completed the lengthy interview 
analyses. Indeed, I only reviewed the 42 summaries on what I considered the back end 
of the analysis just to be sure I had covered all the thematic bases. 
Mapping, I decided, would graphically cross-check the themes that emerged 
from my case summaries. In June 2017, I used a mapping tool in the software to plot 
the themes; unsurprisingly, most of them fit into established categories. Eight of them, 
however, did not. Phrases in my notes such as “determination,” “discipline,” and 
“intent” could not neatly align with any of the categories, even the interior-focused 
representation. After consulting with my peer reviewer, I determined that these eight 
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words—and the concepts behind them—fell under the heading “Agency” (See Figure 
14). 
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Figure 14. Case memo relationship map. This rough iteration details the themes of the 
memos I wrote to organize the interviews. Most of the phrases and words related to 
established categories, except for those in the upper right-hand corner under Agency. 
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The Case for Agency 
The category of agency immediately seemed to accommodate an implied 
aspect of affordance theory that could also be useful in parsing creative identity. I have 
already noted that affordances invite agency if they are perceived by actors who 
reflexively decide to engage with them (Withagen et at., 2012). A more compelling 
reason to include agency in this analysis comes from those who call for heeding the 
social contexts of creativity: Dalton (2004), Joas (1996), Bourdieu (1984, 1993; 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), Williams (1972, 2011), Hallam and Ingold (2007), and 
Amabile (1996) among them. Furthermore, in his sociocultural model for an 
affordance theory of creativity, Glăveanu (2012) describes the “intentionality of the 
actor” (p. 192) as having a bearing on the inherent creativity of a product. 
While my case summaries prompted me to create this category which led to a 
second review of the transcriptions, the words that instigated the summaries came from 
the participants themselves. Indeed, their insights indicated that if affordances invite 
agency, agency invites makers to make. 
Several participant comments on agency have already appeared in this chapter. 
For instance, discussions from P1 and P10 about focus appeared in the section about 
spatial affordances. P30 mentioned influence while she spoke of social affordances, 
while P3 spoke of drive in the same section. These passages and others suggest the 
interchanges that exist between affordances and agency. 
 
Agentic motivation    
That relationship also surfaced in parts of participants’ narratives that did not 
fit so neatly into categories of affordance. In discussing motivation, sashiko maker P4 
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was not only speaking about its effect on her, but those with whom she works: “I think 
it’s like lighting the gas line,” she said, “because once you get the right connection . . . 
you get a source of momentum and things just happen.” 
Conversely, if momentum is missing, nothing much at all will transpire, 
costume-maker P7 said. She recalled the stalled progress of a project she began shortly 
after moving into her first flat: “I didn’t do anything, really, after that for quite a long 
time because it just took me so long. I was a bit discouraged,” she said. “I was really 
pleased with the finished product, but it took me a long time to find the motivation to 
finish it.” Her remark touches on several affordances, most obviously time and 
representation, with space being implicit. The motivation that comes at the end of the 
quote bears the stamp of agency, of doing something in response to or even in spite of 
those affordances. 
 
Commitment and intent 
Landscape painter P21 talked about how his new studio freed him from the 
self-imposed pressures of housework while painting at home. “It’s really allowed me 
to solely concentrate and be as productive and committed as I can be,” he said. 
Similarly, P17 was galvanized by a new, classically derived direction in her flower 
paintings: “I’m taking it very seriously now. Nothing’s in my way,” she said. 
Facing down the affordances of space, time, and representation allowed them 
both to more fully apply themselves to pursuing what they said they wanted to do with 
their work. Their agentic responses did not bear the inner direction of representational 
affordance; instead, they both expressed a reflexive move toward deeper practice. 
The concept of commitment plays into that of intent. Songwriter P16 described 
it regarding performance: 
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It doesn’t matter what song it is, there’s only one way to play it, and it’s out 
there, and you have to find it. That’s where the right technical bits, the right 
intent, the emotional commitment to the song [come together]. In some 
respects, some people would argue that performance is part of that—finding 
that one song and playing it right. But for me, the performance is completely 
wrapped up in the intent. 
In his telling, intent—like focus and drive—is not a choice so much as it is a 
compulsion to create. For him, intent was the locus of making music. 
  
Discipline and determination    
Embroiderer P10 described the necessity of intent when she discussed the 
independence she experienced after she moved to London. “The fact of not having a 
structure gives me the freedom to make choices, and to go in one direction or the 
other, which needs discipline,” she said. “But it is a great gift.” The gift could be 
intuiting that agency requires discipline. 
 It also requires adequate supplies of determination. Videographer P13 mused 
about how affordances have intertwined in his experience; he said they never 
completely aligned for him, but that did not matter. “I think it comes to a stage where I 
just have to accept that I can’t have them all and just make do with that I do have,” he 
said. 
 Printmaker P9 was more instructive about where determination can lead: “The 
head needs to be switched on, but it’s also more intuition or an emotion that you need 
to keep up. It’s difficult to explain,” she said. “I think you do need to do something . . . 
and it will come.” Her account recalls Joas’s (1999) contention that creative action 
might be the way to comprehend agency. Agency, for her and many of the participants 
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in the present research, was and is a precursor to action, which in turn was and is the 
antecedent for creative identity. 
 
Conclusions from the Data Analyses 
 
This section of analyses began with a review of the results of the Creative 
Identity Questionnaire, moved through an interlude that charted the transition between 
the quantitative and qualitative phases of the present research, and proceeded with a 
detailed accounting of the qualitative data.  
The answers on the questionnaire supported the proposition that respondents 
did consider themselves to be creative. Indeed, the average scores indicated that 
respondents considered being creative central to who they are. 
In the interlude between analyses, I used the statistical results from the 
questionnaire to help frame the numerical aspects of the qualitative analysis as well as 
the codebook reflecting the research interests of creativity, identity, and affordances. 
Once I had ascertained the creativity of participants, I found it instructive to think of 
the codes used to analyze the interviews in terms of numbers. The alternative—
plunging straight ahead into the qualitative data—would have lacked the depth 
necessary to adequately digest the descriptions.  
 By choosing to make things as diverse as dances and drones, or boats and bird 
calls, and then talking about them to me, these participants offered a window into how 
they came to think of themselves as creative, and how they continue to think that way. 
Indeed, their actions—and the way they talked about them—fueled the second round 
of qualitative analysis.    
Affordance theory (Glăveanu, 2012, 2017; Moeran, 2014) seemed to be such a 
complete way to describe the things that help or hinder the formation of a creative 
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identity that it was only after a review of my case summaries that I discovered 
passages from the interviews that discussed agency. I discovered that participants used 
words that indicated they were very nearly impelled to create. What I found convinced 
me that agency hides in plain sight very near affordances and the action linked to 
them.   
 One of the research questions asked how being creative changes people’s lives. 
The stories told by participants listed a gamut of outcomes, from happiness to 
frustration, and from open-mindedness to laser-like focus. It was an impressive range 
from people who partake of everyday creative activities simply because they want to. 
Or do they?  
The man who felt creative as he and his son were playing, P24, said he thought 
that everyday creativity served a more compelling purpose, one that underscores the 
sweep of this thesis:  
Very often, there are lots of other things that would take first place in your life . 
. . The practice of something creative, what difference is that going to make? 
It’s not going to pay the bills. It’s not going to keep you your job, of course. 
However, if you have got the time, the process of doing it is like a kind of food. 
You feel what it is to be human. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MAKING AND BECOMING:  
DISCUSSION, INTERPRETATIONS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, 
AND CONCLUSION  
 
As envisioned in Chapter 1, this exploratory study sought to address a gap in 
the literature of psychology, sociology, and anthropology by investigating how people 
form creative identities. Accordingly, the purpose of this research was to identify the 
confluence of events and circumstances that resulted in the formation of a person’s 
creative personal identity. Its original contribution to the field sits at the intersection of 
perception, reflexivity, and the human drive to make things. 
The central research questions aimed to get to the heart of the matter by 
viewing the development of creative identity through the transdisciplinary lens of 
affordance theory (Gibson, 1977, 1979; Glăveanu, 2012, 2017; Moeran, 2014). By 
contemplating the internal and external affordances to creativity—how they are 
identified and perceived, how they are negotiated, and how they change people’s 
lives—the present research intended to recount makers’ evolutions toward seeing 
themselves as creative beings. 
This chapter takes the measure of the project and reviews the results of this 
exploratory study, relating them to the goals for this research stated in Chapter 1. It 
summarizes the main findings and clarifies their interpretations, contexts, and 
implications. It discusses the limitations of this research and contemplates directions 
for future inquiry. 
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Discussion of Findings 
Investigating the multifaceted genesis of creative identity necessitated a 
congruent method. Because the present research was interested in the experiences 
people undergo on the way to developing a creative personal identity, a convergent 
parallel mixed-methods strategy (Creswell, 2014) was selected to allow for the 
complementarity and corroboration that arises during the quantitative and qualitative 
phases. The strategy called for simultaneous collection of quantitative and qualitative 
data followed by interpretation in analysis. It, therefore, encouraged a robust cross-
elaboration of the data, as described in the section in Chapter 6 on the interlude 
between phases. 
The quantitative assessment, the 11-item Creative Identity Questionnaire, was 
guided by the Short Scale of the Creative Self (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 
2012; in press), which among other attributes measures creative personal identity, the 
construct of greatest interest in this project. In this case, the questionnaire sought to 
confirm that participants possessed the creative identities they said they had. In the 
qualitative segment, participants were asked to make something in their preferred 
media as an effort to remember what it was like when they first felt creative, a 
direction that built on empirical research by Gauntlett (2007) and Schön (1992), as 
well as theoretical work by Malafouris (2013). 
Following approval from the Graduate School Board of the University of 
Westminster, this craft elicitation method and the questionnaire were first introduced 
to six participants in a pilot project in October 2015. The formal project took place 
between January and November 2016. Its purposive sampling (Barbour, 2001; Etikan, 
Musa, & Alkassim, 2016) netted 42 adults—17 men and 25 women—in the UK and 
the US who defined creativity for themselves and affirmatively answered the question, 
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“Do you feel creative in your particular medium?” Nearly 40 hours of interviews 
followed, with makers whose media ranged from making music to getting dressed. 
Quantitative and qualitative data were then analyzed using Excel 2016 and 
MAXQDA 12.1 software, respectively. Quantitative data were analyzed for 
descriptive statistics, and then the constructs of creative identity and creative self-
efficacy were statistically compared. Qualitative data were analyzed in a thematic 
qualitative text analysis process (Kuckartz, 2014), which called for iterative reviews of 
the interviews to identify coding categories and subcategories. 
 
Summary of Results 
Quantitative Segment 
Independently verifying that participants felt they had creative identities was 
obviously useful in addressing the research problem. After all, if these people did not 
feel they were creative, how could they describe their creative identities? 
Taking the questionnaire was optional for participants. The 30 who did 
complete it had scores between 4.17 and 4.55 out of a possible score of 5 on questions 
relating to creative personal identity. As a group, they clearly regarded themselves as 
creative. 
Subsequent analysis involved the creation of indices for raw scores and a 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for examining the relationship 
between creative personal identity and creative self-efficacy. While not central to the 
present research, a moderately strong correlation between those two constructs was 
noted.  
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Comparative Segment  
An interim phase between the quantitative and qualitative segments suggested 
by Creswell (2014) eased the transition from numbers to words. Making preliminary 
transcriptions and formatting the text revealed important passages. In turn, these 
precipitated memos and other research notes, often about the prevalence of creative 
affordances (Moeran, 2014) in the interviews. Periodically returning to the research 
questions yielded the meta codes of Creativity, Identity, and Affordance and various 
sub-codes: Physicality and Inspiration for Creativity; Education and Age for Identity; 
and Time, Space, Money, Techno-material, Social, and Representation for Affordance. 
Three constituent sub-codes—Family in Social, and Far and Close in Representation—
emerged from the repeated reviews. 
This phase also allowed for a consideration of the code counts that emerged 
from the review of the texts, which encouraged congruence between the quantitative 
and qualitative segments. Nearly 5,000 segments were coded.  
As a means of further probing the research problem, this phase was informative 
in that it encouraged a reflexive examination of what was known about the project that 
helped bridge what had yet to be analyzed. Thinking of the codes in terms of their 
sheer proportions was a critical step in coming to see which creative affordances 
loomed largest for the participants. 
 
Qualitative Segment 
While this part of the project held the core answers to the research questions, 
condensing the data demanded clear analysis. In general, the density of qualitative 
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research often makes summarizing it a challenge. This project was no exception, 
largely because of the intertwining nature of creative affordances. 
Indeed, as Moeran (2014) hypothesized, affordances occurred in circuits—at 
least, participants in the present research described them in that way. When they talked 
about money, for example, they were also discussing materials or space. Likewise, 
when they mentioned the role of friends or family, they occasionally also broached the 
subject of time. 
Other affordances were often bundled into their remarks on representation. The 
category that was most frequently coded was enlarged from its original aesthetics-
based definition to one that included participants’ judgments about what they made as 
well as how they went about making. Moreover, their discourses regarding identity 
and creativity were also interwoven with their stories about writing novels, for 
instance, or shooting videos. That said, themes emerged from each of the categories 
that aid in distilling how participants understood the interplay of their media, 
affordances, and creative identities. 
 
Creativity 
While participants for the most part discussed creativity outright in implicit 
terms, their descriptions of it affirmed Gauntlett’s (2011) predominantly 
social/individual view, the working definition of creativity for this project. Participants 
saw it as contextual, iterative, and integral to their beings. They spoke of sharing their 
work with others, of stretching their conceptions of the creativity in their social 
networks, and of the self-reward that comes with such generativity. 
Participants linked creativity to experience as well as product and frequently 
characterized it as a way of knowing the world. Some felt creative when they first 
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began working in their media, while others noted feeling creative only after they had 
logged hours of practice to master technical intricacies. Many participants expressed 
the opinion that their efforts fulfilled an inner need to express their creativity. For 
most, this resulted in generativity, though at least one participant described the 
creativity that came from destroying something.  
Participants also referred to the effects of inspiration and the physical aspects 
of creativity as having some bearing on their creative identities. Inspiration was, for 
some, a by-product of creativity. They cited people and places as fueling their ideas for 
projects to come. Others mentioned how the physicality of their media—playing music 
or dancing, for instance—gave them the momentum to keep creating.   
 
Identity 
A number of participants saw themselves as what might be described as pan-
creative—that is, rather than strictly classifying themselves as a photographer, a drone-
maker, or a mimic, they considered themselves creative at heart. While their 
participation in the present research required them to identify one pursuit to discuss, 
for many people, making in general seemed to reinforce their opinions of themselves 
as creative. The expansiveness of creative identity could explain why some of them 
could shift from one pursuit to another without looking back. 
Some participants told stories of having friends or family spontaneously 
confirm their creativity, which stoked their creative identity. Indeed, some considered 
the propensity to make things a tradition in their families.  
School was often mentioned as instrumental in building participants’ sense of 
themselves as creators. School assignments often conferred expertise, as was the case 
when the people in the study became familiar with tools and techniques. Carrying such 
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expertise a step further, other participants were able to raise their grades by applying 
creativity in drawing or writing, even in non-related subjects.  
Others learned their creative pursuits via social media, particularly YouTube. 
Proud of their ability to teach themselves something new, a few participants said that 
learning to make things had an effect that set the course of their creative lives in 
motion.  
Age undeniably factors into how people describe themselves, and participants 
in the present research couched their discussions of their creativity in terms of it as 
well. From the youngest to the oldest, they spoke of creativity as a way of discovering 
oneself as well as a way of making sense of the world. Many participants tied their 
ages to the things they happened to be making at the time. Persistence in making was 
cited as a benefit of age.  
 
Affordances 
Participants understood the construct of affordances, a key construct for this 
project, but few uttered the word itself in conversation. Used by Gibson (1977) to 
describe the things in the environment that have the potential to promote or deny 
behavior, it is hardly a well-known word. Yet those who did mention it observed the 
ambiguity of affordances as a quality they had encountered. For them, either the 
perceived lack or surfeit of one could be either positively or negatively affect a 
creative pursuit.  
The sub-codes of affordance—representation, social, techno-material, time, 
space, and money—accounted for the majority of the codes marked in the analysis of 
the interviews. While affordances appeared to “intertwine,” as one participant called it, 
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sifting through the interviews for accounts of how they encountered each one helped 
make them more understandable. Consider:  
 
• The sub-code representation, detailed in Chapter 7, focused on 
participants’ interior perspectives of their creative pursuits. It also 
revealed aspects of their worldview. In more than one instance, 
participants described the necessity of seeing themselves as creative 
before they would try to make the things they envisioned. The ability to 
view mistakes as a path toward innovation was a theme that emerged 
from the interviews, as was the idea of creating uncertainty as a catalyst 
for new directions. Participants’ conceptions of representational 
affordances also reflected the idea that making is a retreat from a busy 
world, and they sometimes offered their products or processes as proof. 
They also occasionally portrayed the things they were making as being 
either aligned with or removed from their vision, narratives that 
materialized in the constituent sub-codes close and far. 
 
• As they spoke of their social affordances, participants often talked of 
making things for others, both as gifts and as more spontaneous ways to 
connect with people. In turn, making things with other people was 
gratifying for boatmaker and songwriter alike, although working alone 
appealed to those who plied solo pursuits, such as pottery or journal-
keeping. Formal teachers and mentors as well as family—in this group, 
particularly fathers—frequently supported participants’ creative forays, 
though they sometimes undermined them. That such obstacles did not 
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prevent these participants from developing a creative identity speaks to 
how they were able to turn a lack of support into an affordance that 
worked in their favor. 
 
• Techno-material affordances were often described in terms of quality—
especially for tools and raw materials—although some makers were 
pleased to report pride in working with things they happened to have on 
hand. Occasionally, however, the quality of tools or media intimidated 
the would-be makers, who would usually proceed to other, more 
reassuring, projects. Participants also expressed a sense of fulfillment in 
developing stores of knowledge about their materials; some went so far 
as to express a sense of kinship with paper or wood. 
 
• The sub-code time reflected many facets: plans, sequences, and 
deadlines, as well as the personal timelines of each maker and that of 
their chosen field. Participants were willing to juggle their schedules to 
accommodate projects, stealing time before or after work and family 
commitments were taken care of. When they could not find sufficient 
time, they sometimes refocused by selecting projects that could be 
broken into small segments or scaled down for portability. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, participants were quite specific about the number of 
days, hours, or minutes each of their projects consumed. Further, a 
number of them were sanguine about revisiting a completed project 
after a period of time; some felt it beneficial, while others found their 
pleasure in their product had diminished. 
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• Having a proper space to work was an ongoing issue for many 
participants. Many of them managed with outposts in garages, 
basements, and spare rooms, while others altered their projects so they 
could work in public. A few of them mentioned the constraints of 
working with family in the house, though there were some who took the 
initiative to create new spaces from old after children went to university 
or when other remodelings were taking place. When space for making 
was inadequate, participants expressed their frustrations. Perhaps 
predictably, those few whose spaces were well-tailored for their needs 
spoke of their satisfaction and relief in having a place of their own at 
last. 
 
• Money affected participants in direct and indirect ways. Not being able 
to buy tools sometimes forced improvisation. Participants who could 
buy what they needed occasionally described money as a way to invest 
in their creativity with tools and raw goods. A few participants 
resourcefully pressed gifts into service, bartered for equipment, or 
tapped into the ground for free materials. Even as the lack of 
expendable resources compelled some of them to begin making things 
such as sporting equipment and fashion accessories, success with their 
output sometimes could generate social media fans who wanted to buy 
their creations. Further, participants reported that the lack of money 
could be ameliorated by a wealth of imagination. 
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Supplementary Analysis 
Following the formal qualitative analysis, subsequent re-review and mapping 
of themes from the case studies revealed a number of quotes from participants that 
broached the matter of agency. Motivation, commitment, intent, discipline, and 
determination were the words they used to clarify their drive to make. 
Participants’ observations about agency sometimes emerged from their 
descriptions of how they negotiated the affordances they encountered on the way to 
developing a creative identity. Other times, they were simply talking out loud about 
what makes them want to create. 
As a way of making sense of the how affordances influence creative identity, 
the addition of agency to the analysis of this project was a crucial step. After all, for 
each participant, agency drove the action that engaged with the web of creative 
affordances. As the discussion later in this chapter details, that addition is how this 
project follows Dalton’s (2004) call to bridge Joas’s (1996) theory of creative action 
with Bourdieu’s account of habitus (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
 
Constructing New Knowlege 
In Chapter 1, this study made three proposals. First, it was to be an initial 
empirical examination of Moeran’s (2014) theory of creative affordances. Second, it 
sought to further work on creative personal identity by Karwowski and his associates 
(2012, in press) by combining its quantitative thrust with qualitative evidence. Third, it 
proposed to follow the precepts of methodological fit (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) 
to gauge the appropriateness of craft elicitation as a research method. 
236 
 
A Web of Science citation search conducted in October 2017 of “Moeran, B. 
(2014). The business of creativity: Toward an anthropology of worth” listed five 
published works from four authors whose work appeared in The Journal of Cultural 
Economy, Ethnography, Human Organization, American Anthropologist, The 
Anthropology of Work Review, and Signs and Society. One piece was an essay; the 
others explored economic or organizational themes with ethnographic research of 
groups as diverse as career rock climbers and people who work in a fashion house. 
Therefore, the present research appears indeed to be among the first mixed-methods 
appraisals of the topic. Further, this research was also possibly the first conducted with 
amateur makers, as the search results as well as Moeran’s own work focused on 
professionals. 
Likewise, this appears to be a preliminary mixed-methods look at creative 
personal identity, a key precept measured by the Short Scale of the Creative Self 
(Karwowski; Karwowski et al., 2012, in press). As detailed in Chapter 5, the Creative 
Identity Questionnaire used in the present research was adapted from that tool. The 
Short Scale of the Creative Self has been used by its authors to help assess creative 
mindsets (Karwowski, 2014; Karwowski & Brzeski, 2017).  
Because creative identity was the main interest for this project, self-efficacy 
and mindsets, while interesting, were not central to this discussion. The questionnaire 
was nonetheless useful in verifying that the respondents thought themselves creative. 
Moreover, combining it with the interviews went at least part of the way toward 
Karwowski’s stated wish (personal conversation, August 5, 2016) that the scale be 
combined with a qualitative project such as this to explore its robustness. 
As far as examining the methodological fit of craft elicitation, several 
participants claimed the method was helpful in getting them to remember some nearly 
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forgotten moments surrounding the first time they felt creative. P1 said it had been 
years since she had thought of the woman who taught her how to knit, but that the 
memories flooded back when she followed the request to make something and think 
about when she first felt creative in her medium. Pianist P41 called a few months after 
the interview to say he had purchased a new piano and renewed his music lessons as a 
result of participating in this project. During her interview, mimic P42 seemed to make 
the first connection between her fondness for imitation and her father’s 
encouragement. As noted in Chapter 6, embroiderer P10 changed her creative direction 
after thinking about what she wanted to make as a part of this research. 
To a degree, it was as if thinking and talking about their earlier experiences 
while they were making something turned a key for these participants. If the 
experiences of a lifetime of twisting yarn on needles or making chords on piano keys 
are cumulative, it follows that the way back to the beginning would be through 
making. 
 
Interpretation of Findings 
Arriving at meaningful insights from the findings involves unwinding a skein 
of intertwined themes. Chiefly, these involve the mechanics offered by affordances in 
general, and representation in particular, and how affordances coalesce with action and 
agency to apprise creative identity.  
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Affordances Realized 
The most obvious finding was that each interview revealed how affordances 
influenced the way each participant worked, with the implication being that each story 
traced the winding path toward creative identity. 
That the way forward was seldom direct, at least in the participants’ telling, 
could be because of the inherent ambiguity of creative affordances, as well as the way 
they tangled together in participants’ narratives. Each participant met these challenges 
in different ways. Regardless, the strength and intensity of the narratives described in 
compelling terms how these people engaged with the affordances they encountered 
and how the affordances influenced the eventual outcomes in terms of present identity 
and future projects. 
Occasionally, these encounters were directly addressed. When painter P21 
described how his cancer diagnosis paradoxically gave him more time to paint and 
improve his technique, he actually used the term “affordance intertwining.” It was a 
particularly insightful characterization of the Jenga-like way the affordances of time, 
money, space, technique and materials—as well as his sense of them—came together 
for him when he was ill. 
Likewise, when mimic P42 joked about how affordances collide when “you’ve 
either got a lot of one and a complete lack of the other,” she was working through her 
understanding of them in terms of her experience. She was more than familiar with 
feeling pressed for time and cash, she said, so she could see how they would affect 
how she felt about her potential. Even though those affordances did not directly factor 
into her creative pursuit, the way she perceived their universality made an impression. 
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The Persistence of the Interior Landscape 
Indeed, her internal association was an example of the importance of 
representation, as the term was operationalized in this project. As a means of 
identifying how people perceive and evaluate affordances, representation goes a long 
way toward understanding the ways people deal with what circumstances cast before 
them. Simply put, representation helps explain the dynamic properties of people’s 
perceptions of affordances, as well as how they react to the psychological, social, and 
cultural circumstances they find themselves in. It also provides a focus for how they 
might challenge and ultimately break the constraints placed on them not only by 
habitus and field but their own self-imposed psychological and cultural inhibitions. 
As such, the perceptive aspect of representation is why people can “see” how 
affordances affect them in the first place. Yet the perception of this affordance is 
particularly malleable. Participants often brought up how their sense of what they were 
making changed over time. To be sure, embroiderer P10 and cupcake maker P25 
talked of initiating change when their initial creative pursuits failed to align with their 
internal assessments. What was the disruptive mechanism? It appears to have been 
reflexively weighing their progress against what they felt they should be doing. 
Viewed in this light, their narratives further the case that representation is an 
affordance that easily accommodates the way it was construed in this project. As such, 
it moves beyond the uninvented, unperceived, and unexploited aspects of Glăveanu’s 
models (2012, 2014) to assume a transdisciplinary role in how people decide to take 
advantage of or reject outright the offerings of the other affordances. 
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A Framework of Affordances-in-Action 
From the narratives shared by participants in this project, then, Moeran’s 
(2014) diagram of the circuits of affordances is sustained, and we can see that my 
broader definition of representational affordances serves the model well. The circuitry 
of enabling and constraining factors changes constantly and must be renegotiated 
every time a maker creates. 
This renegotiation is the action that Joas (1996) valorizes. Situating affordances 
within action aligns with Gibson’s (1977, 1979) contention that value-neutral 
affordances lie in potentiality until they are perceived and acted on. It is also 
congruous with Letiche and Lissack’s (2009) declaration that affordances draw people 
into action. 
However rich with affordances, though, action alone insufficiently describes 
how a person goes from making something to developing a creative identity. Enter 
agency, the motive force that propels people to action. As noted in the previous 
chapter, participants in this project spoke of agency in terms of focus, influence, 
motivation, commitment, intent, discipline, and determination. It was neither action 
nor self-efficacy they were talking about, exactly, neither potential nor ability. Rather, 
it was the intention of creating that drove them into action and the inevitable 
interchange with affordances. 
The outcomes of that action lie well beyond tangible products. Each encounter 
with affordances clearly colored participants’ judgments of themselves as creators. As 
cases in point, recall that both origami maker P33 and family bandleader P37 
mentioned how important it was to them to be able to envision being able to make a 
project before they attempted it. Every project stretched their sense of what was 
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possible, in a way reminiscent of Williams’s (1972) description of the construction of 
knowledge as “grasping from the known to the unknown” (p. 212). 
That “known-to-unknown” pattern is also a useful way to think about how 
people construct creative identities. For the amateur makers who participated in this 
research, every creative episode—from the first agentic flicker to try something to the 
active negotiation of affordances—builds creative identity, regardless of the success 
(or failure) of the resulting product. 
In the next attempt, agency may be modified slightly or significantly, 
informing the action and affordances as they shape identity. Like the tire swing maker 
described earlier, their repeated evaluations determine whether the next project is 
daring and more difficult or stepped-back and simpler. Certainly, for people like these 
who already claim creative identities, there is always a next project. 
Figure 15 graphically represents this iterative process. Within the spheres of 
psychological, social, and cultural contexts, an individual maker capitalizes on her or 
his creative identity to engender agency. From the drive to make comes the action that 
brings forth the affordances of time, space, money, materials and tools, social 
connections, and representation that are inevitably confronted. The combination of 
action and affordances sparks the person’s reflexive filtering of structure and agency. 
As creative identity is thereby informed by making, agency obtains adequate 
information to drive the actor’s efforts forward, and the cycle repeats with the next 
creative act. 
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Figure 15. The Affordances-in-Action model describes the continual 
interconnectedness of creative identity, agency, and action situated in the contexts of 
sociology, anthropology, and psychology. The circuits of affordances embedded in 
action require renegotiation with every encounter. 
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Besides drawing on Moeran’s (2014) model of creative affordances, the 
Affordances-in-Action model also incorporates precepts from Dalton’s (2004) 
sociological grafting of the work on action from Joas (1996) with aspects of habitus, 
field, and practice from Bourdieu (1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The 
model additionally assimilates aspects of Douny’s (2014) remarks on subjectivity as a 
product of everyday practice and cultural transmission as well as Giddens’s thoughts 
on reflexivity and identity (1984, 1991). It illuminates the lack of demarcation between 
rationality and intuition in the service of creativity that Negus and Pickering (2012) 
suggest, and it is as valid for rule-bending bricoleurs (Lévi-Strauss, 1966) as it is for 
creators who work within the tight prescriptions of tradition (Glăveanu, 2012).  
These antecedents helped delineate the model, while its emphases come from 
participants themselves. As creative people who worked in specific métiers, they 
regularly experienced the agency to try a new technique, material, or approach. In 
action, they confronted the affordances that faced them. They evaluated every 
selection they made throughout that action—and often continued doing so even after 
the process was over—thanks to the way they negotiated the affordances of 
representation. Whether positive, negative, or in-between, the results fed back into 
their creative identities and informed what happened when they made the next 
decision, the next project, or the next series. Essentially, these makers made things to 
keep making things. Chief among those things is a creative identity. 
 
Context and Implications of Findings 
The theories raised in the present research can be thought of as multiple 
branches in a sprawling family tree. Because it sought to explain how people begin to 
see themselves as creative beings, this project reviewed various psychological, 
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sociological, and anthropological theories that could contextualize likely answers. 
From there, it examined systems theories that to some degree blended the three into 
cohesive models. Then theories of identity and affordances were scrutinized before 
focusing on the specifics of creative identity (e.g., Glăveanu & Tangaard, 2014; 
Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; in press) and creative affordances (Moeran, 
2014). While this project can legitimately claim to be their theoretical heir, it has also 
inherited the DNA of the sometimes-knotty trunk from whence creativity study grows.  
 
From Theoretical Parts, a Whole 
This research was strengthened by looking for and finding commonalities in 
fields that often do not speak one another’s language. Knowing about creative 
cognition (Finke, 1996; Finke et al., 1992) and creative metacognition (Flavell, 1979; 
Hargrove, 2013) helped me make sense of identity construction (e.g., Giddens, 1984, 
1991). Seeing how Dalton (2004) envisioned action alongside habitus, capital, field, 
and practice (Bourdieu, 1984, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)—as well as how 
those related to the mechanics of Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) investment theory—
inspired me to look for further connections. I began finding them in many places. 
From worldview (Gabora, 2000; Koltko-Rivera, 2004) to self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1997), I contrived to piece together a narrative of my own that cultivated constructs 
from diverse fields. It provided me with the broad context that became useful in 
analyzing the narratives of participants.  
Throughout the reporting of this project, mention has been made of how 
participants’ stories recalled various theoretical points mentioned in the review of 
literature. When painter P5 talked about destroying a clock to see how it worked, for 
example, she seemed to summon the phenomenological spirit of Csordas (1990) and 
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Merleau-Ponty (1962). Similarly, for boat-maker P23 the subtext of experience, time, 
product, and process was just as apparent in his story about a chest he had just made as 
it was in Ingold’s (2010) theory of textility.   
Working from broad themes to those that came closest to explaining how 
people perceive their internal and external affordances to creativity served to make me 
aware of the sedimentary effect of building knowledge. Psychology, the discipline that 
still undergirds most creativity research, cast its precepts onto sociology. Together, 
they influenced my reading of anthropological and systems theories of creativity. 
Certainly, by the time I began constructing the case for Moeran’s theory of creative 
affordances (2014) and Karwowski’s (2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; in press) work in 
creative personal identity, these layers had laminated in such a way that their 
commonalities were more apparent than their individuation. In other words, my 
perception of the theories I employed framed how I engaged with them as affordances.   
 
Empirical Entities 
The empirical research studies in the field that were most helpful to the present 
research all examined creativity and identity, and some used inspiringly innovative 
methods to do so. Glăveau’s (2012) multi-modal research into Romanian Easter egg 
decorators was instructive in the ways that it viewed a culturally important creative 
pursuit through social and psychological frameworks. Likewise, analysis by Pachucki 
et al. (2010) of college students’ creative pursuits incorporated the self-reported 
creativity precedent and narrative analyses also used in the present research. The 
studies of the Short Scale of Creative Identity (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 
2012; in press) rendered useful insights into the instrument’s validity. Certainly, 
Moeran’s (2014) report of the affordances faced by magazine editors, advertising art 
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directors, photographers, and others in Japan was also an important antecedent to this 
research. 
That said, more than any other empirical work, this project owes much to 
Gauntlett’s (2007) trio of studies that asked people make drawings and Lego models to 
promote thought and talk about identity. My research and his look at everyday 
creators, and our research designs and procedures were similar.  
There were some significant differences that distinguish this work not just from 
that of Gauntlett (2007) but also from the other studies mentioned previously: This 
project involved people who make a variety of things, rather than a single medium, 
and they were interviewed one at a time in a mix of in-person and online formats. 
Moreover, the questionnaire that many participants completed substantiated their 
claims to creative identity.  
Nonetheless, the precedent set by Gauntlett (2007) remains relevant to the 
present research. Not only did his work presage craft elicitation, it involved 
participants in various forms of making which stretched the boundaries of what media 
research can be far beyond the confines of print, broadcast, and even online. That, in 
turn, helped frame this project and its open-ended consideration of media so as to be 
worthy of academic exploration.  
 
Significance and Implications for the Field 
With regards to advancing the research methodology, this study introduced the 
method of craft elicitation. It was a valuable means to solicit reflection. As such, it 
joins projects (e.g., Gauntlett & Holroyd, 2014; Holroyd, 2017) that encourage 
creativity researchers to involve participants in pursuits more active than answering 
surveys. Moreover, by recruiting adults from a diversity of backgrounds, nationalities, 
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and ages, who worked in a variety of media, this project provided real-world insights 
that might not have been available through other means with more narrow populations.  
 The implication that agency is a key element in the ongoing construction of 
creative identity could have significant import for any group that studies creativity. As 
it echoes Gauntlett’s contention that media curriculum should incorporate making as a 
means to bring insight (2016a), the present research could embolden teachers in higher 
and primary education, people who work in creative industries, and of course, 
everyday makers to do just that.  
All of those groups seek to understand what they do and why they do it. 
Enlarging the remit of media studies to go beyond conventional producer-and-
audience models could encourage students and professionals alike to think openly 
about all kinds of media as vehicles for action and reflection. As such, this research 
has the potential to encourage a broad range of people to think of themselves as media 
producers, regardless of the medium at hand.    
The research could also hold important implications for the sector that 
produces the materials and tools makers buy. The affordance-in-agency model could 
exert considerable influence into market research for the sector. Such insight could not 
only clarify how makers use their wares, but a clearer understanding of how their end 
users turn those products into things that promote creative identity could also highlight 
trends that point the way into new products.  
Knowledge about the affordances of creativity could have positive 
ramifications for people who feel blocked or frustrated in their creative pursuits. By 
framing the supports and barriers to making in a way that acknowledges their ability to 
be worked with and through, people could be freed to make things more readily and 
step into the world with more robust, intact creative identities. 
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 In Chapter 1, it was noted that a preponderance of creativity research examines 
the products, processes, and environments of eminent creators. Such a line of inquiry 
is important because it illuminates how and where highly accomplished people 
produce breakthrough ideas and items.  
The disadvantage of such concentrated study, however, is that creativity is not 
the sole province of the eminent. To that end, the present research addresses the gap in 
the literature identified by both Amabile (2017) and Karwowski (personal 
conversation, August 5, 2016), who indicate that one of the most important directions 
for new research in the field is examining the actions and motivations of everyday 
creators.  
 
Discussion of Limitations 
 
In Chapter 5, the constraints of the present research were identified. Under the 
duress of analysis, did those constraints change?  
My previously disclosed biases—most importantly, that I construe creativity to 
be a value-neutral, universally distributed human trait influenced by psychological, 
social, and cultural contexts—remain intact. I would go so far as to say that these 
biases, which were developed over a career of interviewing creative people, have 
become even more ingrained in the commission of this project.  
If anything, though, being aware of my own preconceptions and prejudices 
about creativity shaped the self-awareness I sharpened during this project. Further, it 
made me sensitive to the possibility of observer bias. I, therefore, tried to remain 
cognizant of both the text and subtext of what was being said in the interviews and 
stayed alert to unexpected insights. Indeed, my repeated reviews of the data, which 
always returned to the research questions, became object lessons in staying open to 
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surprises. The discovery of agency in the interview memos was an important case in 
point. 
Interacting with participants, I tried to minimize potential observer effect in 
two ways. One was by involving them in craft elicitation. My thinking was that 
participants would become so engrossed in making that their attention would focus 
more on what they were doing than on what they would say when we talked. The other 
was to employ the first precept of high-yield interviewing: Spend enough time in 
conversation, so the somewhat artificial, awkward beginnings of an interview fall 
away into a thoughtful exchange. I believe the depth and range of the interviews 
resulted from the combination of these two tactics.  
Other inevitable limitations, including those that dealt with how those 
interviews were captured, were dealt with as straightforwardly as possible. Transcripts 
were created as soon as possible after the interviews so that the tone and ramifications 
of what was said were top of mind and could be reiterated if needed. By using the 
software to capture insights both verbally and graphically—as in the case of reviewing 
key concepts from participant memos—I sought to mitigate the shortcomings of 
engaging with the software in a single mode.  
Perhaps the most apparent limitation of any investigative mixed-methods 
research project is its lack of generalizability. This study was undeniably exploratory, 
and its sample of everyday makers, no matter how carefully selected or interrogated, 
could hardly be expected to speak for all creators.  
Its greater utility might lie, as Glăveanu (2017) suggests, in how it offers a 
more finely-grained portrait of the layered relationships that constitute creative 
identity. For that reason, the Affordances-in-Action theory that emerged from 
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participants’ insights into the nature of creativity and identity could be found to have 
the potential to ameliorate the absence of conventional qualitative inferences.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
 Several matters arose in the commission of this project that point to a diversity 
of ways forward. Clearly, one additional direction would be to examine the role of 
creative self-efficacy in how people form creative identities, particularly since it was 
analyzed in the Creative Identity Questionnaire as well as in the Short Scale of the 
Creative Self (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; in press). Although this 
research takes the position that creative identity is separate from creative self-efficacy, 
it could be that creative self-belief plays some part in a maker’s transition from 
identity to agency. While Karwowski and Brzeski (2017) have begun to investigate 
this possibility quantitatively, qualitative inquiry would complement and deepen any 
potential answers.  
 Another avenue for exploration would involve more closely following 
Moeran’s (2014) lead and interviewing professionals who see their work as creative. 
Doing so would approach a concern voiced by P26, who found creativity in making 
quips. “Everyday creativity, which allows you to do something without any great risk 
to your livelihood or your existence, is fundamentally different [than the things you do 
at work],” he said. In what ways might the realities of competition, compensation, and 
market forces affect the way affordances interact with creative identity and the agency 
to create?  
As noted earlier, Moeran’s work on creative affordances (2014) qualitatively 
looks at situations among media and culture workers in contemporary Japan. Perhaps 
further mixed-methods research involving creative organizations in a number of 
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countries would present a fuller picture of how their employees negotiate the 
affordances of time, space, money, technology and materials, social networks, and 
representation. 
 Alternatively, research could be conducted with amateur makers working in a 
single medium, perhaps with participants of a narrower age group than those in the 
present project. Such an approach would provide a closer focus of the ramifications of 
specific techno-material affordances, or the permutations of making that come from 
the accumulation of knowledge over time. Furthermore, a similar project could be 
attempted with high school and university students to assess the fitness of the 
Affordances-in-Agency model with everyday creators who lack experience of the 
makers in this project.   
 
Reflexive Points 
Participants devoted hours crocheting, sewing, making videos, and painting—
among other things—in the service of this project, in addition to the hours they spent 
talking about how and why they make. What, then, is the key insight of their efforts? 
Simply put, there is not a moment when creative identity is born. It is an ongoing 
process, and for people who create, life is filled with such moments. 
Consider that participants in this project all professed to having creative 
identities, and tested well on an instrument aimed at assessing the strength of those 
identities. While many of them could remember making things in childhood—
including card-maker P27, who had sketchbooks she drew in as a toddler—none could 
precisely identify when they first felt the mix of astonishment and satisfaction of 
realizing they had brought something new into being. No one could quite put a finger 
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on the initial time they thought, as Gauntlett put it, “Here I am” and “I made this” 
(2014, para. 7).  
As it turned out, that mattered less than the fact that they could say, “Here I 
am” and “I made this” the day or the week before we spoke. Indeed, they often 
expressively told of how making had given them a sense of self, and fondly detailed 
the wonder of the elements of a dance they were learning (P36) or the ingredients they 
used in dinner (P22). Each time they approached the studio or the kitchen was not just 
one more try at making some new way to move or something else to eat; it was another 
chance at confirming to themselves and the world that material culture was their 
culture.  
The way forward in many instances was incremental; regard the many 
Saturdays that P3 spent working on his spreadsheets, or the weekends P23 whiled 
away with his son in the boat shop. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect was that their 
creative identities were enhanced with even small steps. 
Small steps or large, making was important to them because of its potential to 
bring joy to themselves as well as to the others in their lives. In negotiating their 
affordances, these participants found pleasure in devising things for and with others, as 
well as saving money or time, or finding a space of their own to create in. They also 
felt the delight of engaging with tools and materials they loved and the comfort of 
bringing into being something they had only before seen in their imaginations. 
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 1, I wondered about the foundations of creative identity. Diving 
deep into that topic has been a challenge I have borne from the time that I first began 
writing this thesis. This conclusion weighs how well it met that challenge, and in so 
doing, satisfied the requisite demands of any serious academic undertaking. 
My mixed-methods research queried everyday creators in the US and UK about 
how their making contributed to their creative identities. The topic was novel because 
creativity research, as discussed in Chapter 2, has historically favored querying 
eminent creators over those who are less renowned. In addition, affordance theory—a 
key component of the theoretical approach of this project—is a relative newcomer to 
the field of creativity research and has only just begun to be tied to creative identity. 
Further, my project yielded a new construct, the affordances-in-agency model which 
attempts to identify how cycles of agency and action inform an individual’s creative 
identity.    
The research method I inaugurated with this project, craft elicitation, is detailed 
in Chapter 4. The method was innovative in that it asked each participant to make 
something in her or his métier, think about when she or he first felt creative doing so, 
and then participate in a one-on-one interview and online questionnaire. It went 
beyond projects that looked at a single mode of making (e.g., Glăveanu, 2012), those 
that asked participants to construct metaphors of their identities (Gauntlett, 2007), and 
those that simply asked people to think about their creativity without making anything 
(Pachucki et al., 2010) 
My thesis posed three research questions: How do the internal and external 
affordances to creativity influence an individual maker’s evolution toward seeing him 
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or herself as a creative actor? How do people identify and perceive these affordances? 
How does assuming a creative identity change a person’s life?  
The answers are explored in depth in Chapters 6 and 7. Briefly, in response to 
the first question, I discovered that affordance theory offered a potent way of 
envisioning how the supports and barriers for creativity operated in participants’ lives. 
By confronting the affordances of time, space, money, tools and materials, social 
networks, and representation in making things, the participants also made and remade 
their creative identities.  
Regarding the second question, participants volubly described how they 
perceived affordances, and were fluent in detailing the ways they worked within and 
through affordances. I came to understand that while their narratives were different, 
they all managed to find various openings in their affordances for the action that is 
essential to creative identity.  
As for how being creative changed their lives, participants frequently offered 
accounts of how being creative was central to their identities. One went so far as to say 
that being creative was tantamount to being human, which underscored for me why 
this research matters.  
These findings add to the literature of creativity study with original 
contributions to knowledge. As noted in the previous chapter, this thesis apparently is 
among the first mixed-methods examination of Moeran’s (2014) theory of circuits of 
creative affordance. Another contribution is that it complemented the qualitative Short 
Scale of the Creative Self (Karwowski, 2012; Karwowski et al., 2012; in press) with 
mixed-methods research. The chief implications of this new knowledge, discussed at 
length in the previous chapter, give a greater credence to the power of agency in 
helping forge creative identities.  
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As a result of my project, further research could take several directions: It 
could be carried out with professionals or with people who make one kind of thing. It 
would also be useful to see how circuits of affordances operate within the 
improvisation that takes place between students and teachers, both in secondary and 
higher education. 
Most importantly, perhaps, the work points the way for new studies that could, 
as Amabile (2017) proposes, shed light on the internal and external practices of these 
makers in order to better understand how everyday creators think, work, and burnish 
their identities. Making things, of course, is the proving ground for that personal 
transformation. 
 Participants in the present research were unanimous: When making works, the 
experience is very good. Yet they were equally clear that even when it goes awry—the 
print out of register, the fly too obvious, the chord too dissonant—the action inherent 
in making still manages to imbue the maker with a sense of her or his own humanity.  
That feeling is why a creative person heeds the urge of agency and bothers to 
tangle with affordances in the first place. One makes to feel creative again and again: I 
make, therefore, I am.   
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APPENDIX A 
Creative Identity Questionnaire 
Adapted from Karwowski, Lebuda, & Wiśniewska, (2012, in press) 
Directions: The statements below describe various feelings people have about how 
they experience creativity. For each one, indicate the extent to which you feel the 
statement describes you by clicking on the appropriate dot. The response scale ranges 
from “Definitely not” to “Definitely yes.” There are no right or wrong answers, only 
your opinions.  
 
Definitely not              Definitely yes 
1. I think I am a creative person. 
○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
2.  My creativity is important to who I am. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      3.  I know I can efficiently solve even complicated problems. 
       ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      4.  I trust my creative abilities. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      5.  Compared to my friends, I am not distinguished by my imagination. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      6.  Many times I have proven that I can cope with difficult situations. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      7.  Being a creative person is important to me. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      8.  I am not sure I can deal with problems requiring creative thinking.  
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
      9.  I am good at proposing original solutions to problems. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
     10.  Creativity is an important part of myself. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
     11.  Ingenuity is a characteristic which is important to me. 
      ○                            ○                           ○                           ○                                    ○ 
     12.  What is your gender? 
     ○   Female 
     ○   Male 
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   13.  What is your age? 
     ○   18-29 
     ○   30-54 
     ○   55+ 
    14.  In what country do you currently reside? 
     ○   US 
     ○   UK 
   15.  Which of the following categories describes your employment status? 
     ○   Employed, working full time 
     ○   Employed, working part time 
     ○   Not employed, looking for work 
     ○   Not employed, NOT looking for work 
     ○   Retired 
     ○   Disabled, not able to work 
   16. In your country’s currency, how much TOTAL combined money did all 
members of your HOUSEHOLD earn last year?  
     ○   0-9,999 
     ○   10,000-24,999 
     ○   25,000-49,999 
     ○   50,000-74,999 
     ○   75,000-99,999 
     ○   100,000-124,999 
     ○   125,000-149,999 
     ○   150,000-174,999 
     ○   175,000-199,999 
     ○   200,000 and up 
     ○   Prefer not to answer 
    17. Name (optional):  
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APPENDIX B 
Participant Email 
[Date] 
 
Dear [Participant]: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study about creative people and the 
contexts they operate in.  This letter outlines more about the project and your role in 
it.  
 
What I’m interested in: I want to talk to people who feel creative in a particular 
pursuit and find out what helped (affordances, in the language of social science) or 
held them back (barriers) when they were on their way to becoming creative.  
 
What you can do: Within the next six weeks, you should make something in your 
medium. While you are making the item, it would be great if you could think about 
what it took for you to feel creative as a person working in that medium. By the way, 
it doesn’t have to be a whole piece—if your piece is labor-intensive, you might, for 
instance, complete a portion or even a sample. The main thing is that you make 
something and think about when you first felt creative. 
 
The reason I’m asking you to make something is that making in itself is a meditation—
you will think about your answer while you make your piece. Research indicates that 
the making process is a way of helping you arrive at a more accurate answer to the 
questions than if I just asked you to answer off the top of your head.  
 
Next, I would like you take a quick photo of whatever you’re working on and email it 
to me, just so I have a record. A smartphone or digital image is great. 
 
Then I would like you to think about the constraints and encouragements that you 
had to negotiate before you became creative with what you just made. While you 
don’t have to follow this list point by point, some things you might want to think 
about could include: 
 
*Materials and techniques 
*Space 
*Time 
*How things look and feel 
*Money 
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*People in your social/family/regional circles 
 
For instance, when you first started [medium], how did you learn about it? Who, if 
anybody, taught you how? What kind of materials? Where did/do you [make item]? 
How long do you spend doing it a day/week/month? How long have you been 
working in the medium? Did making things seem to take longer when you were first 
learning? How did the way your creations look change over the course of your 
experience? Were you able to spend more money on materials, instruction, or 
equipment when you became more experienced? And how did the people around 
you influence that acquisition of creativity? Who encouraged you? Who thought you 
should try something else? 
 
You may find that these points are related. If you do, it would be great to know how 
you think so. 
 
What I’m after: I am looking for the story of your creativity, and how you came to 
think of yourself as a creative [pursuit]. To do that, you and I can talk in six weeks at 
[date]. I’ll take notes and record our talk. It would be best if we can talk in person in 
the place where you made your object. If that’s not possible, we can talk by Skype or 
phone, or we can email—whatever works for you. 
 
And at some point between now and our interview, I’d also like you to take a short 
online survey, the Creative Identity Questionnaire. The URL for the questionnaire is: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CreativeIdentity 
 
Some other things you should know: You are free to decline being involved in this 
study. There is no financial compensation for taking part.  
 
The study offers little inherent risk to you beyond those in everyday life. Beyond the 
time spent on making and photographing your item, participating in the interview, 
and completing the questionnaire, the risks are minimal. 
 
I will maintain your confidentiality by storing our interview and your photo on 
password-protected computers and backing that up with password-protected secure 
cloud-based storage.  The personal details of your interview—such as your 
hometown or the names of people you mention—will be made anonymous. All 
interviews, transcripts, photos, and assessments will remain under password 
protection in my files for a minimum of three years.  
 
I will share information with you about the study as it develops.  I plan for this project 
to be published in a series of written academic reports. I will also document the study 
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in a blog, “X Makes Y,” which highlights your and other participants’ anonymized 
narratives and the images of your objects. You and the other people in the study will 
be the audience for the blog, as well as other creativity researchers and makers.  
 
That’s it! Let me know if you have any questions or comments about this process. I 
am so looking forward to hearing your story. Thank you for agreeing to share it. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Mary Kay Culpepper, MSc 
Doctoral Researcher 
Westminster School of Media, Arts and Design 
University of Westminster, UK 
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APPENDIX C 
Anonymized Interview Log 
 
P# Country Sex 
Age 
Range 
Interview 
Date Locale 
Length/ 
mins Mode 
 
Pursuit 
 
1 US F 55+ 4-Jan-16 Home 65 Person Knitting 
2 US M 55+ 22-Jan-16 Studio 55 Skype Fly tying 
3 US M 55+ 8-Aug-16 Coffeeshop 17 Person Spreadsheets 
4 US F 40s 4-May-16 Home 47 Person Sashiko  
5 UK F 20s 17-May-16 School 53 Person Oil painting 
6 UK F 55+ 27-May-16 Studio 69 Person Crochet 
7 UK F 20s 5-Jun-16 Home 33 Person Costumes 
8 UK M 20s 5-Jun-16 Home 63 Person Drones 
9 UK F 30s 8-Jun-16 Coffeeshop 47 Person Printmaking 
10 UK F 55+ 13-Jun-16 Coffeeshop 51 Person Embroidery 
11 UK M 30s 14-Jun-16 Bar 69 Person Pop art 
12 UK M 30s 20-Jun-16 Restaurant 32 Person Poetry 
13 UK M 20s 22-Jun-16 School 32 Person Videography 
14 UK F 30s 1-Jul-16 Coffeeshop 49 Person Dressing 
15 UK F 30s 4-Jul-16 Coffeeshop 75 Person Jewelry making 
16 UK M 20s 4-Jul-16 Restaurant 81 Person Songwriting 
17 US W 40s 12-Aug-16 Studio 88 Person Flower paintings 
18 US F 55+ 13-Aug-16 Home 30 Person Crazy quilting 
19 UK M 20s 17-Aug-16 Home  14 Skype Movie making 
20 US M 30s 19-Aug-16 Home 43 Phone Turkey calls  
21 US M 55+ 19-Aug-16 Home 59 Phone Landscapes 
22 US F 55+ 23-Aug-16 Restaurant 32 Person Making dinner 
23 US M 55+ 29-Aug-16 Studio 27 Phone Boat making 
24 UK M 40s 2-Sep-16 Home 36 Skype Playing with son 
25 US F 20s 4-Sep-16 Coffeeshop 34 Person Cupcakes 
26 US M 55+ 5-Sep-16 Home 54 Phone One-liners 
27 US F 40s 6-Sep-16 Home 43 Phone Cards 
28 US F 55+ 8-Sep-16 Studio 42 Person Handbags 
29 US F 40s 8-Sep-16 Studio 44 Person Photos 
30 US F 30s 8-Sep-16 Studio 27 Person Pottery 
31 US F 20s 9-Sep-16 Home 34 Phone Journaling 
32 US M 20s 9-Sep-16 Car 36 Phone Pocket squares 
33 US M 30s 10-Sep-16 Home 36 Hangouts Origami 
34 US F 30s 11-Sep-16 Home 31 Hangouts Machine quilting 
35 US F 40s 19-Sep-16 Home 34 Skype Cartooning 
36 UK F 30s 24-Sep-16 Home 44 Skype Modern dance 
37 UK M 40s 24-Sep-16 Home 40 Skype Family bandleader 
38 UK F 30s 5-Oct-16 Restaurant 29 Person Drawing 
39 UK F 20s 6-Oct-16 Home 44 Person Baking 
40 UK F 40s 18-Oct-16 Home 44 Person Novel writing 
41 UK F 55+ 20-Oct-16 Restaurant 22 Person Playing piano 
42 UK F 20s 5-Nov-16 Home 35 Person Mimicry 
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